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Operating under rapidly changing conditions, organizations face various challenges that can damage 
core competencies and collaborative partnerships that have been developed for normal operations. To 
address these challenges, organizations need to learn from previous events, develop relevant 
strategies, and seek to evolve in resilient ways. The critical task in designing adaptive systems is to 
determine the bases for the effective organizational adaptation. This study seeks to explore evidence 
of organizational learning, identify the most critical factors that facilitate organizational adaptation, 
develop strategies for change, and assess the effects of these strategies on the performance and 
evolution of the system. To achieve these purposes, this study applies a mixed approach of 
qualitative and quantitative methods including content analysis of newspaper articles and situation 
reports, social network analysis, and agent-based computational simulation.  
To explore processes of organizational learning, I conducted a comparative analysis of two 
hurricane response systems; Hurricane Katrina, 2005 and Hurricane Gustav, 2008. This analysis 
documented gaps in the performance of the two systems. The organizations in the Hurricane Katrina 
response systems suffered from a lack of personnel, plans, and equipment for the effective 
communication. Accordingly, they were unable to create a common knowledge base of operations 
and failed to allocate resources as requested. Evidence from organizational analysis documents that 
organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system learned from the experiences of Hurricane 
Katrina and upgraded their performance in response operations in various ways. They invested 
significant resources and effort to improve organizational capacity in communication and 
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strengthened their collaboration links with expected and spontaneous partners from public, private, 
and non-profit sectors.   
Based on findings from this analysis, I offer a set of policy implications for guiding effective 
organizational adaptation to changing conditions. First, organizations need to collaborate under 
strong leadership to develop trust that is critical to effective coordination and collaboration. To make 
effective use of established mutual trust, adaptive systems need to address the problem of turnover in 
major positions of organizations. Second, while organizations in the system work on the 
institutionalization of joint operations for the development of mutual trust among agencies, they also 
need to develop policies to retain experienced core personnel for effective collaboration with partners. 
Third, operations need to integrate advanced information technologies into their operations to support 
effective communication, knowledge management, and diffusion of organizational learning. 
Combined with the cultivation of experienced personnel, the integration of advanced information 
technology into disaster mitigation and response represents the construction of a socio-technical 
system. To build a socio-technical system for organizational adaptation, organizations need to focus 
on the technical design of advanced communication equipment and data management tools that 
facilitate the processing, transmitting, storing, and extracting of critical information both for 
enhanced performance and organizational learning. Further, they need to focus on the organizational 
training and education of strategic learning to develop more experienced and collaborative personnel.  
Based on accumulated experience and memory of collaboration, enhanced capacities, and 
reinforced partnerships, organizations in an adaptive system can achieve a creative mental leap to a 
new practice of action. Findings from this study document that organizations can successfully 
address challenges from rapidly changing conditions and eventually, evolve in a resilient form of 
adaptation.  
.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1.0  THE ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION TO CHANGING CONDITIONS 
Organizational adaptation to rapidly changing conditions has long been a major topic in 
organizational studies. This study, in an effort to address the issue of organizational adaptation, 
deals with the situation in which organizations face harsh challenges from complex and uncertain 
conditions. Under rapidly changing conditions, organizations‘ core competencies for accurate 
decision makings can be lowered (Comfort, 1999) and links for collaboration and coordination 
become vulnerable to the outer impacts to the system (Isbell & Goldstein, 2006). When facing 
these limitations, organizations need to analyze their strengths and weaknesses, explore the 
critical factors that facilitate adaptation, and develop strategies to make use of learning from 
previous events, and finally, align them with changing factors in their operating environment 
(Bryson, 1988) to make them more adaptive to changing conditions. 
For the achievement of an effective adaptation to changing conditions, I address the 
following critical question, how to make organizations develop and maintain an appropriate level 
of capacities and collaborative partnerships. To address this question, I focus on the learning 
aspects of organizations (Carley & Harrald, 1997) through which, organizations can engage in an 
iterative cycle of assessing core competencies, searching for the possible policy alternatives, 
applying them to the cases of changing conditions, and setting new standards for management. 
With the completion of this learning cycle, organizations can evolve over time in a more 
effective way in their adaptation to rapidly changing conditions.  
 2 
1.1 CHALLENGES IN RAPIDLY CHANGING CONDITIONS AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
In changing circumstances, organizations are forced to operate with previously inexperienced 
speed, cost, and intensity (Comfort, 1999); accordingly, they face various types of unexpected 
challenges that are difficult to address. Especially when organizations are forced to adapt to 
complex and uncertain conditions, they find that their established core competencies and 
collaborative partnerships designed for normal operations do not work properly, and their 
performance in response to crises can be seriously lowered. Then, what types of challenges do 
organizations face and need to address for the achievement of effective adaptation? This study 
sorted various challenges into the following four major categories. 
The first challenge is the fragility of the pre-established linear model. In a traditional 
linear model, the relationship between cause and effect is smooth and proportionate (Rogers et al, 
2001), especially when the linear model was designed for hierarchical structures. But 
organizations performing under complex and uncertain conditions face unexpected situations in 
which the pre-defined linear model affects the separate groups differently (Comfort, 1999; 
Ashmos et al, 2000; Urry, 2003) and if these differences are iterated over time, it is no longer 
certain that a given act can always produce a specific outcome. As a result, any pre-defined 
causation between solutions and outcomes is no longer able to work and there is a lack of 
proportionality between inputs and outputs. This situation can cause a severe problem of 
mismatches between established rules/procedures and demands for action. When organizations 
are forced to operate in this situation, they do not know what actions to take because any 
measure can ensure expected results and push them in chaotic conditions.  
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This challenge to the Newtonian paradigm of determinism can be supported by an 
example of the Mississippi river floods in the summer of 1993 (Kiel, 1995). For several decades 
prior to flooding in 1993, the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) built a series of levees to protect 
many river front communities. These levees, however, led to unexpected changes in the course 
of the Mississippi in many areas and eventually exacerbated downstream flooding that inundated 
many riverfront communities (Burton and Gibson, 1993). The seemingly simple decisions or 
solutions to aid individual communities with levees led to a tangled web of cause and effect that, 
over time, had disastrous results many years later in other communities. This case shows how 
limited ability to predict all of the interactions and outcomes in a complex and nonlinear 
situation can cause a failure of pre-defined linear model. 
The next challenge that organizations can face is the breakdown of collaboration links 
that are critical for integrated responses to changing conditions. Under complex and uncertain 
conditions, collaboration links in networked governance can become vulnerable to unexpected 
outer impacts and this might cause isolation of organizations from the other part of the system, 
leading to the break of the entire collaborative system (Siebert, 1995). More importantly, this 
problem of organizational isolation can block the proper channel of information. Without getting 
critical information in a timely manner, isolated core agencies cannot conduct an accurate 
assessment for the actual situation and accordingly, they can fail in employing proper operation 
strategies in their adaptations to changing conditions.  
The case of 9/11 terrorist attack exemplifies how the isolation of core organizations from 
the main body of collaboration can cause the further damage to the entire system. According to 
9/11 Commission staff statement No.17 (2004), there were critical communications failures at 
the federal level during and after the 9/11 attacks, and one of the most serious problems occurred 
 4 
in an "Air Threat Conference Call" initiated by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) 
after two planes had crashed into the World Trade Center. But, according to this report, because 
the participants were unable to include the Federal Aviation Administration‘s (FAA) air traffic 
control command center, which had the most critical information about the hijackings, they 
failed in getting accurate information for action. Even though the highest level Defense 
Department officials relied on the NMCC‘s Air Threat Conference, the FAA did not join the call 
for the first 15 minutes because FAA‘s representatives had no access to decision makers, and had 
none of the information available to senior FAA officials by that time. The result was, shortly 
after the conference call, Pentagon was hit by the third airplane. As this case implies, the 
isolation of core organizations can cause severe breakdown of information sharing channels, and 
this can lead the failure of entire system in its adaptation to changing conditions.  
When a pre-defined linear model does not work and the established collaboration links 
are disconnected, organizations try to create dense coordination and collaboration partnerships, 
but another challenge is that this increased demand for collaboration does not always guarantee 
effective joint operations. The increased demands can impose extraordinary burdens to core 
organizations (Comfort et al, 2007) and make their cognitive capacity and resources depleted in a 
short time. To address the problem of the lack of organizational capacity and resources, 
organizations may seek to secure additional resources from outer sources, but, under complex 
and uncertain conditions, they may fail in tapping resources from other sources. Moreover, this 
situation can be worsened in a bureaucratic culture because managers, operating under a rigid 
command and control structure, narrow work descriptions, and inward looking perspectives, tend 
not to foster collaborative culture necessary for addressing problems and transcending 
organizational boundaries (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004).   
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The Northeast Blackout of 2003 shows clearly how overloaded demands in a part can 
cause the entire collapse of the system (NYISO, 2004). Theoretically, the increased demand load 
on any power grid must be matched by the boosted supply and its ability to transmit that power, 
but when there was an overload of a power line, it caused hard-to-repair and costly damage to the 
entire power grid. The major problem was when power lines carried more power than designed, 
they got hotter and caused cascading failures that resulted ultimately in a forced shutdown of 
more than 100 power plants in the entire network. As this case implies, keeping an appropriate 
level of workload for organizations is also critical for the achievement of effective organizational 
adaptation to changing conditions. 
Increased demands for collaboration can cause another challenge to organizations due to 
the situation in which organizations are forced to have unplanned interactions with emerging 
organizations that differ in mission, size, and rule (Comfort, 2006). The challenge to 
organizations is that increased demands for collaboration with heterogeneous organizations can 
make the level of complexity become higher and the responsibility for operations unclear. To 
address this challenge, they need to develop new ways of coordination and collaboration to 
integrate efforts from all participating organizations and make them contribute to the 
achievement of shared goal of the system. But, due to the lack of experience and the absence of 
protocols, it is hard for organizations to develop those strategies for effective collaboration and 
coordination in a short time.  
Some examples of system failure due to the difficulties in coordinating distributed efforts 
can be found in water conflicts cases. Historically, there have been various litigations between 
local and state governments for securing right to use water from the Colorado River system (In 
1952, the State of Arizona and the State of California had a dispute over the extent of each 
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State‘s right to use water from Colorado River system). Similarly, the disputes among 27 cities 
in the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) show how individual and heterogeneous agencies in 
the system can easily vie rather collaborate for the same resources when it is not properly 
coordinated (Los Angeles Times, 2008).  
1.2 DESIGNING AN ADAPTIVE SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO RAPIDLY 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT  
To address previous challenges, organizations in the system need to develop appropriate 
management tools and strategies for building a resilient and reliable collaborative system. This 
concept of developing management tools for effective adaptation is closely related to Simon‘s 
term of ―artifact‖ in his book of ―The Sciences of the Artificial (1996).‖ According to Simon, 
organizations can design some modes of adaptation to create conditions in which they function 
better in a challenging environment. Even though organizations have limits in their capacity for 
adaptation, they can appropriately align their inner environment with their outer environment. 
And as a result of these efforts, organizations design an ‗artifact‘ which is composed of new 
programs for operation, structural reengineering, and reinforced resources and capacities that 
contribute to the effective alignment of the inner with the outer environments.  
In exploring an adaptive system, this study adopts the concept of ―design‖ and ―artifact‖ 
from Simon‘s argument. With these concepts, this study sees that organizational environments 
are subjects for design, and in this sense, ―design‖ can be defined and composed of various tasks 
that include developing programs/procedures, improving capacities, and renovating collaboration 
structures. So, in this study, the meaning of design is not limited to the structural changes itself. 
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Rather, it pursues the balance between structural flexibility and operational stability in designing 
a new system for adaptation, and it focuses on the improvement of the organizational core 
competencies in creating, processing, and transmitting critical information in the system.  
This study assumes that organizational adaptation is closely depends on determining the 
appropriate balance between structural stability and operational flexibility. To provide public 
services reliably under rapidly changing conditions, the administrative structure among the parts 
of the system need to be stable. At the same time, it should be sufficiently flexible to make the 
system resilient to outer impacts and let organizations function properly in response to 
environmental changes (Kauffman, 1993). But sometimes there is a tension between them in 
extreme situations. Too much focus on structural stability does not allow chances for flexibility 
and too much emphasis on flexibility cannot provide stability that is necessary for consistent 
operation.  
Then, why is the balance between stability and flexibility important for organizational 
adaptation? To answer this question, this study considers the concept of resilience (Peltokorpi, 
2008). Resilience is about how the collective action of multiple organizations can be properly 
coordinated to let the entire system go back to normal operation (ISDR, 2007) after perturbations 
from rapidly changing conditions. According to discussions on resilience, an adaptive system 
needs to have structural stability that is resistant to major impacts from the outer environment 
and, at the same time, operational flexibility so that they can create an innovative method of 
collaboration when any regular interactional structure is severely damaged or weakened.  
In addition to the balance between structural stability and operational flexibility, this 
study considers improvements in organizational capacities such as personnel, equipment and 
resources in designing an adaptive system to the changing environment. Especially, this study 
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deals with organizational capacities for effective communications because the problem of 
communication meltdown can cause severe delay in recognizing risk and, accordingly 
organizational reaction to crises. The problem of communication breakdown can further 
deteriorate when there is no pre-defined protocol for collaboration among those heterogeneous 
organizations. So, another meaning of design is the improvement of organizational capacities in 
addressing the challenges from communication system breakdown and the improvement of 
organizational capacities in collecting, processing, and transmitting accurate information to other 
organizations in a timely manner.  
1.3 RESEARCH PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY  
To address the question of organizational adaptation to rapidly changing conditions, this study 
conducts multi-faceted analyses to provide a knowledge base for the development of possible 
sets of policy alternatives to make organizations more adaptive to changing conditions. The 
purposes of multi-faceted analyses include a meticulous examination of current system‘s 
capacities and the complex features of surrounding environments, an identification of structural 
weaknesses and strengths of the system, an exploration of critical factors that facilitate effective 
organizational adaptation, and an assessment of effects of those factors when applied to the 
actual operations under complexity and uncertainty.  
To achieve those purposes, this study conducts comparative examinations of two systems 
that are structured through one-time or constant interactions among same set of organizations. 
The main advantage of this network comparison is that it can reveal whether there is evidence of 
organizational learning between two systems. If there is little evidence of organizational learning 
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between two systems, it is hard to expect an effective organizational adaptation and evolution 
either. Further, this study seeks to identify how accumulated and combined organizational 
learning can work as a major driving force for system-wide adaptation to changing conditions.  
The evidence of organizational learning provides the critical intervention point in 
collaboration structures and organizational capacities in adaptation because it reveals what 
factors are most critical in facilitating organizational collaboration and adaptation to changing 
conditions. Using those identified factors, this study checks how critical factors can be arranged 
together in developing strategies for intervention, and finally, in designing adaptive system, this 
study assesses the changes in the performance of entire adaptive system when any individual or 
combined strategic management tools are applied to the existing system. For the assessment of 
organizational performance with targeted strategies, this study develops a performance 
measurement metric that is composed of previously identified critical factors. The findings from 
this performance measurement and its evolution pattern can be used as the knowledge bases for 
the effective organizational adaptations. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY  
An issue of organizational adaptation to changing environment is critical issue for any system to 
survive in complex and uncertain conditions. If organizations have unsuitable resources, 
competencies, and collaboration partnership, they cannot respond properly to challenges from 
rapidly changing conditions and eventually these challenges can cause collapses of systems and 
lower the probability of organizational adaptation to changing conditions. 
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The problem is that imperative demands for creative adaptation under rapidly changing 
conditions can happen any time and any place. Specifically, considering recently increasing level 
of interdependency among organizations in various systems, the significance of study for 
organizational adaptation under crisis augments. For example, the sudden collapse of 
international financial system in 2008 showed how intricately interwoven network could be 
vulnerable to partial failures of the system and how the adverse impact could be enlarged and 
expanded to other core parts of the system.  
To provide an applicable knowledge base for organizations seeking to creatively adapt to 
changing conditions, this study tries to combine the factors of organizational capacity interaction 
structures for securing effective collaborations. Also, this study tries to integrate and create a link 
between an identification of core factors for organizational adaptation, a development of possible 
policy alternatives, and an assessment of its effect on actual organizational performance which 
currently has not been fully established. Accordingly, this study expects that the findings from 
analyses can be applied to other policy areas and help managers of core organizations in those 
systems to design and develop more relevant policy alternatives for building adaptive systems.  
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2.0  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
GUIDING RESILIENT AND STABLE SYSTEM EVOLUTION  
As organizational environments become more complex and uncertain, demands for effective 
organizational adaptation increase (Terreberry, 1968). In efforts to meet these increased demands, 
organizations develop strategies in various ways to improve stability and flexibility in their 
responses to crises. First, they change the collaboration structure to secure information sharing 
for effective decision making (Lawler et al, 1995), and they may invest resources to improve 
communication systems to create, process, and transfer critical information to partnering 
organizations (Argot et al, 2003). Also, organizations commit significant resources to human 
capital to improve capacities for creating and managing collective knowledge stock (Davenport, 
1999) required for the creative adaptation to changing conditions. 
To respond to increased demands for adaptation, organizations need to improve their 
adaptive capabilities for operating at multiple levels of organizational system (Kozlowski et al, 
2006, Comfort, 2007), and as Cyert and March (1963) argue, they need to acquire capacities and 
develop strategies for maintaining the balance between stability and flexibility. To achieve 
effective organizational adaptation, many perspectives proposed factors to be considered in 
building capacities for adaptation. Among them, Huber and March (1991) argue the importance 
of information processing and communication for effective organizational decision making 
(Simon, 1997). Also Fiol and Lyles (1985) view organizational adaptation as mainly depending 
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on memory that is developed and shared by past and present members of organization. Finally, 
some researchers such as Argyris (1999) and Mintzberg (1982) see organizational adaptation as a 
process of organizational change and evolution based on accumulated practices of adaptation 
(Brown et al, 1991).  
But the major problem of this diversity in determining critical factors for the achievement 
of effective organizational adaptation is that it can lead to so many differing interpretations 
(Ulrich et al, 1993) rather than synthesized conceptualization. Without integrated framework and 
the assessment of effects of individual or combined factors, it is hard to provide a set of policy 
alternatives that makes managers invest their limited resources in effective ways. In this sense, 
addressing extensive and multidisciplinary nature of literatures regarding organizational 
adaptation, this chapter develops an integrative framework that provides a theoretical foundation 
for this study. With this integrated framework, this study determines the primary factors that 
drive an effective organizational adaptation to changing conditions. Before forming an integrated 
framework, this chapter starts by highlighting Simon‘s arguments on science of design (1997) in 
which Simon mentioned that the science of design involves creating artificial systems to function 
in specific outer environments.  
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2.1 THE MEANING OF SCIENCE OF DESIGN AND ORGANIZATIOAL 
ADAPTATION TO COMPLEXITY 
2.1.1 Simon’s concept of designing artificial system for organizational adaptation  
Defining the meaning of designing an adaptive system, this study adopts Simon‘s (1996) 
arguments on the science of design. Simon argues that the fulfillment of organizational 
adaptation involves a relation among three terms: the purpose or goal of the system or artifact, 
the character of the artifact, and the environment in which the artifact performs. To Simon 
(1997), the external environment is a context in which humans function and have interaction, and 
an artifact is an interface for interactions between an inner environment (the substance and 
organization of the artifact itself) and an outer environment (the environment where the artifact 
performs). Simon‘s idea of aligning three terms: goal, artifact, and environment provide the basic 
meaning of design for this study. Especially, for the successful adaptation to changing conditions, 
Simon suggests that individuals (or individual organizations) should make a correct 
administrative decision (Simon, 1997) in selecting appropriate means to reach designated ends, 
thus, a creative adaptation to changing conditions. But, at the same time, according to Simon, 
decision making and human problem solving rejects the full rationality necessary for maximizing 
or selecting the best alternative from all available to individuals or organizations. Rather, an 
administrative decision making to address problems from complexity can be done with bounded 
rationality of the behavior of human beings who satisfice rather than maximize. This means that 
decision makers in organizations might face a situation in which they are forced to choose one 
alternative without examining all possible alternatives and without ascertaining that these are, in 
fact, all the alternatives. 
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For effective decision making, the problem originated from bounded rationality that 
could be worsened in complex conditions, especially when organizations fail at an alarming rate 
(Starbuck & Nystrom, 1981). To address the problem of bounded rationality in adapting to 
changing conditions, Simon counted effective communication systems as a key factor. 
According to Simon (1999), effective administrative decision making with proper information-
processing systems will permit organizations to absorb and extract the needed information 
selectively. So, for this, he suggested the use of advanced computing systems that help individual 
organizations to learn instantly and to transmit, store, and process knowledge and information. 
Thus, Simon argued that organizations can increase the capacity of problem solving through 
information technology and the preparation of knowledge bases for common operation (Comfort, 
2006).  
In addition to the emphasis on communication and information processes for precise 
decision making, Simon suggests the restructuring of organizational interaction structure and the 
underlying cognitive processes at a corresponding pace for facilitating organizational learning 
and innovation for adaptation. About this, Simon (2002) suggested an incorporation of ―near 
decomposability‖ in designing an interaction structure. The key concept of nearly decomposable 
systems is in the coordination and communication efforts that align individual organizations‘ 
activities to the shared goal of entire system. Organizations operating in this kind of system 
balance the gains from coordination against its costs while retaining hierarchy. With this balance, 
they determine the level of interdependency that will benefit from coordination, and then 
minimize the amount of coordination in a way requiring much less interaction between subunits. 
Simon‘s concept of near decomposability has been tacitly adopted as a central concept in the 
present national disaster response plans, the National Response Framework.  
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2.1.2 Reduction in the level of entropy 
As Simon suggested, by reinforcing organizational capacity for decision making and renovating 
collaboration structure, organizations may address problems from environmental complexity and 
uncertainty. Regarding this issue, systems theory (General Systems Theory, GST; Bertalanffy, 
1968) focuses on the achievement of negative entropy in the system through openness and 
feedback (Senge, 1990; Zheng, 2003). According to these authors, organizations in the system 
should continuously deal with entropy both from circumstances and from the inner interactions 
because, if not controlled, entropy in the system will decrease the system‘s overall energy and 
prevent creative adaptation to changing conditions. As a method for decreasing the level of 
entropy in the system, Simon (1996) once more suggests the use of effective communication 
systems. According to him, if information cannot be processed or transmitted properly, mere 
increase in frequencies of communication could result in increased entropy in the system 
(Shannon, 1948). Usually, outside influences of crisis may diminish the integrity of the 
communication and, possibly, distort the message for the receiver in the system. In this sense, 
entropy in information sharing may occur in instances in which incomplete or blurred messages 
are transmitted to other agencies and the quality of information deteriorates easily through 
several steps of information transmission (Mitchell, 2003). Further, when information is 
transmitted, some organizations may not know the value of that information (Shannon, 1948).  
Therefore, the level of entropy in a complex adaptive system needs to be reduced through 
more advanced coordination mechanisms with a reliable communication system to reduce noise 
in information transmission and to help organizations avoid the dispersal of efforts (Prokopenko 
& Wang, 2003). Facilitated by advanced technologies of communication, the reduction of 
entropy will allow organizations to coordinate their responses. This organizational effort to 
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balance between entropy and negentropy has a direct relationship with a system‘s evolution over 
time because, for that balance, organizations continually interact with complex conditions. These 
interactions affect the possible evolution of the system either toward a higher resilience or the 
system's collapse (Ludovico, 1988). In this sense, the level of entropy in the system is the force 
that affects effective organizational behavior and leads to a steady and predictable state of system 
evolution with resilience and stability.  
2.1.3 Auto adaptive systems and complex adaptive systems (CAS) perspective    
To analyze organizational efforts to address problems of complexity, complex adaptive systems 
theory (CAS) sees networked governance as an independent unit of analysis. Networked 
governance addresses how to mobilize the entire system‘s overall capacities, and how to 
reengineer its structure to make it effectively adapt to a changing environment. Axelrod and 
Cohen‘s concept of harnessing complexity (1990) suggests that organizations need to deal with 
complexity through designing effective interactions between organizations or mechanisms for 
interoperability. According to Axelrod and Cohen, organizational interactions and efforts impact 
not only the outcome of activities, but also influence the probabilities of later events. So they 
suggest that, rather than eliminating complexity, organizations should harness this complexity by 
taking advantage of variation that can foster successful changes.  
Axelrod and Cohen‘s argument relates to the main assumption of this study; 
organizations in an adaptive system can manipulate conditions for successful adaptation and they 
can support those conditions that are most viable to the successful adaptation of the system. 
Further, discussions regarding complex adaptive systems suggest that managers of organizations 
need to design strategies for actions that make adaptive mechanisms more efficient and effective 
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under complexity. Regarding the possibility of building adaptive systems with strategic designs, 
Comfort (1999) identifies four distinct steps of adaptation to complexity: non-adaptive, emergent 
adaptive, operative adaptive and auto-adaptive systems. These four steps show a process of 
transition to self-organization in which organizations have high flexibility, adaptive technical 
structure, and high cultural openness. According to Comfort, due to its self-organizing elements, 
an auto-adaptive system is the most effective in managing complexity. In the following sections, 
this study discusses strategic designs of organizations‘ capacities and interaction structures for 
achieving an auto-adaptive system. 
2.2 DESIGNING EFFECTIVE INTERACTION STRUCTURE 
Under complex conditions, the traditional organizational boundary between public and other 
sectors has become blurred (Stoker, 1998). Especially, during the actual response to crisis, public 
organizations face exceptionally higher needs for inter-jurisdictional and inter-sectoral 
coordination and collaboration. In addition, factors such as circumstantial ambiguity and 
complexity require the transformation of interorganizational relationships into broader, but 
loosely coupled forms (Orton &Weick, 1990). Thus, a new structural design for building a 
complex adaptive system needs to be based on network perspectives rather than the traditional 
command and control approach that is limited to intergovernmental relationships. The reason for 
considering interconnectedness in designing effective interaction structure is that, as Watts 
(2003) argues, the embeddedness of organizations in networked system (Granovetter, 1985) 
influences the pattern of sharing information and resources.  
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According to Watts, policy makers can use networks as an ‗instrument of a social action‘ 
to influence group behavior in addressing challenges from complexity. Within networks, 
organizations form structures as lasting patterns of interactions, and these patterns determine, 
limit, or improve interactions among participants. Also, as Nohria and Eccles (1992) argue, 
defining structural characteristics makes possible an analysis of how the structural characteristics 
affect organizational performance. Combining the concepts from Watts and Nohria & Eccles, the 
basic idea of designing structure in this study is that it explores the structural effects on 
organizational performances in adaptations to changing conditions. In this context, this study 
aims to unravel the ―web of organizations‖ or other complex sets of relationships, and tries to 
design relational structures to improve the performance of the system in information and 
resource sharing. With an application of social network analysis, this study offers a mean of 
measuring social relationships more rigorously, and develops a systematic characterization of 
complex structures (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
2.2.1 Self-organization and organizational adaptation 
Organizations in a complex adaptive system have dynamic interactions with other organizations 
and the environment to increase its possibility for survival. But when any standard operational 
procedures and collaboration protocols do not function as planned, the theory of self-
organization suggests that agencies need to adapt to this unexpected crisis through creating 
unplanned interactions. Thus, the creation of new operational procedures and new collaborative 
partnerships allows the system to adapt to changing environments more effectively. According to 
Kauffman (1995), self-organization is a process in which various components in a system 
interact independently but still exhibit a spontaneous emergence of order and system structure 
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that is not pressured or guided by exogenous forces outside of the system. This system with self-
organization is characterized by positive/negative feedback, balance of exploitation and 
exploration (March, 1991), and creative adaptive interactions among organizations. 
In the processes of self-organization, systems can be stable and respond effectively to 
demands to adapt to changing conditions. But the policy problem to be addressed is how to 
complement the official structure with self-organized sets of relationships. About the alignment 
two different interactions, Laughlin (2005) suggested a differentiation between weak emergence 
and strong emergence in self-organization. According to him, weak emergence means new 
properties arise in systems as a result of interactions at an elemental level. If, on the other hand, 
systems have qualities not directly traceable to its components after the iteration of such 
relationships, these new qualities are irreducible to the system's constituent parts and constitute 
strong emergence (Corning, 2002)
1
. Like this, emergent structures are patterns not created by a 
single event or rule, rather, the interaction of each component with its immediate surroundings 
causes a complex chain of processes leading to some order.  
The implication of Laughlin‘s argument for the design of effective collaboration structure 
is the potential benefit of exploring the evidence of weak emergence of self-organizing patterns 
and formalizing them in the design of new interaction structures. The value of self-organization 
in this study is that it gives rise to a decentralized, distributed, but still self-healing system which 
functions more effectively than hierarchy under changing conditions. In self organization, the 
network as a whole exhibits a distinctive synergistic behavior through the combination of 
behaviors of individual actors in the network. The process is guided by a common goal shared by 
all participants in the network. Also, self-organization is vital to this study because it deals with 
                                                   
1 Corning (2002) insisted that this structure may be co-determined by the context and the interactions with its 
environments. 
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the structural flexibility among organizations. The flexibility in interaction can bring a resilient 
characteristic to adaptive systems, but at the same time, as Simon suggested in his concept of 
nearly decomposable systems (2002), these individual efforts for self organization need to be 
coordinated by some set of pre-defined interaction protocols or structures. In this sense, 
managing the balance between flexibility and stability becomes important in designing a new 
collaboration structure. The formalization of weak emergence of self-organizing interactions 
with the structure of hierarchical coordination, or the balance between man-made and grown-
order will be the major direction in designing new collaboration structures.  
Regarding the relationship between self-organization and regular coordination protocols, 
Hayek (1973) argues that a difference between ‗made-order‘ and ‗grown-order‘ needs to be 
balanced. The made-order is a pre-defined relationship governing interaction and grown-order is 
related to the emergence of new interaction structure that is discussed in the self-organization. 
Hayek (1973) states that this made-order is the most important social structure, including the 
laws (nomos) governing the relations among individual entities. Accepting Popper‘s idea (1945), 
he criticizes the practice of admitting the current state as made-order while emphasizing the 
importance of grown order in the system. The balance between made-order and grown-order is 
important in designing an effective interaction structure because, when any pre-defined or 
planned interaction structure cannot function in conditions of complexity and uncertainty, a 
possible grown-order will be necessary to replace or complement the made but inflexible order 
and to facilitate system‘s adaptation. In this sense, the importance of self-organization comes 
from unplanned interaction among organizations.  
Once established, a contractual relationship is quite rigid and inflexible and a breach of 
contract implies severe penalties in most cases, but the benefit of a contract-based model (made-
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order) is that it facilitates organizational planning and the development of robust organizational 
structure that does not easily collapse under external impact. Also a participatory-model (grown-
order, self-organization) lessens the rigidity and inflexibility of the system by building resilience 
into the system. The importance of self-organization and its alignment with planned structure 
becomes more important under crisis. To respond to uncertain conditions, organizations in 
adaptive systems need to create collaborative relationships with unplanned or unexpected 
organizations that differ in mission, size, capacity, and historical path of evolution. If activities of 
these heterogeneous organizations can be coordinated effectively, their dynamic interactions will 
produce more appropriate structures for collaboration as the system evolves over time. Thus, the 
issue of adaptation, self-organization, and system evolution are important points to consider in 
building an effective collaboration structure. 
2.2.2 Hybrid use of network and hierarchy  
The relationship between grown-order and made-order is not always clear and thus, the question 
arises how to make these structures complementary to one another. Many times, there is a 
tension between the two types of organizational structure (Davies, 2005) because, if self-
organization leads to an unauthorized effort for adaptation, it could be instantly punished by a 
strict rule of bureaucracy. In addition to bureaucratic inertia or rigidity, a collective action 
problem (Ostrom, 1990; Olson, 1971) can also lead to competition among organizations rather 
than collaboration. This rigidity of bureaucracy and collective action problem requires a well-
designed coordination system for improved performance and adaptation. Facing rapid change, 
traditional solutions through bureaucracy rarely function well because bureaucratic procedures 
that operate under command and control, narrow work restrictions, and inward looking cultures 
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are not effective in addressing problems that transcend organizational boundaries (Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004). To make both approaches complementary to each other, Moore (1997), and 
Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) suggest the web of multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral 
interactions that can manage complex, interdependent relationships. They argue that this web of 
various interactions can encourage collaboration. 
Traditionally, organizations built massive, hierarchical structures to gather, process, 
certify, and store all information necessary for effective response to their environments. But as 
Coase (1960) observed, if there is more partnership and more collaboration among organizations, 
the process of information management increasingly becomes more cost efficient. Also, with the 
advance of information technology, the cost of information processing has meaningfully 
decreased. With advanced information technology and close collaborative partnerships, 
organizations can easily share data and integrate their business processes with external partners 
in real time. In this sense, organizations with advanced information technology strongly favor 
networked organizational forms over the traditional hierarchies. Table 2-1 compares the key 
organizational features of market, hierarchy, and network and how the network, as a hybrid form 
of market and hierarchy, can lead to the balance between stability and flexibility.  
Table 2-1 Comparison of Two Perspectives, Hierarchy and Market vs. Network 
Key Features Market Network Hierarchy 
Means of Communication Prices Relational Routines 
Methods of Conflict 
Resolution 
Haggling -Resort to courts 
for enforcement 
Norm of Reciprocity – 
Reputational Concerns 
Administrative fiat – 
Supervision 
Degree of Flexibility High Medium Low 
Amount of Commitment 
among the parties 
Low Medium to High Medium to High 
Tone or Climate Precision and/or Suspicion Open-Ended, Mutual 
Benefits 
Dependent 
Actors Preferences of 
Choices 
Independent Interdependent Dependent 
Source: Revised Powell (1990)‘s comparison of market, hierarchy, and network.  
The key issue in designing an effective adaptive system is how to combine the good 
features of each type of structure, hierarchical and non hierarchical, rather than choosing one of 
them exclusively. As Watts (1997) argued, ‗formal interaction‘ provides stability to the system 
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and ‗informal interaction‘ complements it with high flexibility2. In this sense, this study‘s inquiry 
into designing effective structures for organizational interaction needs to be reoriented to making 
the two sub-structures in one network cooperate together. About this, Sydow & Windeler (1993) 
argued that, compared to markets, a network is more structured, but produces more interaction 
among the component organizations. In doing so, it provides 'thicker' information channels, 
demands more loyalty and trust, and prefers voice to exit. Also, Webster (1992) argued that a 
network is a loose and flexible coalition that can be guided from a ‗hub‘. The key functions of 
hub organizations include i) development and management of the alliances among components, 
ii) coordination of resource allocation and technology use, iii) management of core competencies 
and strategy, and iv) management of information resources that bind the network. This study 
reviews the strengths and weaknesses of current structures and suggests the combination of two 
different structure types into a ‗network structure‘ as the most appropriate organizational form 
for organizational adaptation
3
 because as Sydow (1992) and Siebert (1995) suggest, there is a 
‗white‘ area in which the market needs ‗internalization‘ and hierarchy needs an ‗externalization‘. 
Therefore, in an effort to design an effective collaboration structure, this study seeks a hybrid 
arrangement to use the best of both worlds
4
 and to create collaborative value.  
                                                   
2 In the study of Virtual Software Company (Weber et al, 2004), they found that the centralized and hierarchical 
structure is good in rapid development but not adequate for cooperation with new participants into system. So the 
advantage of decentralized and egalitarian structure of system is that it‘s comparatively easy to assimilate new 
entrants to the system   
3 Because this study assumes the ‗network‘ form as an appropriate structural type, the disaster management ‗system‘ 
and the disaster management ‗network‘ represent the similar management structure after this part.  
4 About this, he suggested the mixture of good features for both structure. Functional specialization and Market 
pressure from Market and Trust and Information integration from Hierarchy.
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2.3 SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION   
2.3.1 Role of communication for creative adaptation 
When focusing on partnered and networked structures, this study also discusses organizational 
capacities that support collaborative partnerships. For creative adaptation to changing conditions, 
organizations need the ability to communicate and share information. Under crisis, demands for 
accurate administrative decision making increases. To improve decision making, Simon (2002) 
and Axelrod and Cohen (1999) suggest the role of communication to harness complexity in 
designing a system for successful adaptation. Also, Kauffman (1993) emphasizes the role of 
information sharing and communication in designing a complex adaptive system. With his 
concept of the ―edge of chaos‖, Kauffman argues that we can design a structure that supports 
information exchange among organizations, and also, can allow enough flexibility to adapt to the 
dynamics of the environment. This shows that, under the constraint of complex environments, 
organizations can adapt to changing conditions. 
The role of communication is more critical to make the system resilient to outer impacts. 
After the shock or perturbation, the state of the system needs to come back quickly to continue 
operations. If the system stays under malfunction for a long time, given the importance of initial 
conditions from chaos theory (Prigogine, 1984), the destructive effect of crisis will drive the 
overall system to collapse. To improve the resilience of the system, Oliver et al (1997) argue that 
the major goal of designing adaptive systems is to organize technical support for the lifecycle of 
the system. This technical support includes more efficient processing of critical information, 
defining effectiveness with the development of proper measurement tools, creating behavioral or 
structural models, and building/testing action plans. Regarding the role of information processing 
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for systems engineering, or from Simon‘s term, building artifacts for the creative adaptation, 
Luhmann (1995) suggests the concept of ‗evolution of communication‘ and considers social 
systems as the product of communication. With communication systems, he argues that the level 
of complexity could be reduced in the internal system (he called it the ‗reduction of complexity‘). 
Also, he asserts that communication can create meaningful information for all entities in the 
system. Considering the challenges from complex conditions, the formation of a common 
knowledge base typically can be reinforced by ‗Positive feedback,‘5 and this feedback can be 
facilitated through the use of advanced communication technology. In this sense, Luhmann‘s 
concept of self referentiality can be applied to this study as a sociological application of self-
organization theory. For Luhmann, human beings are sensors in the environment of the system 
and the interaction among them represents ‗self-producing communications‘ which produces 
further communications, hence a social system can reproduce itself as long as there is dynamic 
communication among organizations.  
Luhmann‘s idea of utilizing communication to combine all the technical contributors to 
unified efforts and to create a structured process for reducing complexity has been developed and 
expanded to the development of tools and methods to better comprehend and manage complexity 
in systems. However, Luhmann‘s discussion on how to create information for system evolution 
covers only some of the many factors required for successful system evolution. Luhmann‘s 
model of the evolution of communication discusses narrowly communication technology factors. 
In this context, the socio-technical systems approach covers this problem and includes more 
factors by suggesting that organizations should balance among five critical factors - personnel, 
                                                   
5 A system in which there is positive feedback to any change in its current state is said to be in an unstable 
equilibrium, building an adaptive system is the continuous processes of pursuing equilibrium in its response but this 
state is also hard to achieve because of complexity and uncertainty 
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structure, technology, task, and environment - to achieve a successful evolution of the system 
(Coakes et al, 2002). Like this, socio-technical systems perspective discusses the interrelatedness 
of social and technical aspects of an organization with a shared emphasis on achievement of both 
excellence in technical performance and quality in organizational operation. Accordingly, it 
argues that the interaction between technical factors and organizational factors produces the 
conditions for desirable system evolution. So, the application of this socio-technical system 
theory in defining critical factors for a system‘s adaptation has significant implications for 
designing an adaptive system. 
2.3.2 Socio-technical systems and organizational learning 
The previous discussion on the role of communication reveals how the application of advanced 
communication technology can contribute to the construction of knowledge bases that are 
necessary for effective organizational adaptation. The discussions regarding the construction of a 
socio-technical system requires a strengthened communication system with the application of the 
most advanced technology, and with this advanced system, organizations can generate, transform, 
and deliver critical information to other organizations. Like this, using an advanced 
communication system, organizations dynamically exchange and combine various information 
from individual organizations and create meaningful information for the effective collaboration 
and coordination in their adaptation to changing conditions.  
The value of information created through this dynamic interaction is that it can generate a 
knowledge base for effective organizational adaptation. The most well-known tool for the 
dynamic interaction in the design of a knowledge base is the use of forward and backward 
feedback across the boundaries of the system. According to Argyris and Schon (1978), double 
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loop learning is a possible mechanism for the creation of valuable information. In double-loop 
learning, the adaptive system may question the values, assumptions and policies that led to the 
actions in the first place. If they are able to view and modify them based on previous experiences, 
then a new convention for problem solving emerges. Through this organizational learning, the 
disaster management system accumulates ‗explicit knowledge‘ rather than ‗tacit knowledge‘ 
(Polanyi, 1983)
6
 and this new knowledge contributes to the process of sensemaking (Weick, 
1995). The learning processes that enable creative adaptation have been discussed as strategic 
learning processes (Kuwada, 1998). According to strategic learning processes, system wide 
knowledge is accumulated from organizational learning and can be used to support the system‘s 
adaptation. 
2.4 GUIDING SYSTEM EVOLUTION: CYBERNETICS AND STRATEGIC 
INTERVENTION 
The concept of feedback derives from the theory of cybernetics. According to this approach, in a 
double loop learning system, actions taken by the system cause change in the environment and 
that change is manifest to the system through feedback, and again causes the system to adapt to 
the new conditions (Ashby, 1956). This "circular causal" relationship is necessary and sufficient 
for the construction of an adaptive system because the essential goal of cybernetics is to 
understand and define the functions and processes of systems that have goals. Organizations 
operating in such a circular causal system follow the causal chains that move from action, 
                                                   
6 Tacit knowledge is personal, context specific, subjective knowledge, whereas explicit knowledge is codified, 
systematic, formal, and a knowledge easy to communicate (Polanyi, 1983) 
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sensing, to comparison with the desired goal, and again to action. In this comparison, cybernetics 
argues that, organizations can have a means for examining the design of a current disaster 
management system. In this section, this study examines how the circular causal processes can 
contribute the development of adaptive strategies for organizations in the system.  
2.4.1 Cybernetics and the meaning of strategic intervention 
The concept of cybernetics developed from the study of organizational systems. It deals with the 
issue of control, decision making, and modeling to increase the possibility of system‘s adaptation 
to changing environments. Control is still significantly important in managing organizations 
because it officially forms the organization‘s strategy, structure, and motivation of personnel. In 
addition to the issue of power and influence in organizational management, organizational 
cybernetics emphasizes the strengthening of decision making capacity with the use of technology 
in information processes. Simon‘s (1996) emphasis on strategic intervention for more effective 
decision making tools requires modeling in computational simulation to explore strategies of 
organizational learning in practice for possible adaptation. The starting point of modeling is to 
describe the basic operational activities of the system. If operations do not succeed in bringing 
expected performance, then management cybernetics attempts to provide managers with a 
number of tools that enable them to intervene to regular operations procedures. In this sense, the 
concept of cybernetics can be combined with the idea of strategic control to guide an adaptive 
system to function properly in the short term and finally evolve to effective performance over the 
long term (Viable system model; Beer, 2000).  
The next question in designing strategic control for better performance is how to control 
or intervene in the current operations of the system. Socio-cybernetics discusses several ways of 
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intervention with social forces that influence system performance. The theory of socio-
cybernetics seeks to devise better ways of intervening in the operation of current systems. Snook 
(2000) defines five types of interrelations among organizations
7
 in the system, and impact on the 
system evolution. In the dynamic adaptation, Snook‘s five interrelations exist as actual patterns 
of interaction in a complex adaptive system. There can be a problem of aggression and 
competition in sharing resources when many organizations were operating under severe scarcity. 
The policy challenge in designing a more effective disaster management system is how to 
coordinate the strategy of individual organizations with that of other organizations participating 
in the system toward convergence into the system‘s shared goal (Decision and Empathy level). 
To achieve coordination, Bookchin (1996) suggested that individual organizations in the 
system not be organized by some center in hierarchy, but by a network of feedback (cybernetic) 
processes that will provide the system with a capacity of evolution. Through constant interaction 
with the environment and with other organizations, the social structure does not endure forever. 
It adapts and should adapt to the continuous and rapid changes of the environment. Also, this 
structure evolves through the iterative and cumulative interaction among organizations in a 
disaster management system and through creative efforts for adaptation by managers of 
individual organizations.  
                                                   
7 Those five interrelations are; Type A. Aggression: organizational survival or death, Type B. Bureaucracy: 
following norms and rules, Type C. Competition: zero-sum game among organizations (my gain is your loss), 
Type D. Decision: disclosing individual feelings, intentions, and Type E. Empathy: cooperation in one unified 
interest
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2.4.2 Dynamic system evolution and resilience 
Dynamic systems theory focuses more on the system‘s evolution over time. The main interest of 
this theory is not in finding any precise solution, or equilibrium of the evolving system of 
disaster management. Rather, it explores the possible range of a system‘s performance toward a 
steady state over the long term. What are the possible states of system evolution over time and 
how do internal interactions among organizations affect the evolution pattern are crucial 
questions to be answered in this study. The study of dynamic evolution in a complex adaptive 
system is complicated because the parameters of the successful system evolution may not be 
known precisely or may be missing from the equations. This uncertainty reduces the validity and 
reliability of estimates of the system‘s evolution. Some trajectories may be periodic, whereas 
others may wander through many different states of the system, so the type of trajectory may be 
more important than one particular trajectory pattern. Accordingly, the study of possible 
trajectories of evolution as a function of a parameter is essential for an application of this 
dynamic system approach to the evolution of complex adaptive systems.  
Among the various types of system evolution, this study seeks the adaptive system 
evolution that is most closely related with resilience of the system. In systems theory, resilience 
is the rate at which a system returns to a single steady or cyclic state following a perturbation. 
Also, it is a system‘s capacity to endure and rebuild its system after a major crisis. This 
definition of resilience assumes that the behavior of a system remains within the stable domain 
(Walker et al, 2004) after the outer adversarial impact and keeps its core capacity for operation. 
Every complex adaptive system tries to avoid risks and system collapse, but if it cannot tolerate 
the perturbation with its existing system, it will pursue adaptation, reorganize, and finally shift 
from one domain of stability to another through mutually reinforcing processes. This system 
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resilience requires an effective management of organizational operation and collaborative 
relationships among agencies in the complex adaptive system. To decrease a risk to the system, 
managers try to decrease vulnerability and increase resilience. If any system is vulnerable to 
change and its current configuration can't handle change effectively, management efforts for 
system reconstruction to recover collaboration among its partners needs to be introduced to the 
complex adaptive system.  
2.4.3 Agent-based modeling and computational simulation 
The previous discussion of cybernetics theory suggests strategic intervention is required for 
guiding better system evolution. As a tool for the cybernetic interventions, this study uses agent-
based modeling as a method of checking the effect of possible strategic interventions on the 
system‘s evolution. Agent-based modeling is a computational model for simulating the actions 
and interactions of organizations in a system to assess their effects on the system as a whole. 
Such a model simulates the simultaneous operations of multiple agents in an attempt to re-create 
and predict the actions of complex phenomena for disaster management. The agent-based models 
are composed of: i) numerous entities with heterogeneity, ii) decision-making heuristics, iii) 
learning rules and adaptive processes, iv) interaction topology, and v) the non-agent environment.  
Unlike other types of computational modeling, agent-based modeling does not search for 
any kind of equilibrium. Rather, it uses comparatively simple rules and seeks results in far more 
complex behavior. It can reach equilibrium in the short term, but it is difficult to define 
equilibrium in a complex adaptive system when the logic of its processes is inductive. In this 
case, agent-based modeling results in an emergent pattern or an unintelligible mangle (Axelrod, 
1997). The more important issue is that agent-based modeling focuses more on the emergence of 
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higher order patterns and robustness, or the ways in which complex systems adapt to internal and 
external pressures to maintain their functionality.  
The crucial areas for systems engineering are organizational capacity for adaptation and 
its interaction structure. Specifically, through dynamic communication of information, 
organizations can achieve the effective operations and better collaboration in the system. Also, 
this study assumes that strategic intervention in interaction structure among organizations is 
critical. Particularly important is the bridging role of core organizations in information and 
resource sharing in the complex adaptive system. In this context, Burt‘s (1992) concept of 
‗Structural Holes‘8 is relevant to this study because it refers to issues of how to devise a ‗strategic 
partnership‘ in the newly emerging network or how to reinforce existing relationships through 
the management of relationships in the system. Burt‘s main argument is that no information can 
be completely and perfectly shared in the system. To address this problem of partial 
communication, the cluster with high and strong relationships should be motivated to circulate 
information at a high velocity, and as a result, information should be correctly retrieved with 
perfect recall. In this process, the core actors who fill the structural hole
9
 between contacts 
should be able to broker communication while displaying different beliefs and identities to each 
contact (Breiger, 1995). According to Burt, the structure itself does not matter; the important 
factor is the existence of a player with high structural autonomy from the structural hole. This 
person is positioned best for the benefits of information sharing that networks provide, and adds 
value by brokering connections between others (Burt, 1992). These entrepreneurs are people who 
                                                   
8The original definition of structural hole is that there are gaps between non-redundant relationships in network that 
generates information and control benefits, giving certain players in a competitive arena an advantage in 
negotiating their relationships 
9 Structural hole is a static hole that can be strategically filled by connecting one or more links to link together other 
points. 
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build interpersonal bridges across structural holes and who speed the process of information 
sharing by building bridges between disconnected parts of network.  
Value is created as network entrepreneurs‘ move strategically to increase accurate 
information diffusion among people in the routine flow of information. The information and 
control benefits of bridging the holes reinforce one another at any moment in time, and cumulate 
together over time. These characteristics enlarge the original concept of brokerage to 
‗Sensemaking‘ (Weick, 2001). With early access to information, people can expect to find 
themselves synthesizing new understanding, and they implement their adaptations creatively. 
With creativity, participants in the disaster management system will be able to increase the 
probability of knowing alternative ways for their adaptation to a changing environment and they 
will become aware of trouble sooner. Early detection of threats leads the network to be more 
flexible in reshaping a project to adapt to exogenous change.  
Agent-based modeling is used in this study to develop an analytic tool for building and 
guiding a more robust and resilient system. Multi-agent simulation (MAS) has been used since 
the 1970s to analyze the interactions and emergent behavior of complex systems and to estimate 
the impact of situational changes on the system (Moon, 2008). For example, when a functional 
death happened to any core organizations in the disaster management system, it is possible to 
measure the impact of this event on the performance of the entire disaster management system 
and to assess how to recover the functionality of the system in short time. The advantage of 
computational agent-based simulation is that it can draw an analogy to human organizations and 
actors in the actual disaster management system. Considering the difficulty in conducting 
experiments in social science settings, this tool of multi-agent based computational simulation 
brings an analytic advantage to the study of disaster management. Using computational agent-
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based modeling, this study can estimate the evolution of an organizational structure for disaster 
response and mitigation. This approach has been used by many other researchers. For example, 
the ‗virtual design team‘ (Kunz et al, 2002) project aims at developing computational tools to 
analyze and simulate decision making and communication behavior to support organizational 
reengineering. Also, Lin and Carley (1997) identify strong factors of an organization's 
performance and its weaknesses by using computational simulation. In their paper, they 
simulated an organization's performance based on a model of agents‘ information processing and 
an organization‘s resource dependency.  
2.5 CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THIS STUDY: GUIDING RESILIENT AND 
STABLE SYSTEM EVOLUTION 
This study tries to build a complex adaptive system that continuously tries to adapt itself to its 
changing environment. This study first determines the most critical factors for effective 
organizational adaptation, it develops a set of intervention strategies to guide effective adaptation 
and evolution, and finally, it assess the effect of those strategies to explore the applicability of 
strategies. Ideally, through continuous interactions with its environment and inner elements, a 
complex adaptive system can coordinate a large number of interacting elements. This study 
further assumes that a complex adaptive system is able to evolve to a more resilient and stable 
state through organizational learning and strategic intervention. To answer how to make the 
system learn, adapt, and evolve dynamically over time, this study searches for the integration of 
different perspectives into a common base of understanding and for the guidance of multiple 
types of action.  
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First, as an operating entity, the system needs to adapt itself to the complexity and 
uncertainty of its environment, and it also should recover as quickly as possible from the 
adversarial effect of disasters. From this definition, three capacities of the adaptive system needs 
to be considered in this study, the ‗capacity to collaborate‘, the ‗capacity to learn‘, and eventually 
the ‗capacity to evolve‘. Besides the challenges from the environment, pressures for successful 
adaptation come from relationships among organizations within the system. Accordingly, an 
effective design of a complex adaptive system needs confront complexity and uncertainty from 
the environment and also manage problems of heterogeneity among participating organizations 
in an effort to seek the best mode of collaboration. To enhance collaboration among participants, 
the system‘s capacities for processing information and communication are the most critical one. 
Under complexity and uncertainty, a rational model is not effective in information exchange 
because its independent decisions are constrained in quantity and quality due to the individual‘s 
limited cognitive capacity in reasoning. It also does not acknowledge the different concepts of 
time for different subsets within the system nor interdependence among the actors within and 
between systems (Comfort, 2007).  
Second, for designing a complex adaptive system, most problems cannot be solved by 
individuals, but require many actors who are involved in interdependent decisions. Also, given 
the limits of human cognitive capacity for cooperation and coordination, reinforcement of the 
structure and technology for communication is essential in the process of designing a better 
disaster management system. Organizational learning using this advanced communication is an 
important capacity for any organization in a complex adaptive system. As an integrated set of 
organizations, the system should detect internal and external changes, adopt new ideas, and 
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develop new patterns of interaction. To increase organizational learning in a disaster 
management system, individual learning needs to be enhanced in component organizations. 
Finally, a complex system should evolve with resilience and stability. If it is unstable and 
vulnerable to external impacts, it is very hard for organizations in the system to recover and 
come back to normal operations. This study assumes that this resilience can be attained through 
continuous efforts for adaptation. Adaptation, as a continuous effort for the system survival, is an 
ongoing process that is continuously constructed and reconstructed during interaction with 
environment. There exists a pattern or trajectory of evolution, but we cannot guarantee that this 
evolution moves toward effective performance under complexity and uncertainty. Therefore, as 
Parkhe (1993) suggested, it is essential for organizations to have the perspective of looking 
backward (the cooperative history of the partners) at the same time as looking forward because 
the network evolves with continuing interactions and this evolution is path dependent. In this 
sense, achieving resilience is considered as one of the critical goals to be achieved through 
strategic intervention. From the network perspective, resilience is the ability of the network to 
provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of various challenges to normal 
operation (ResiliNets, 2004). In the midst of the tradeoffs between efficiency and persistence, 
constancy and change, and predictability and unpredictability, a resilient network should have 
the capacity to tolerate disturbance without collapse through adaptive capacity. This study seeks 
to identify the criteria for a ‗resilient network‘ in a complex adaptive system which looks for 
ways to enhance the ability of organizations to create processes that are robust yet flexible, and 
to use resources proactively in the face of disruptions.  
In this study of building adaptive systems, failure does not mean a permanent breakdown 
of a normal system, but rather represents the emergence of demands for adaptation that are 
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necessary to cope with the real world complexity. Under the threat of extreme events, voluntary 
efforts to participate in the existing system should be connected and mutually reinforced through 
the resilient efforts of those organizations. Encouraging that type of voluntary participation and 
coordination through an open system model is another key issue to consider in designing 
complex adaptive system. As discussed, several researchers have suggested the concept of ‗self 
organization‘ and applied it to a complex adaptive system10. In self organization, the network as 
a whole exhibits distinctive synergistic behavior through the combination of the behaviors of 
individual actors in the network and is guided by a common goal shared by all participants in the 
network. Figure 2-1 shows the basic conceptual structure and components of designing a 
complex adaptive system.  
 
Figure 2-1 Components of designing a complex adaptive system 
                                                   
10 For example, Comfort (1999) suggested that self organization process can emerge to enable the community to act 
voluntarily for the public good under some conditions such as disaster.  
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3.0  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HURRICANE 
KATRINA AND HURRICANE GUSTAV RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
In the previous chapter, this study defined characteristics of complex adaptive systems and 
clarified that building a ‗complex adaptive system‘ requires an enhanced capacity and 
collaboration structure for adaptation, learning, and evolution. From these theoretical discussions, 
this study set the main premise; when collaborative partnership and organizational capacity are 
combined strategically, organizations can effectively adapt to a changing environment and the 
accumulated organizational learning can be incorporated for the system‘s resilience and stability. 
Based on these theoretical discussions, this chapter introduces detailed research questions 
and their links to individual research methods of this study. In the first chapter, this study set up 
three major research purposes of, 1) identifying the core factors necessary for building adaptive 
systems, 2) examining networks as a form of organizational adaptation to changing conditions, 
and 3) assessing the effects of intervention strategies on performance of organizations. For the 
achievement of these three research purposes, this study employs a small-N comparative case 
study as the basic research methodology and a mixed set of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods.  
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3.1 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
3.1.1 Identifying core factors necessary for designing adaptive systems 
To identify the most critical factors for system adaptation to changing conditions, this study will 
conduct a comparative analysis of two crisis cases and check the gap in performance between 
two extreme events in which organizations were required to communicate, learn, and adapt to 
rapidly changing conditions. With this comparison, what changes in organizational capacities 
and interaction structure contributed to the effective organizational adaptation?  
Research Question 1: What are the core factors that affect the successful adaptation to 
rapidly changing environments? 
 
To answer this question effectively, this study identifies the challenges from changing 
conditions, checks the strength and weaknesses of an adaptive system, and determines how 
those factors affected the performance of the system in response to crises.  
3.1.2 Examining network as a form of organizational adaptation to changing conditions  
In addition to the identification of core factors, to design an effective adaptive system, it is 
necessary to examine the existing interaction structure and patterns among organizations in the 
system. By examining and comparing interaction structures of two extreme cases, this study will 
reveal how organizational interaction structure was formed and who took the key role in 
collaboration for information sharing and resources allocation. Also, it will show how embedded 
interaction structure can create vulnerabilities and opportunities for organizations that actively 
seek collaboration opportunities in the system. This examination of network structure is crucial 
to this study because it will reveal where managers of organizations can strategically intervene 
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and decide how to invest their resources to improve organizational capacity in adaptation. Sub-
research questions related with this question are; 
Research Question 2: What are the actual interaction patterns among organizations and 
how do they create vulnerability and opportunities for organizations in a complex 
adaptive system? 
 
The main advantage from answering this question is to get the practical knowledge of 
how a large complex system is formed from smaller components and what factors influence its 
formation. Also, the examination of existing interaction structure reveals what organizations are 
structurally important and who takes the key role in collaboration. The findings from the answers 
to these questions will be used for the structural renovation in building an adaptive system.  
3.1.3 Assessing effects of intervention strategies on performance of organizations  
Based on the findings from previous research questions, managers in participating core 
organizations can develop a set of policy alternatives that allow their organizations to more 
effectively collaborate, create a knowledge base, and adapt to changing conditions. But without 
the proper metrics for performance measurement and analytic methods for checking a system‘s 
evolution, managers struggle to decide how to apply policy alternatives within an adaptive 
system under changing conditions. So, the third research question of this study is how can 
identified core factors be converted to policies and applied to effective adaptation and evolution. 
This study develops a performance measurement metric and checks how to assess the effects of 
intervention strategies on the performance of organizations in complex adaptive system.  
Research Question 3:  How can identified core factors be converted to policies and 
applied to guide a successful evolution of complex adaptive systems? 
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3.2 SMALL-N CASE STUDY OF TWO HURRICANE RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
In order to identify the most critical factors for organizational adaptation to changing conditions, 
to examine networks in actual interaction responding to crisis, and to assess the effects of 
possible policy alternatives, this study uses a small-N comparative analysis.  Network 
comparison as a major research methods allows the exploration of various phases of 
organizational interaction in response to crisis, especially how critical contextual factors shape 
the interaction pattern among organizations. In this sense, it is different from a variable-centered 
study that tends to overlook contextual information (Ragin, 1987).  
The two cases for this small-N comparative analysis are the response system of Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) and Hurricane Gustav (2008). With this small-N case comparative analysis, this 
study will conduct an exploratory as well as explanatory analysis for the two networks of 
hurricane response systems. It is explorative because it searches for what are the most critical 
factors in designing adaptive systems for resilience and stability. At the same time, it is also 
explanatory because it provides in-depth pictures of actual interaction among organizations 
(Creswell, 1998). The examination of two response networks for hurricanes will reveal the 
hidden relationship among organizations and how the hurricane response systems were formed 
and responded to crisis.  
From the comparative analysis of two hurricane response systems, this study will explore 
whether there is any evidence of organizational learning and if so, how organizational learning 
contributed to improvements in performance of Hurricane Gustav response system. As 
Pezeworski & Tenue argue (1970), this purpose of explaining differences and similarities of two 
hurricane response systems is quite well aligned with the purpose of small-N comparative 
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analysis because this study tries to find the common and the most critical factors in designing 
adaptive systems while controlling external variances as much as possible.  
3.2.1 Rationale of case selection for small N comparative case study 
As cases for small-N comparative analysis, this study selected the Hurricane Katrina (2005) and 
Hurricane Gustav (2008) response systems because similarities and differences in two hurricane 
response systems provide an unusual chance for a quasi-experimental comparative study. The 
comparison of the two hurricane systems can reveal the evidence of organizational learning and 
provide the most critical factors for organizational adaptation under crisis.  
Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005 as a Category 3
11
 
storm and Hurricane Gustav struck nearly the same geographic area in the summer of 2008 as a 
Category 2 storm (downgraded to a Category 1 hurricane soon after landfall). Both hurricanes: 1) 
struck roughly the same geographic area with similar strengths, 2) occurred over similar time 
spans, 3) mobilized response systems of local, state, and federal organizations, and finally, 4) 
saw the activation of major disaster management plans just several months before landfall (the 
National Response Plan, seven months before Hurricane Katrina, and the National Response 
Framework, five months before Hurricane Gustav). Despite these similarities, the consequences 
of each hurricane were quite different in relation to the damage to the affected area. The death 
toll of Hurricane Gustav was 112 with $6.61 billion cost. These number are quite small when 
                                                   
11 The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a classification used for most Western Hemisphere tropical cyclones that 
exceed the intensities of tropical depressions and tropical storms. The scale divides hurricanes into five categories 
distinguished by the intensities of their sustained winds. In order to be classified as a hurricane, a tropical cyclone 
must have maximum sustained winds of at least 74 mph (33 m/s; 64 kt; 119 km/h). The highest classification in the 
scale, Category 5, is reserved for storms with winds exceeding 155 mph (69 m/s; 136 kt; 249 km/h). Source: 
FEMA, Hurricane Glossary of Terms. 
 
 
 43 
compared to the 1,464 deaths and over $100 billion in losses cost incurred by Hurricane Katrina 
(statistics from FEMA
12
).  
Considering these similarities and dissimilarities, analyzing the response operations for 
two hurricanes offers an unusual opportunity for comparative analysis to examine the evidence 
of learning of disaster response systems. Moreover, the three year difference between 2005 and 
2008 allows sufficient time for the disaster management system to reflect its learning and 
reorganize its structure and operational protocols. During the three years between Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Gustav, the disaster response system developed a new action plan, 
strengthened its communication protocols and equipment, worked and carried out exercises 
together, and invested enormous resources to build a more resilient disaster management system.  
Through a comparative analysis of these two hurricanes, it will be possible to determine 
whether there were any system wide efforts to improve the disaster response system‘s 
effectiveness and if so, what factors were critical in improving its performance. If the gap 
between two hurricane response systems can be identified, then this study can identify critical 
factors that contributed to gaps in performance between the two hurricane response systems. 
Finally, it is possible to use implications from this comparative study to develop policy 
alternatives on how to strategically design a collaborative relationship and strengthen 
organizational capacity for learning and adaptation.  
                                                   
12 http://www.fema.gov/hazard/hurricane/2005katrina/statistics.shtm 
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3.2.2 Links between research questions and research methods  
To examine the issue of system adaptation to complexity and to identify the evidence of 
organizational learning between two hurricane response systems, this study uses a set of mixed 
methods, including several quantitative and qualitative approaches such as: content analysis, 
semi-structured interviews, social network analysis, and multi-agent based computational 
simulation. The main reason to use a mixed methods approach is to explain organizational 
adaptation to complexity and uncertainty, which cannot be easily explored with the application 
of only one or two research methods.  
Mixed methods or ‗triangulation‘ in social inquiry invites multiple models to the inquiry 
space for the purpose of collectively generating a better understanding of the topic being studied 
(Green, 2007). As Wolcott (1988) argues, the triangulated techniques are helpful in ―cross-
checking‖, or ―ferreting out‖ varying phenomena in complex issues and events of this study.  
However, the critical problem of using a mixed methods approach is to integrate different levels 
of analysis into one study. To address this problem and to structure the role and relations of each 
research method within the analysis, this chapter makes links and clarifies the relationships 
between multiple research methods and research questions.  
The combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis allows this study to achieve the 
three major research purposes of this study; the examination of the actual interaction structure of 
two hurricane response systems, the identification of core factors that will contribute to the 
design of an adaptive system, and the assessment of network performance with the application of 
strategic policy alternatives. More specifically, content analysis provides the basic data for all 
other analyses of this study. From the content analysis, this study developed structured data sets 
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for social network analysis and this study will be able to identify the major problems in response 
to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav.  
Based on structured data from content analysis, I conducted social network analysis to 
examine the actual interaction pattern among participating organizations in the Hurricane Katrina 
and Hurricane Gustav response systems. With social network analysis, this study addresses the 
second research question of how a large system was formed from smaller components, what 
organizations were most structurally important, and who took the key roles in collaboration and 
response to changing conditions of crisis. The findings from content analysis and social network 
analysis will be verified through semi-structured interviews with managers of organizations that 
actively participated in both hurricane response systems. Using managers‘ insights and 
experiences from semi-structured interview, this study aims to identify the most critical factors to 
be considered in designing more effective adaptive systems.  
Finally, with agent-based computational simulation, this study will assess the effects of 
intervention strategies on the performance of organizations adapting to changing conditions. As 
Simon argued (1999), computational simulation is the virtual experiment that will check the 
effects of policy alternatives on the system‘s overall evolution. Especially for this study, 
developed policy alternatives from the findings of content analyses and semi-structured 
interviews will be used to improve information sharing among organizations and see how those 
alternatives eventually contribute to an effective system evolution over time. The links between 
major research questions and research methods is presented in figure 4-1.   
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Figure 3-1 Links between research questions and research methods 
3.3 EXAMINING PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTION IN 
HURRICANE KATRINA AND HURRICANE GUSTAV: CONTENT ANALYSIS 
3.3.1 Analytic purpose of content analysis of newspaper articles and situation report  
This study used content analysis as a standard methodology for studying the pattern of 
interaction and communication among organization in the disaster response system because, as 
Babbie (2003) and Lasswell (1969) defined, content analysis is the study of recorded human 
communications and interactions. This study conducted content analysis to elicit information 
from textual data and to structure data that was extracted and coded by content analysis. More 
specifically, the role of content analysis in this study is to expose binary relationships or 
reciprocal collaboration links between two organizations. Each reciprocal collaboration link was 
marked with pre-defined coding procedures. Based on the coded interactions among 
organizations, this study created specially structured data sets that show the actual interaction 
and collaboration pattern of organizational response to Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. The 
coded data for the interaction pattern in the disaster response system to Hurricanes Katrina and 
Gustav is a necessary input for social network analysis and computational simulation in the later 
 47 
part of this study. The findings from content analysis further show the major problems that 
organizations faced during their response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav.  
3.3.2 Data sources of content analysis 
  
For the content analysis, this study used two sources of data: the first are newspaper articles from 
the Times-Picayune and the second are situation reports from the Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP/GOHSEP
13
). The data for content analysis 
document a daily record of actions undertaken to cope with Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav by 
the various organizations in the system. Through the content analysis, this study identified each 
organization that participated in the response operations, and interactions among them by date in 
response to both Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. 
The first data sources used for the content analysis are newspaper articles from the Times-
Picayune, the local newspaper published in New Orleans and the major newspaper for the state 
of Louisiana, from August 27 to September 19, 2005 (one week before and three weeks after  
landfall of Hurricane Katrina). The same time frame for Times-Picayune newspaper articles were 
used for the content analysis response operations for Hurricane Gustav, from August 26 to 
September 21, 2008 (one week before and three weeks after the landfall). The second data source 
is the set of situation reports produced and managed by the Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) for Hurricane Katrina and similarly managed 
by the Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) for 
Hurricane Gustav. The reason for using two different sources of archival data is to avoid missing 
                                                   
13After Hurricane Katrina, LOHSEP was placed under direct authority of the Governor and renamed Governor‘s 
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP).  In this study, LOHSEP refers to Katrina 
response and GOHSEP to Gustav response. 
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meaningful transaction data that can happen when a content analysis relies on any single data 
source. If only newspaper articles are used, many unpublicized transactions within governmental 
organizations may be missed. Likewise, if only the State of Louisiana situation reports are used, 
the main body of information for interactions of private and nonprofit organizations may be 
missed. Because the range of identifying and coding collaborative interactions are broad 
interactions among public, private, and nonprofit organizations, the use of both types of archival 
data are necessary and complementary to each other. Table 4-1 shows the data sources, duration, 
and total numbers of identified transactions in each data source.  
Table 3-1 Data Sources of Content Analysis 
Hurricanes Data/Sources Duration 
Total Number of  
Transactions Identified 
Katrina 
Newspaper Articles/ 
Times Picayune 
August 27, 2005 –  
September 19, 2005 
1398 
Situation Reports 
August 27, 2005 –  
September 6, 2005* 
2498 
Gustav 
Newspaper Articles/ 
Times Picayune 
August 26, 2008 –  
September 21, 2008 
753 
Situation Reports 
August 29, 2008 –  
September 18, 2008 
419 
*Situation Reports were not available for August 31, 2005. 
3.3.3 Coding procedures of content analysis  
To handle large amounts of textual data, and to categorize the main information from content 
analysis, I used a classification scheme developed at the Center for Disaster Management
14
 that 
facilitates effective data analysis
15
. Especially, in developing the coding scheme, we addressed 
the questions of i) who initiated the interaction, ii) who actually responded to requests for 
                                                   
14  The coding of newspaper reports was done by graduate student researchers at the Center for Disaster 
Management, University of Pittsburgh. I participated in this work and acknowledge the contribution of my 
colleagues; Thomas Hasse, Steve Scheinert, and Gunes Ertan in the creation of the data base.   
15 For effective content analysis, Krippendorff (2004) suggested that six questions must be addressed in every 
content analysis. These questions are, 1) which data are analyzed? 2) How are they defined? 3) What is the 
population from which they are drawn? 4) What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed? 5) What are 
the boundaries of the analysis? 6) What is the target of the inferences? 
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collaboration, and finally iii) what were the content of their interactions  (revised Krippendorff,  
2004). We began coding processes by scanning all newspaper articles and situation reports 
focusing on information that reveals any binary interaction between two organizations. For 
example, in performing analysis on the newspaper article titled ―Parts of Old Metairie, Airport 
area still under some water; Jefferson getting better grip on security‖ in September 3, 2005, 
Times-Picayune, we focused on the content of interaction such as:  
―Department of Homeland Security, United States instructed the American Red Cross to hold off 
at least 24 hours before delivering aid to East Jefferson and West Jefferson Medical Center in 
Marreo so that 30,000 National Guard troops could secure the storm-ravaged New Orleans area.‖ 
 
This specific content contains some important information of interaction that needs to be 
coded. First, it identifies two interacting organizations: the initiating organization (Department of 
Homeland Security) and the responding organization (American Red Cross). Second, it contains 
the content of interaction or communication between two organizations. In this instance, the 
Department of Homeland Security coordinated response activities of the American Red Cross 
and National Guard. Third, it shows when this interaction occurred, in this case, September 3, 
2005. With this basic information (again, who interacted with whom, when, and what was their 
interaction), this study created additional categories for management purposes of data. First, this 
study assigned a system number as an identification number for each organization in the 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems. Additionally, we sorted every 
organization by funding sources and level of jurisdictions and assigned those attributes to each 
organization in the system.   
For the content analysis of situation reports, this study added several more attributes to 
binary transactions because the content of situation reports contains more detailed information 
such as the types of transaction, status of requests from initiating organizations, and the quantity 
of requested resources to responding organizations. For the types of interaction, this study used 
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‗Emergency Support Functions16 (ESFs)‘ for the categorization of interactions. These ESFs were 
defined by the National Response Plan (NRP, 2004) for Hurricane Katrina and by the National 
Response Framework (NRF, 2008) for Hurricane Gustav. Using ESFs categories, this study  
sorted the all transactions into 15 categories of ‗transaction type‘ which include: search & rescue, 
heavy equipment, light equipment, supplies, security, evacuation, shelter, emergency response, 
communication & coordination, personnel, utility, transportation, medical, damage assessment, 
and others. The set of variables that this study created for the creation of structured data listed in 
table 4-1 below.  
Table 3-2 Scheme of Data Transformation: Situation Report into Structured Data  
Name of Variables Content 
Serial Number Serial number given to each transaction 
Time 
Reported time of transactions in the situation report (Hurricane Katrina situation reports 
only) 
Date Reported date of transactions 
System Number Identification number assigned to each organization in the system. 
Initiating Organization (I*) Name of organizations which initiate interactions with other organizations 
Source of Funding (I) Source of funding for initiating organization (public, private, nonprofit) 
Level of Jurisdiction (I) 
Level of jurisdiction for initiating organization (international, federal, state, regional, 
sub-regional, parish/county, local) 
Content of Transaction Content of transaction which was actually realized between two organizations 
Transaction Type 15 Categories of various transactions (Hurricane Katrina situation reports only) 
Responding Organization Responding organization that interacted with initiating organization 
System Number (R**) Assigned system number of responding organization 
Source of Funding (R) Source of funding of responding organization 
Level of Jurisdiction (R) Level of jurisdiction of responding organization 
Status of request 
Status of transaction (Hurricane Katrina situation reports only,  
No response (NR), Action Required, Cancelled, Pending, On-Scene, Enroute, Released) 
Quantity of requested 
resources 
Amount of resources which was shared between two organizations  
(Hurricane Katrina situation reports only) 
 
* I: Initiating organization ** R: Responding organization 
                                                   
16 The Emergency Support Functions annexes the missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of agencies for 
coordinating resource and programmatic support (National Response Plan, 2004, Department of Homeland Security, 
p12). They are mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently used to provide federal support to states and 
federal-to-federal support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and for non-Stafford 
Act incidents (National Response Framework, 22 Jan 08, DHS) 
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3.4 INSIGHTS FROM PRACTICING MANAGERS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION 
OF CORE FACTORS IN DESIGNING ADPATIVE SYSTEMS  
3.4.1 Analytic purpose of semi-structured interview  
The interactions of organizations identified from the content analysis of newspaper articles and 
situation reports are useful in documenting the actual interaction structure and patterns of the 
disaster response system to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. But, at the same time, the 
content analysis is limited in terms of exploring the critical factors that affect the effective 
collaboration in response to complex environments. These qualitative data can be obtained 
through in-depth and semi-structured interviews with the managers of organizations that actively 
participated in the disaster response systems to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. With 
semi-structured interviews, it was possible to validate relational data from the content analysis 
and to obtain important qualitative information regarding the actual organization‘s operation and 
interaction during the preparation and response phases of both hurricanes.  
To identify the most critical factors to be considered in designing adaptive systems, this 
study relied on insights from managers of organizations who actively participated in Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems. The semi-structured interview includes both 
open-ended and closed questions (Refer to Appendix A for the interview questionnaire). More 
specifically, with open-ended questions, this study provides rough categories of questions to 
make the interview less intrusive, to encourage two-way communication for exploring new 
information from interviewees, and to allow them to speak more freely about what they 
experienced during the response phase of Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. With these open-ended 
questions, interviewees can more easily discuss sensitive issues and reveal hidden and 
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unexpected information that was not available through archival data analysis. Although the 
specific topics that this study seeks to explore are organized in advance, key questions could be 
posed during the interviews in open conversation, allowing the interviewer and interviewee the 
flexibility to probe for details (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). This flexibility helps interviewees to 
focus on the topics at hand without constraining them to a particular format.  
At the same time, using closed questions, this study asked interviewees to evaluate or rate 
the organizations‘ capacity in four major categories; communication, managerial 
entrepreneurship for adaptation, number of personnel, and training level of personnel, which 
were identified as critical factors for the effective operation and collaboration with partners in the 
system. As a tool for closed questions, rating was a useful way to measure an individual‘s 
attitudes toward the capacity and the performance of his or her organization, and how 
perceptions have changed since Hurricane Katrina. Sometimes, open conversation was used with 
closed questions together, particularly when asking about the reasoning behind the interviewee‘s 
rating of each category. For example, if respondent stated that the overall capacity for 
communication of her or his organization had been greatly improved since Hurricane Katrina, 
the interviewer could then ask her to explain what kinds of improvements have been made more 
in detail.  
To achieve the overarching research question of organizational adaptation to changing 
conditions, this study needs to compare the organizational response to Hurricane Katrina with 
that to Hurricane Gustav, and to assess any improvements in the disaster response system 
between the two events, and to check whether there was any evidence of organizational learning. 
Figure 3-2 shows the logic of a semi-structured interview and how open-ended and closed-ended 
questions mixed for the complementary use to achieve the analytic purpose of semi-structured 
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interview (These purposes include, the exploration of new information mainly to identify core 
factors considered in designing adaptive systems, the verification of findings from content 
analysis of newspaper articles and situation reports, and the assessment of organizational 
performance to identify evidence of organizational learning between two hurricanes.  
 
Figure 3-2 Logic of semi-structured interview and expected output 
3.4.2 Sampling organizations for semi structured interview 
This study uses several criteria to determine which organizations‘ managers to interview. This 
study did not use random sampling methods because the purpose of a semi-structured interview 
is to use insights from experienced managers of disaster response systems. Accordingly, rather 
than conducting interviews with randomly selected, but not core organizations, this study 
intentionally selected some core organizations that took the most crucial roles in information 
sharing and resource allocation in the hurricane response systems. 
The first sampling criterion is the measurement of degree centrality by social network 
analysis. Among various kinds of centrality measures in social network analysis, I used total 
degree centrality
17
 because it provides information about what organization takes the most 
                                                   
17 For a graph G: = (V,E) with n vertices, the degree centrality CD(v) for vertex v is:  
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important position in sharing information and resources in the entire disaster response system by 
counting the number of links incident upon a node (i.e., the number of ties that a node has). 
Table 3-3 shows the top 15 organizations with highest total degree centrality in the entire 
response system for Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. To measure the total degree centrality of 
each organization in the system, this study used structured data sets from content analyses of 
newspaper articles and situation reports.  
Table 3-3 Top 15 organizations with high total degree centrality in hurricane response systems 
Rank Organization (Hurricane Katrina) 
Degree  
Centrality 
Organization (Hurricane Gustav) 
Degree  
Centrality 
1 FEMA 46 
Governor's Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness, LA 
51 
2 Office of President, US 22 Department of Social Services, LA 43 
3 Office of Governor, LA 21 FEMA 23 
4 Police Department, New Orleans 20 National Guard 16 
5 Parish of Jefferson 15 Office of Mayor, New Orleans 15 
6 Louisiana National Guard 14 Army Corps of Engineers 14 
7 Florida National Guard 13 Parish of Plaquemines 11 
8 Office of Mayor, New Orleans 12 American Red Cross 10 
9 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness 
11 Parish of Jefferson 9 
10 Department of Homeland Security, US 10 Louisiana National Guard 9 
11 Army Corps of Engineers 10 American Humane Association 8 
12 Louis Armstrong International Airport 10 Louis Armstrong International Airport 7 
13 Public Health Service, US 7 Parish of St. Tammany 7 
14 American Red Cross 7 Louisiana State Board of Regents 6 
15 Parish of St. Bernard 7 Entergy 6 
 
The second sampling criterion, especially for the state agencies, is the set of primary 
organizations that were assigned to Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) under Louisiana‘s 
emergency operations plan. Table 3-4 shows the ESFs and the primary organization for each 
ESF. Using this table, this study sampled all the primary organizations in each ESF and if there 
was more than one primary organization listed, I chose only one to make ensure that there was 
no duplication among ESFs.   
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Table 3-4 Emergency support functions and responsibility chart (P: Primary, S: Support) 
 
 Source: State of Louisiana Emergency Operation Plan, 2007. Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness 
The third and final sampling criterion, especially for Parish governments, is the level of 
damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. Figure 3-3 shows the parishes that were tagged for 
mandatory evacuation as of September 5
th
, 2005 and were, accordingly, most severely damaged 
by Hurricane Katrina. I conducted semi-structured interviews with emergency managers in all 
red colored parishes on the map, as those parishes were on the exact path of Hurricane Katrina.   
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 Source: Situation Report, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 
Figure 3-3 Parishes under mandatory evacuation orders for Hurricane Katrina (As of Sept. 5, 2005) 
 
Using these three criteria, this study selected 36 organizations for the semi-structured 
interview. All three sampling strategies were designed to identify the organizations that most 
actively participated in the hurricane response systems. The list of sampled organizations and 
their attributes is shown in Table 3-5, and this list also provides the position of the  interviewed 
managers and total number of years they worked in that position. Seniority within position is 
critical for the comparison of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav because after the barrage 
of criticisms of mismanagement during Hurricane Katrina, many manager-level personnel 
resigned from their positions and those positions were replaced by new personnel for the 
response to Hurricane Gustav. In order to compare performance of two hurricane response 
systems, interviewees needed to have been in their current positions for over three years. 
However, due to the turn-over, some directors did not have a working memory of Hurricane 
Katrina (6 out of 36 organizations, 17%). In these cases, to increase the relevancy of data, 
personnel who had working experiences from Hurricane Katrina, such as the deputy director or 
operations chief, accompanied the main interviewees and answered some of the questions. The 
second detail of ‗total years in disaster management field‘ is also a critical measure because it 
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indicates how many experienced personnel kept their positions after the failure of Hurricane 
Katrina.   
Table 3-5 List of organizations for semi-structured interview 
Organization 
Level of 
Jurisdiction 
Source of 
Funding 
Position 
Years of 
Service in 
Position (>3)* 
Total working 
years in disaster 
management field 
American Red Cross Federal/National Nonprofit Chief Executive Officer 9 20 
Army Corps of Engineers Federal/National Public Chief 4 13 
Ascension Parish Parish/County Public Deputy Director 2** 11 
Assumption Parish Parish/County Public Director 15 20 
Coast guard Federal/National Public Chief 5 13 
Department of Agriculture State Public Deputy Incident Commander 3 32 
Department of Health and Hospitals State Public Program Manager 2** 5 
Department of Natural Resources State Public Deputy Assistant Secretary 3 5 
Department of Social Services State Public Director 5 30 
Department of Transportation State Public Director 5 24 
Department of Wildlife & Fisheries State Public Administrator 4 31 
Entergy Regional Private Vice President 25 30 
FEMA_Federal Federal/National Public Principal federal official 5 19 
FEMA_Local Parish/County Public Operations Officer 2** 3 
FEMA_Regional Regional Public FCO 2** 20 
GOHSEP State Public Director 3 18 
GOHSEP2 State Public Deputy Director 5 15 
Jefferson Parish Parish/County Public Director 3 13 
Lafourche Parish Parish/County Public Director 4 25 
Louis Armstrong International Airport Regional Public Manager 12 17 
Louisiana State Police 1 State Public Superintendent 5 26 
Louisiana State Police 2 State Public Director of Operation 3 15 
Louisiana National Guard State Public LNO 3 22 
National Weather Service Regional Public Officer 14 23 
New Orleans Police Department City Public Superintendent 4 28 
NOFD Parish/County Public Chief 8 25 
Ochsner Hospital Regional Nonprofit Vice President 13 25 
Parish of Orleans Parish/County Public Director 3 30 
Parish of Terrebonne Parish/County Public Director 11 33 
Plaquemines Parish Parish/County Public Director 3 12 
Public Service Commission State Public Director 10 30 
St. Bernard Parish Parish/County Public Office Manager 2** 13 
St. Tammany Parish Parish/County Public Director 4.5 38 
State Fire Marshal State Public Fire Marshal 1** 23 
Verizon Regional Private Director 7 9 
Washington Parish Parish/County Public Director 14 18 
Average    6.2 20.4 
* It should be over 3 years for interviewees to compare Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav 
**shows that some of the interviewees took their current positions after Hurricane Katrina (years<3) 
The cross-tabulation of the 36 organizations by level of jurisdiction and source of funding 
is presented in Table 3-6. When categorized by level of jurisdiction, the federal/national 
organizations make up 11.1%, parish/county organizations 36.1%, regional organizations 16.7%, 
and state organizations 36.1%. When sorted by source of funding, there are 2 non-profit 
organizations (5.6%), 2 private organizations (5.6%), and 32 (88.9%) public organizations.  
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Table 3-6 Cross tabulation of organizations by level of jurisdiction and source of funding 
                 Source of  
                 Funding 
Level of  
jurisdiction 
Nonprofit Private Public Total 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Federal/National 1 2.80 0 0.00 3 8.30 4 11.10 
Parish/County 0 0.00 0 0.00 13 36.10 13 36.10 
Regional 1 2.80 2 5.60 3 8.30 6 16.70 
State 0 0.00 0 0.00 13 36.10 13 36.10 
Total 2 5.60 2 5.60 32 88.90 36 100.00 
 
The portion of public organizations is large (88.9%) because the types of coded 
interactions from content analysis of newspaper articles are mainly about the preparation and 
response activities of public organizations and their transactions with private and nonprofit 
organizations. Especially, because the situation reports were mainly managed and published by 
public organizations, it contains more activities of public organizations than those of private and 
nonprofit organizations.  
3.4.3 Checking validity and reliability of interview questionnaire  
Like other research procedures, verifying reliability and validity of a measurement tool increases 
its applicability to the analysis. For the validity of the questionnaire, I conducted a pre-test with 
several experts in disaster management field. Specifically, this study focused on interrater 
reliability to check the extent to which two or more interviewees agree (Howell et al, 2005) and 
to confirm the consistency of a rating system that depends upon the ability of two or more 
individuals to be consistent in their answers. To assess validity
18
, this study is concerned with 
                                                   
18 Validity refers to the degree to which a study accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that the 
researcher is attempting to measure. While reliability is concerned with the accuracy of the actual measuring 
instrument or procedure, validity is concerned with the study's success at measuring what the researchers set out to 
measure (Howell et al, 2005) 
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‗criterion related validity (instrumental validity)‘ because it demonstrates how the accuracy of a 
finding from an interview can be verified by comparing it with findings from content analysis of 
newspaper articles and situation reports. Specifically, the interviews deal with the issue of 
‗content validity‘ to guarantee that this questionnaire remains within the intended domain 
(Carmines & Zeller, 1991) that was identified from content analysis.  
To improve the integrity of interview questions in reliability and validity, this study 
conducted several pre-tests with academic researchers and professionals who have over 10 years 
of experience in the disaster management field. Because it is a pre-test, sampling is not as serious 
an issue as in a real interview situation, but to make the pre-tests more relevant, I selected pre-
test interviewees from various groups. I selected one director from a parish government‘s office 
of homeland security and emergency preparedness (Lafourche parish), one person from a federal 
agency (FEMA), one staff member from a non-profit organization (American Red Cross), and 
one interviewee from a state organization (GOHSEP). From the academic field, I asked two 
researchers, one in New Orleans and one in Pittsburgh, to review interview questions and check 
the integrity of questions.  
Based on the results of this pre-test of the interview questionnaire, I reorganized and 
reconstructed the interview questions to make them clearer and more consistent in measuring 
important factors in designing complex adaptive systems. First, I considered time management 
for this interview. Because most interviewees of this study are current directors of their 
respective organizations, they cannot afford more than one hour for this interview. Therefore, I 
omitted some duplicate or minor questions to get more important answers in a limited time span. 
Secondly, I introduced a 5-point ordinal scale to measure the levels of collaboration and 
organizational capacity more consistently. Finally, I changed the order of the set of questions for 
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Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. Because this analysis is designed to compare the disaster 
response system‘s operation and collaboration in two hurricanes, the answers for Hurricane 
Gustav can interfere with the answers for Hurricane Katrina. To minimize this interference effect, 
I asked the set of questions for Hurricane Katrina first and then repeated the same questions for 
Hurricane Gustav. 
3.4.4 Devising questionnaire 
To achieve the analytic purposes of the semi-structured interview; the exploration of core factors 
for designing adaptive systems and the validation of findings from content analysis, the 
questionnaire for the interview is composed of three parts: diagnosis of organizational capacity 
for disaster response and mitigation, evaluation of collaboration partnership with other agencies, 
and suggestions for the design of future adaptive systems to major crisis. Each question was 
asked twice, once for Hurricane Katrina and once for Hurricane Gustav. 
The questionnaire begins by asking about the organizations‘ role in the system and its 
preparation level. Also, it asked managers to evaluate their organization‘s capacity for four pre-
defined categories: communication technology/equipment, managerial entrepreneurship for 
adaptation, number of personnel, and training level of personnel. Using the responses to these 
questions, this study identified the organization‘s major role in the disaster response system, 
evaluated the level of preparedness and source of information for disaster preparation, and the 
organizational capacities of the four critical categories that are required for the effective 
operation and collaboration.  
The second section of the questionnaire includes questions about the effectiveness of 
organization‘s collaboration with other organizations in the system. This section uses both open 
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questions and closed questions, but mainly relies on open-ended questions in an effort to identify 
the most critical factors that improve organizational collaboration for information and resource 
sharing during the period of disaster response and mitigation. Given the responses to these 
questions, I evaluated the overall level of collaboration of organizations within the disaster 
response systems to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav.  Also, I tried to clarify who the 
major collaboration partners were, what kinds of information and resources they shared, what 
were the major problems in collaboration, and what they did to overcome difficulties in 
collaboration.  
The third section of interview questionnaire seeks suggestions from interviewees. Based 
on their specialized expertise and experiences, they provide creative insights for improving 
organizational capacities and collaboration structure to make organization‘s adaptable to 
changing conditions. In this section, not all questions were designed and phrased ahead of time 
in order to get more extensive suggestions from managers. These questions were designed to 
determine what factors should be considered and how long-term system evolution could be 
guided through strategic intervention and policy recalibration. The aim is to develop the system 
to be more resilient and stable for future major crises and eventually allow the system to adapt 
more creatively to changing conditions. The last section contains questions of demographic 
information, questions about the interviewees themselves, including total number of years 
working in current position and in the disaster management field.  
3.4.5 Developing coding procedures 
This study used grounded theory methods to develop coding trees and categories. The grounded 
theory (Glazer, 1992) is a systematic qualitative research methodology emphasizing generation 
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of theory from data in the process of conducting research. After the semi-structured interviews, 
the key points are marked with a series of codes, which are extracted from the text. Then the 
codes are grouped into similar concepts in order to make them more workable. From these 
concepts, categories are formed, which are usually, in the grounded theory, the basis for the 
creation of a theory or a reverse engineered hypothesis (Strauss, 1998). But this process of 
developing codes, concepts, category, and theory in grounded theory stops at the category level 
because the purpose of semi-structured interviews is not in the development of theory but the 
identification of core factors for successful adaptation to changing conditions. 
Using transcriptions from the recorded interview data, this study utilized the ‗open 
coding‘ method. ‗Open coding‘ or ‗substantive coding‘ is used for the conceptualization of the 
first level of abstraction. Transcriptions were conceptualized line by line and each code from this 
open coding is compared and merged into new concepts, and eventually renamed and modified 
for the creation of categories. According to grounded theory, this coding process goes back and 
forth while comparing data, constantly modifying and sharpening the concepts for categorization. 
After the open coding procedure, I conducted axial coding procedures. Axial coding in grounded 
theory is the process of relating codes to each other through a combination of inductive and 
deductive thinking. With this axial coding, I reorganized a set of initial codes into preliminary 
concepts. During this reorganizing process, this study could create a new set of ideas and more 
comprehensive concepts that described the initially coded themes in more detail. With these new 
codes and ideas, I moved toward organizing the ideas or themes and identified the axis of key 
concepts in analysis (Neuman, 2006). The three major categories created from coding procedures 
are, improvements after Hurricane Katrina, major problems in response to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Hurricane Gustav, and suggestions for making future systems more resilient and stable.  
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For the section on improvements since Hurricane Katrina, there are two categories: 
improved organizational capacity and improved collaborative partnerships. For improvements in 
organizational capacity, I created the concepts of human resource management, resource 
management, communication, planning, and funding as the five most important factors for an 
organization‘s capacity for adaptation. For the improved collaborative partnerships, I devised 
codes for building rapport, collaboration structures, and support from partners in the disaster 
management system. The section on identified problems is composed of three sub-categories: 
problems in operation, problems in collaboration, and problems in communication. Problems in 
operation include: failures in human resource management and resource management, the lack of 
professional management plan/procedures, and insufficient funding. Problems in collaboration 
include: rivalries among organizations, institutional barriers for collaboration, and a lack of 
collaborative attitudes and culture. Finally, problems in communication include the breakdown 
of the communication system.  
The third section, factors to be considered for building future adaptive systems, is 
composed of two categories: better collaboration and better operation. Under the category of 
better operation, are included codes for: human resource management, resource management, 
consistent planning, and funding for future system. Under the category of better collaboration, 
there are included codes for: communication technology/equipment, and building rapport among 
partners through established constant working relationships among organizations in the system.  
Tables 4-7 to 4-9 show the structure of codes. Each code has a separate column for 
frequency (number of times mentioned by interviewees) and number of organizations that 
mentioned it as an important factor. To give weight to the codes to help select important factors 
for the disaster response and mitigation, this study used both frequency and number of 
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organizations. To create the coding tree, this study used the qualitative analysis software known 
as MAXQDA (2008).  
Table 3-7 Structured codes for the part of improvements since hurricane Katrina  
Category Concept Code Description 
Improved 
organizational  
capacity 
Improved 
Manpower 
Training and Education Increase in required training and training programs 
Improved personnel Welfare More considerations for personnel's safety and working conditions 
Adaptive leadership Improved leadership based on learning from previous disasters 
Increased expertise of 
personnel 
Increased level of expertise through disaster management experiences 
Staffing Increased number of personnel for the operation of disaster management  
Improved 
Resource 
Management 
Private Vendor management Pre-identified and pre-contracted vendors for stable supplies provision  
More regional resources for 
self sufficiency 
Using available regional resources to fill the needs gap until state and 
federal assistance  is provided 
More available resources More resources for disaster response and mitigation in the system 
Pre-positioning of resources Positioning resources before hurricane landfall 
Exact estimation of needs Estimating the exact needs of resources in advance   
Improved 
communication  
for getting 
common 
operation 
picture 
Reliability Increased reliability for communication system  
Clear communication 
procedures 
Clear contact point and procedures for communication 
Application of more 
advanced technology 
Communication equipment or reporting procedures with more advanced 
technology  
More communication 
equipment 
More communication equipment 
Redundancy of 
communication 
More redundant communication facilities and equipments 
Reinforced public 
notification system  
Reinforced information diffusion system for public awareness of the 
situation  
Utilizing LNOs for on-site 
information 
Deployment of liaison officers in partners' emergency operation center 
Frequent communication 
with partners 
More communication with partners during disaster response 
Improved  
planning 
activities 
New operation procedures New procedures and plans for operations after hurricane Katrina 
Clear Role Definition Clearly defined role of each organization and department 
Alignment of plan among 
organizations 
Coordinated plan and timeline among organizations in the system 
More funding 
for system 
improvement 
  More funding for disaster management system improvement 
Improved 
Collaboration 
Partnership 
Building 
Rapport 
Keeping constant working 
relationship 
Constant interactions with partners for building rapport 
Improved collaboration 
through co-planning 
Co-planning with other partner organizations 
Trust through co-exercise Co-exercises with other partner organizations 
Improvement in 
Interaction 
Structure 
Collaboration under unified 
system 
Establish unified system for better coordination among organizations 
Fewer bureaucratic layers in 
decision making 
High rank personnel involvement for the quicker decision making  
Building new units for 
coordination 
Building new coordinating units in the system for better collaboration  
Improved 
Supports  
from partners 
Supports from political 
leaders 
Support from political leaders for better collaboration 
Supports from national 
network partners 
Personnel and resources within national network partners  
Supports from local/regional 
partners 
Personnel and resources from partners in the same region 
Supports from partners in 
civil sector 
Personnel and resources from civil sector partners 
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Table 3-8 Structured codes identified for major problems in disaster management 
Category Concept Code Description 
Problems in 
Operation 
Failure in 
human resource  
management 
Staffing Lack of personnel for operation 
Deteriorated personnel 
working conditions 
Insufficient facilities and resources that weaken 
personnel morale 
Inexperienced personnel 
Inexperienced personnel with insufficient 
training 
Turnover in major positions Replacement of personnel in major positions 
Failure in 
resource  
management 
Delayed or partial delivery Delayed or partial resource delivery 
Inaccurate estimation for 
needs 
Lack of exact resource estimation system  
Failure in vendor 
management 
Unreliable resource delivery by private vendors 
in a timely manner 
Lack of available resources 
Lack of resource in the disaster management 
system 
Lack of proper 
management  
plan/procedures 
Lack of clear disaster 
management plan 
Lack of proper disaster management plan 
Lack of flexibility for 
adaptation 
Inflexibility of plan for adaptation 
Lack of aligned plan Incompatibility of plan among organizations  
Insufficient 
funding 
  Insufficient funding for operation 
Difficulties in 
getting 
common 
operating 
picture 
Lack of 
situational 
awareness 
Failure in transmitting 
action knowledge 
Problems in diffusing action knowledge 
Difficulty in processing and 
producing action knowledge 
Organizational incompetency in processing and 
producing action knowledge for collaboration 
Problems in 
communication 
system 
Communication system 
breakdown 
Communication system breakdown  
Lack of communication 
equipment 
Lack of extra communication facilities for 
redundancy 
Lack of communication 
channels 
Lack of clear communication channels and 
partners 
Lack of proper technology 
for communication 
Lack of proper communication technology 
Problems in 
collaboration 
Lack of 
collaborative 
attitudes 
Rivalries among 
organizations 
Territorialism or competing interests on 
authority 
Competition for resources 
Competition among organizations for the same 
resources  
Ego (Personality) Personal tendency refusing collaboration 
Institutional 
barriers 
Lack of transparency in its 
operation 
Hidden agenda preventing collaboration 
Bureaucratic incompetence 
Lack of collaboration due to the bureaucratic 
incompetency 
Lack of coordinating 
structure 
Lack of coordination institutional structure 
Unexpected intervention 
from political leaders 
Unexpected intervention from political leaders 
which disrupt the entire operation 
Lack of collaboration 
experiences 
Lack of collaboration experiences 
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Table 3-9 Structured codes for the suggestion of future disaster management  
 
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Description 
Factors for 
better 
collaboration 
Communication 
More communication with partners 
More communication during disaster response and 
mitigation 
Application of more advanced technology Application of more advanced technology 
More communication equipment More equipment for better communication 
Building 
rapport with 
partners 
Mutual understanding of other's role and 
limitation 
Clear understanding of other's role and weakness  
Constant co-training, planning, operation More co-planning, co-training, and co-operation 
Establish working relationship through 
interaction 
Constant interactions with partners for constant working 
relationship 
Developing community partnership 
Reinforcing partnership with community and education for 
publics 
Factors for 
better 
operation 
Resources 
Management 
More available resources in the system Securing more available resources in the system 
Exact resource assessment for demands 
and supplies 
Developing resource management system for exact 
estimation  
Human 
Resource 
Management 
More consideration for personnel welfare 
Investment in personnel welfare during operations  of 
disaster response and mitigation 
Staffing More personnel for operation 
Experienced leadership for adaptation Securing more experienced managers for adaptation 
More training and education More required training programs for personnel  
Planning 
Constant planning for adaptation 
Frequent updates for appropriateness of the disaster 
management plan 
Aligned and shared timeline Aligning each disaster plan with other partner organizations  
More Funding 
for system 
improvement 
  
More funding for education, equipment, facilities, and 
planning 
3.5 EXAMINING INTERACTION STRUCTURE AND IDENTIFYING GAPS 
BETWEEN TWO HURRICANE RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
3.5.1 Analytic purpose of social network analysis 
The complex adaptive system can be understood as a network that is comprised of a set of nodes 
and links. A node is the smallest unit in a network and a link is a relation between two nodes, or 
points of intersection, in a network. In case of a multi-level (Multi-jurisdictional and multi-
sectoral) response system, nodes can include federal agencies, local governments, and other 
related organizations such as non-profit or private organizations. Those nodes are connected and 
interdependent with each other through links in the networked structure.  
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An organizational network does not simply mean relationships, but it is a ‗network 
structure‘ (Keast et al. 2004). Keast and his colleagues argued that networking is a common term 
that refers to actors making connections with each other. The ‗networking‘ can be formal and 
also informal, while the ‗network‘ means the connections become formalized. It may involve 
simultaneous actions by independent actors. More specifically, ‗network structure‘ is formed 
from the formalized networking when actors realize that working separately is not enough to 
solve a particular problem or issue. In this sense, formality and strategic interdependence 
distinguish organizational networks from simple networking. So, the organizational network is a 
collectivity in which each member shares broad missions with ‗strategically interdependent‘ 
actors for the effective collective problem solving.  
I examined the difference between ‗network‘ and ‗networking‘ in each hurricane 
response system and how innovative creation of collaborative links (networking) contributed to 
the effective adaptation of the hurricane response system to changing conditions of crisis. Also, I 
compared the two separate networks of disaster response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Gustav. Through this network comparison of two hurricane response systems, this study checked 
the questions of: 1) what are the actual interaction patterns among organizations and how do they 
create vulnerability and opportunities for organizations in a complex adaptive system, 2) how 
can large complex adaptive systems be formed from smaller components and what factors 
influence it, 3) what organizations are structurally important and who takes the key role in 
collaboration. Eventually, this study identified whether there was any evidence of organizational 
learning in the three years since Hurricane Katrina tested the response system and how this 
organizational learning in changing interaction patterns and organizational capacities contributed 
to the effective organizational adaptation to changing conditions.  
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3.5.2 Measures of social network analysis for the examination of interaction structure 
From the content analysis of newspaper articles and situation reports for Hurricanes Katrina and 
Gustav, this study acquired a structured data set that was used for the social network analysis. 
This structured data set from content analysis of newspaper articles and situation reports were 
verified by practicing managers of hurricane response systems. For the identification of 
evidences of organizational learning in managing collaborative relationships, this study uses 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) analysis. QAP analysis starts from the following 
research question;  
If there is a tie between two particular actors in one relation, is there likely to be a tie between 
them in another relation?  If two actors have a strong tie of one type, are they also likely to have a 
strong tie of another? (Hanneman, 2005) 
 
According to Hanneman (2005), when we have information about multiple relations among the 
same sets of actors, it is often of considerable interest whether the probability (or strength) of a 
tie of one type is related to the probability (or strength) of another. An effort to answer to this 
question correlates to the identification of evidence of organizational learning. If organizations in 
the Hurricane Katrina response system created more effective collaborative links in the system, 
and if organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system learned lessons from the 
experiences of the Hurricane Katrina, they needed to use the organizational learning to revise the 
new version of the emergency management plan.  
To address the research question of how large complex adaptive systems can be formed 
from smaller components and what factors influence its formation, I used clique analysis and 
identified the sub-groups in the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems and 
compared the cliques or sub-groups of each system to see whether there are any changes since 
the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. As Hanneman argued (2005), many of the approaches 
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to understanding the structure of a network emphasize examining how dense connections are 
built-up from simpler dyads and triads to more extended dense clusters such as cliques.  This 
view of social structure focuses attention on how solidarity and connection of large social 
structures can be built up out of small and tight components. Also, with this clique analysis, this 
study identified the embedded relationships of core organizations and the relationships between 
subgroups. The definition of clique or subgroup in social network analysis is that a clique is a 
sub-set of a network in which the actors are more closely and intensely tied to one another than 
they are to other members of the network (Hanneman, 2005).  The smallest unit of relationship to 
form a clique is two, but at this level the number of cliques will be greatly increased rendering no 
analytic advantage for this study. So to control the number of cliques and make the network 
comparison manageable, this study will set a minimum size for organizations at three. One thing 
to clarify is that the directed links of the disaster management network were symmetrized 
because, by definition, ties must be reciprocated in order to count for cliques. So a tie or link 
between organizations only exists if x y and yx are both present. 
For the identification of core actors or organizations in the hurricane response systems, 
this study used centrality measures of social network analysis. The most common way to identify 
the core actors in a network would be the use of several measures of centrality with the 
combination of intuitive interpretation of a sociogram. Centrality can be considered as a primary 
criterion for choosing core actors in the disaster network. Considering the complex 
characteristics of the hurricane response networks for Hurricanes Katrina and Hurricane Gustav, 
I used various conceptual standards more than total degree of centrality. Traditionally, as 
Freeman (1979) suggested, there are three basic centralities; Degree, Closeness, and Betweeness 
for the identification of core actors in a network. The problem of using centrality measurement is 
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that there seems to be no dominant centrality measurement in defining core nodes. In other 
words, each centrality measurement is a partial one and has its own strengths and weaknesses in 
identifying core actors. For example, a particular organization can be central in the sense that it 
has the most number of ties with other nodes in Degree Centrality
19
. Others can be powerful 
because they display the closest geodesic distance from other actors in Closeness Centrality
20
. At 
the same time, the length of paths between nodes also can matter in Betweeness centrality
21
. 
These various types of centrality imply that any one measurement cannot capture the exact 
‗central‘ nodes, and the combination or multiple use of centrality needs to be suggested.  
For example, it is intuitive to say that the organizations with a large number of links in 
the entire system can be considered a core organization in the system, but at the same time, as 
Burt (1992) argued, power can be originated from the ability of ‗bridging‘ actors and activities. 
Facing severe damage to their communication systems, some organizations in Hurricane Katrina 
response system functioned as ‗mediators‘ and these organizations contributed by making the 
response system more adaptive to changing conditions. While focusing on the concept of 
‗centrality‘ for the identification of core actors, I considered the concept of ‗mediator‘ at the 
                                                   
19 Degree Centrality is based on adjacency and the number of immediate ties, such as dyadic relations, a node has. 
The strength of Degree Centrality is that it is useful in finding dominant actors in the network. The assumption is 
that if any actor has a high Degree centrality, it can be considered as powerful or dominant in the network because 
the more ties the actor has, the more opportunities and alternatives it will have. And this will make it possible for the 
actor not to be too dependent on any specific actor. Because this study assumed that this network is a directed one, 
we can use this centrality more in detail by dividing it into in-degree and out-degree centrality. According to 
Hanneman (2001), in-degree centrality shows how influential the actor may be, and the out-degree actor indicates 
that how prestigious the actor may be. 
20 The closeness centrality is a measurement which is based on geodesic distances. It emphasizes the distance of an 
actor to all others in the network. According to Hanneman (2001), this concept is useful in the sense that it considers 
the relationship with all other nodes in the network. The basic assumption is that if any node has a high closeness 
centrality, then it can be a central actor because this actor can reach other actors with shorter paths and it can be 
favored by other actors. 
21Betweeness centrality shows an actor who is located between actors and within a network, other actors depend on 
exchanges such as information and resources. Hanneman (2001) said that the betweeness assumes that the actor who 
is located in important geodesic paths is considered significant under the assumption that if any node has a 
betweeness location in the path, it can increase its leverage in the exchange activities. 
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same time. Thus, for the identification of ‗core‘ actors in the network, I used both the concept of 
‗centrality‘ that deals with the most frequent relationships and the concept of ‗mediator‘ that 
deals with the most critical interactions for information and resource sharing at the same time. 
Using these various centrality measures, this study compared two hurricane response systems 
and checked whether there are any changes in interactions among organizations as an evidence 
of organizational learning.  
Based on findings from social network analysis, I developed management strategies for 
effective adaptation and those strategies were applied to the creation of new collaboration 
patterns. One of the critical knowledge for the strategic intervention could be gained from the 
identification of critical collaboration links in the hurricane response systems. To identify the 
most critical collaboration links among organizations and weaknesses in collaboration, this study 
used fragmentation analysis and lambda set analysis. While the clique or subgroup analysis 
checked how the large system was composed of small subgroups and which group or 
organization played the key role in connecting the entire subgroup, lambda set analysis identified 
the vulnerabilities of the disaster response systems. Once those weak nodes or links were 
identified, I developed a computational simulation to strategically intervene at these weak points 
and conducted an experimental study on guiding more effective system evolution with stability 
and resilience.  
The concept of fragmentation analysis basically asks if there are certain connections in 
the graph which, if removed, would result in a disconnected structure (Hanneman 2005). The 
Lambda set approach ranks each of the relationships in the network in terms of importance by 
evaluating how much of the flow among actors in the network goes through each link. It then 
identifies sets of relationships which, if disconnected, would most greatly disrupt collaborations 
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among all of the actors. So, to check for the weaknesses in relationships, this study conducted a 
lambda set analysis first. Then, with this lambda set analysis, this study checked ‗network 
robustness‘ which measures the stability of the entire structure when any major nodes are 
removed. This is especially meaningful in a disaster dynamic network because there is a 
sufficient possibility that nodes might be eliminated from the network by the unexpected impact 
of disasters.  
3.6 AGENT-BASED COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATION IN DESIGNING 
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM 
3.6.1 Analytic purpose of agent-based computational simulation 
From the content analysis and social network analysis, I accumulated and prepared the data set to 
analyze the multi-agent based computational simulation. With the social network analysis, I 
identified weak structural points requiring intervention. Also, with data from the semi-structured 
interviews, I was able to provide insights into how to intervene. Through the agent-based 
computational simulation, I addressed the research question of how the complex system evolves, 
changes, and adapts to changing conditions and how it responds to conditional impact from 
outside with and without intervention.  
More specifically, I posed sub-questions including: what types of interventions would 
guide a successful network evolution? What factors can be used as parameters for guiding 
improved performance of disaster response system? What factors inhibit ‗network collapse‘ or, 
from the opposite perspective, what factors support ‗network stabilization‘ after a major disaster? 
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One issue to clarify for the agent-based computational simulation analysis is what is meant by 
the ―strategic intervention‖ in guiding a resilient and stable evolution of system. Like other social 
systems, a complex adaptive system operates under limitations from environmental complexity. 
For example, as identified in the semi-structured interviews, organizations in a disaster response 
system experienced a communication meltdown or a lack of personnel and resources. In this 
situation, the task of effective information sharing and resource allocation is hard to achieve, and 
organizations in the system face difficulties in adapting to changing conditions.   
To address this problem, I virtually increased the capacities of organizations to make 
them process information more effectively. Also, I restructured or recreated collaboration links 
between core organizations in the system. These strategic interventions were possible through 
the identification of strengths and weaknesses in their relationships and the core actors in the 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems. The third way of strategic 
intervention is to check the effect of culture, such as trust or rapport among organizations in 
disaster response (Comfort, 2005) that can be established between organizations through joint 
training exercises and drills. For example, the collaboration involved in planning and executing 
practice exercises before crisis can develop rapport. And this may increase the amount and the 
accuracy of information that any organization transmits to others with whom they have already 
established a good working partnership.  
3.6.2 Development of a performance measurement metric for network comparison 
This study developed a performance evaluation tool that compares networks to determine which 
intervention strategies can be effective in improving performance of a complex adaptive system. 
Although limited research on the measurement of network performance has been done, some 
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network researchers have started developing tools for this performance measurement in the 
network. For example, Moon and Carley (2007) developed the performance measures of 
knowledge diffusion (KD) and task completion (TC) in networks and suggested metrics for 
gauging knowledge and resource dispersion across organizations. According to this measurement, 
the ability to complete the system‘s mission depends on nodes receiving information.  Therefore, 
information should be circulated and transmitted securely and rapidly for any system to adapt to 
a changing environment effectively.   Using the ideas of knowledge diffusion (KD) and task 
completion (TC), this study developed a performance measurement formula: the rate of resource 
allocation in the disaster response system. The logic behind this formula is that, to complete its 
assigned mission, no organization can stand alone with its own resources. Complex and 
uncertain situations require timely and accurate resource allocation among organizations. If not, 
the lack of resources makes the collaboration fail and finally leads to the collapse of the disaster 
response system and eventually the failure of an organization to adapt to changing conditions.  
The formula for resource allocation is defined as,                                in which, A means 
agent and R means resources to be allocated to other organizations. The concept of network 
adaptation is already included in this formula. Instead of the comparison of static networks, it 
compares the degree of resource allocation after initial stage (i=0, j=0) and checks how 
organizations allocate resources over time. From semi-structured interviews, this study explored 
critical factors that influence the performance of the entire disaster response system, and by 
inserting these parameters into computational simulation models, this study explored the effects 
of single or combined parameters on the construction of adaptive system.  
However, the metric of resource allocation is a proxy that does not directly measure the 
performance of the disaster response system. This metric is based on the assumption that the 
RA = 
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effectiveness of the performance of a complex adaptive system depends on timely allocation of 
available resources to requesting organizations in the system. Especially when normal operating 
procedures fail and the communication system breaks down due to major crisis, the need for 
interdependency for resource allocation increases significantly. In this sense, resource alignment 
measures how well the collective activities of organizations distributed system-wide resources to 
other organizations. In developing this metric, this study considers two aspects. The first thing to 
consider is whether or not an organization has a resource that will be required by other 
organizations in the system. If an organization has specific resources - for example, generators 
for electricity, helicopters for search and rescue, or regular supplies for shelter management etc. - 
and if partnering organizations pursuing a related mission do not have enough equipment or 
resources for the completion of that mission, the partnering organizations will then make a 
request for the needed resource to the organization that has it.  
The second aspect to consider is whether or not an organization is assigned to a task. If an 
organization has a resource but that resource cannot be used for the completion of any specific 
mission-related function, then the existence of that organization and the resources that 
organization has cannot contribute to the completion of any specific mission. For example: the 
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has a flat boat for its search and rescue functions 
but the American Red Cross does not need that resource for its sheltering function because they 
do not operate in the same functional domain. Therefore, whether any two organizations operate 
in the same emergency support function (ESF) domain is also important in building a 
performance measurement metric. The conceptual framework used to build the resource 
allocation (RA) metric is shown in Figure 4-5.  
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Figure 3-4 Framework of relationship between agency, resources, task 
Figure 3-4 represents a simple example of relationship between agencies, its task, and its 
resources. The mission of Agency 2 (A2) is to do Task 1 (T1), and to do Task 1, Agency 2 needs 
Resource 1 (R1) and Resource 3 (R3). While Agency 2 has Resource 3 available, it does not 
have access to Resource 1, which is owned by Agency 1. For the completion of Task 1 and to get 
the necessary resource for the completion of Task 1, Agency 2 requires a resource to Agency 1. 
In this virtual situation, the major policy issue is how to facilitate the resource allocation between 
Agency 1 and Agency 2 in a timely manner. In other words, the strength, stability, and resilience 
of links between Agency 1 and Agency 2 are the most critical things to consider in building 
adaptive systems for disaster response and mitigation. After considering two aspects - the 
availability of resources and the assigned task of each organization, this study developed the 
metric for measuring the effectiveness of resource allocation between agencies more specifically 
as shown in formula 1.  
 
Formula 1: Resource Alignment 
 
A: Agency (Organization) 
R: Resources 
T: Task (Emergency Support Function) 
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3.6.3 Logic of multi-agent based computational simulation  
An organization initiating resource-allocation procedures with another organization must go 
through the following steps. First, in time N, when agent 1 needs resources for its task 
completion, it finds resource exchange candidates within two social links. The reason why agent 
1 looks to its interaction partner within two social links is due to its embeddedness in the major 
disaster response plans. To acquire the necessary resources from other local, state and federal 
agencies, requests from local agencies must pass through the coordination system of the Parish 
EOC and the Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP). 
So, the request for a resource allocation from the local agencies in the disaster response system 
should pass through at least two social links or nodes, the local Parish EOC or GOHSEP.  
Second, agent 1 in the simulation model evaluates the probability of successful 
interaction between possible candidates and the organization itself.  In evaluating the possibility 
of success, agent 1 considers whether the partnering organization has the necessary resources, 
and at the same time, it considers the disaster management plans and whether the interaction with 
the targeted organization is possible. It also considers whether it has a close working relationship 
with the partnering organization for the resource exchange.  
Finally, based on this evaluation, agency 1 selects an interacting organization and sends a 
request for a resource allocation. In finding an interacting candidate in the disaster management 
system, agent 1 also has to consider two ‗if‘ questions. First, when any organization tries to 
interact with other organizations within two social links, if that target organization does not have 
a required resource, then that organization should follow the previous three steps again. Second, 
after it succeeds in finding the organization which has a required resource, if that target 
organization does not have enough cognitive capacity required to process the necessary 
 78 
information, then this trial for interaction will just result in numerous ‗No Responses (NRs)‘ in 
the system.  
A successful resource exchange depends on the level of available resources of partnering 
organizations, a pre-defined role set by the disaster management plan, the existence of a solid 
working relationship, and the cognitive capacity of coordinating organizations. Some clarity is 
necessary regarding the relationship between clear roles defined by the disaster management plan 
and the solid working relationship among organizations. When previously agreed upon 
interaction is not possible under the extreme conditions of a disaster or when an organization 
functionally does not exist after a severe hit by a major disaster, organizations in the complex 
adaptive system seek possible alternative interactions and the collaboration history or solid 
working relationship helps the organization find a possible partner for resource allocation more 
effectively. In this sense, the pre-defined partnership and historically reinforced partnerships are 
both important for any organization to find partners for resource exchange. Figure 3-5 shows the 
algorithm of agent-based simulation model of this study.   
 
Figure 3-5 Algorithm of agent-based simulation Model   
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3.6.4 Steps of multi-agent based computational simulation 
Based on the logic in the computational simulation, this study defines the steps of multi-agent 
based simulation in this section. First, the cycle of the computational simulation starts from the 
identification of key parameters. To improve the relevance of the computational simulation 
model, the identification of core parameters should be conducted by semi-structured interviews. 
The second step of the computational simulation is the exploration of the parameter space. 
One must identify how to operationalize the core parameters in the computational simulation 
model and define what values each parameter can have. By varying the value of core parameters 
in the system, this study will check how changes in the parameter values affect the overall 
performance of a complex adaptive system in resource allocation.  
The third part of the computational simulation is the execution of the computational 
simulation. This study will run the simulation 20,000 times and observe the evolution patterns of 
the complex adaptive system. Using a computational simulation allows the model to be run 
through a high volume of cycles. This will be a great advantage because, under normal situations, 
this many experiments are impossible with actual cases of response systems to major crisis. 
Comparative analysis of several hurricanes that hit different regions at different times is possible 
in a very limited way, but the lack of real-time data for disaster management requires use of a 
simulation method. The fourth step of computational simulation is the validation and 
recalibration process. Through calibrating and fitting the model of computational simulation, this 
study will adjust the value of parameters and explore the parameter space more in detail.   
The final step of this computational simulation is to form several hypotheses or possible 
policy recommendations based on the result of the computational simulation. If any parameter 
proves to contribute significantly to the improved performance of the modeled complex adaptive 
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system, this study will suggest that that parameter be carefully considered when designing future 
interaction structures and developing policy alternatives for more effective system adaptation to 
changing conditions. These five steps of the computational simulation are shown in Figure 3-6.  
 
Figure 3-6 Steps of multi-agent based computational simulation   
3.6.5 Expected outputs of computational simulation   
With a static data set, this study can only compare a limited phase of the network adaptation and 
evolution. But, networks change and evolve over time, and the prediction of this evolution is 
very important in designing a more resilient and stable adaptive system. Adaptation, as is 
necessary for system survival, is not a one-time influence but an ongoing process that is 
continuously constructed and reconstructed during interaction with the environment. A study of 
this nature can expect any pattern of evolution over time, but this natural evolution cannot 
guarantee that it is moving in a desirable direction under conditions of complexity and 
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uncertainty. Therefore, I will develop possible policy alternatives and check how can strategic 
intervention alternatives can make the network perform better, and eventually to adapt to 
changing conditions.  
The concept of strategic intervention requires finding successful strategies (Carley, 2004) 
to make the complex adaptive system recover and adapt successfully in a changing environment. 
A strategic intervention in a network means to arbitrate between the entities or links of a network. 
For instance, a node can be added or removed, so as to form a link (Borgatti et al, 2006; Albert et 
al, 2000) to increase information and resource sharing among organizations in the network. Also, 
by adding links, we can increase the capacity of an organization in processing information and 
delivering required resources to other organizations in a timely manner.  
The idea of network evolution and strategic intervention inherently include the concept 
that there is a starting point of organizational relationship (every network evolution has its initial 
point t=0). These interventions can increase performance, but they can also disrupt existing 
relationships and lead to the deterioration of network performance. Roughly, there are three 
possible types of system evolution: ―Improvement‖, ―Resilience‖, and ―Dysfunction‖. In the case 
of ―Improvement‖, the diffusion rate goes above the baseline after the intervention. This instant 
performance improvement is the ideal type of system evolution. When ―Resilience‖ occurs, the 
diffusion rate goes down immediately after the intervention but can recover within several 
periods of time. This case has some policy implications because there is sufficient possibility that 
any core organization may be rendered functionally dead for a comparatively long period of time. 
During response operations for Hurricane Katrina, many critical organizations were isolated due 
to the collapse of the communication system, which led to the malfunction of those organizations. 
Designing a system to recover from this situation is a critical policy issue. This case of 
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―Resilience‖ can identify some policy implications to assist organizations recover from outer 
impacts. In the case of ―Dysfunction‖ the diffusion rate goes down and the damage will be 
sustained for multiple time points. This is the pattern for any complex adaptive system to avoid 
in its path of evolution. The three possible evolution patterns are shown in figure 3-7. This study 
will pursue ―Improvement‖ and ―Resilience‖ as desirable evolution patterns and seek strategies 
of how to avoid the ―Dysfunction‖ condition.   
 
Figure 3-7 Three possible evolution patterns after strategic intervention 
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4.0  THE CONTEXT FOR ADAPTATION: THE ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT OF THE 2005 AND 2008 GULF COAST HURRICANES 
This chapter introduces two cases of comparative study of organizational adaptation to changing 
conditions; the response systems to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. It provides 
contextual information gained from an assessment of external environments. Environmental 
factors, combined with internal organizational capacities, affect the overall performance of 
system. From these environmental assessments, I identified opportunities and threats (Bryson, 
1988) that organizations in the system faced during their response to Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Gustav. Basically, the external factors are those that organizations cannot control, 
while the inside factors are those mostly controlled by the organizations in the system (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). As Bryson (1988) argued, the identification of opportunities and threats can be 
discovered through monitoring a variety of political, economic, legal, and technological forces 
and the organizations in the system can cleverly use these assessments in improving their 
capacities for effective adaptation to changing conditions. 
As the major contextual information, this study discusses legal, technical, and 
social/political factors that directly or indirectly affected the performance of the system‘s 
responses to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. For the legal factors, I investigated the 
fundamental disaster management plans at the local, state, and federal level and how disaster 
management plans in each level were integrated or failed to be integrated into a consistent plan 
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in response to Hurricane Katrina. I also identified how weaknesses in laws and plans for the 
response to Hurricane Katrina could be revised based on learning from failures. For the technical 
assessment that affected the operation of hurricane response systems, I focused on issues in 
management of the levees‘ system, technical and management issues in the communications 
system breakdown, and the blackout of electricity, especially for the Hurricane Gustav response 
system. For the categorization of political and social factors, I examined the failure of exerting 
responsible leadership, inequality in economic and social status, and racial issues that prevent 
organizations from collaborating effectively in response to crises.  
4.1 THE CONTEXT OF THE HURRICANE KATRINA AND HURRICANE GUSTAV 
RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
4.1.1 Hurricane Katrina (August-September 2005) 
Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas on August 23, 2005, and crossed southern Florida 
as a moderate Category 1 hurricane, causing flooding before strengthening rapidly in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Katrina made its second landfall at 6:10 a.m. CDT
22
 on Monday, August 29 as a 
Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of 125 mph near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana. At 
landfall, hurricane-force winds extended outward 120 miles from the center and the storm's 
central pressure was 920 mbar. After moving over southeastern Louisiana and Breton Sound, it 
made its third landfall near the Louisiana/Mississippi border with 120 mph sustained winds, still  
at Category 3 intensity (See figure 4-1 below). 
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 Central Daylight Time 
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 Facing this large scale disaster, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) issued a hurricane 
watch for southeastern Louisiana, including the New Orleans area at 10 a.m. CDT Saturday, 
August 27. That afternoon, the National Hurricane Center extended the watch to cover the 
Mississippi and Alabama coastlines as well as the Louisiana coast to Intracoastal City. Also, the 
United States Coast Guard began pre-positioning resources beyond the expected impact zone 
starting on August 26, and activated more than 400 reservists. Also, the President of the United 
States declared a state of emergency in selected regions of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi 
on Saturday, the 27th, two days before the hurricane made landfall. That same evening, the 
National Hurricane Center upgraded the storm alert status from hurricane watch to hurricane 
warning over the stretch of coastline between Morgan City, Louisiana to the Alabama-Florida 
border. During video conferences involving the president on August 28 and 29, the director of 
the National Hurricane Center, Max Mayfield, expressed concern that Katrina might push its 
storm surge over the city's levees and flood walls. On Sunday, August 28, President Bush spoke 
with Governor Blanco to encourage her to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans (United 
States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006).  
But, in spite of those various preparation and response activities, the response system at 
all levels of government did not work properly. As delineated in the National Response Plan 
(2004), disaster response and planning was first and foremost a local government responsibility. 
When local government exhausts its resources, it then requests specific additional resources from 
the parish level. The request process proceeds similarly from the parish to the state to the federal 
government as additional resource needs are identified. Many of the problems in disaster 
response to Hurricane Katrina arose from inadequate planning and breakdown of back-up 
communications systems at various levels (refer 4-2 for more detailed discussion). Also, even 
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though some disaster recovery responses to Katrina began before the storm, the level of 
preparedness was lower than expectations and the voluntary activities from faith-based 
organizations and residents from communities could not be coordinated and guided in an 
effective manner.  
In responding to these chaotic situations of official system breakdown, the activities of 
military agencies were highly regarded. Of the 60,000 people stranded in New Orleans, the Coast 
Guard rescued more than 33,500 (GAO, 2006). The United States Northern Command 
established Joint Task Force Katrina based out of Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to act as the 
military's on-scene command on Sunday, August 28 (Bowman et al, 2005; GAO-06-643). 
Approximately 58,000 National Guard personnel were activated to deal with the storm's 
aftermath with troops coming from all 50 states; the Department of Defense also activated 
volunteer members of the Civil Air Patrol (CNN, 2006). But the Department of Homeland 
Security‘s late decision to take over the federal, state, and local operations officially on 12:00 
CDT August 30, 2005 was doomed to fail. This decision was rejected by Governor Blanco who 
indicated that her National Guard could manage the situation, an analysis that was already 
proven false (GAO-06-643). FEMA provided housing assistance to more than 700,000 
applicants, but only one-fifth of the trailers requested in Orleans Parish had been supplied, 
resulting in an enormous housing shortage in the city of New Orleans.  
At least 1,464 people lost their lives in the actual hurricane and in the subsequent floods, 
making it the deadliest U.S. hurricane since the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane (Department of 
Health and Hospitals, 2006). The economic effects of the storm were far-reaching and by April 
2006, the Bush Administration had sought $105 billion for repairs and reconstruction in the 
region (Boston Globe, 2006). Also, Katrina redistributed over one million people from the 
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central Gulf Coast elsewhere across the United States; this became the largest diaspora in the 
history of the United States. By July, 2006, when new population estimates were calculated by 
the U.S. Census Bureau, the state of Louisiana showed a population decline of 219,563, or 
4.87% (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimate, 2006). 
 
       Source: Weather Underground (http://www.wunderground.com) 
 
Figure 4-1 Trace and change of strength of hurricane Katrina 
 
The criticisms of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina primarily consisted of 
condemnations of the mismanagement of the communication system and the lack of leadership 
in the relief efforts in response to the storm and its aftermath. More specifically, criticism 
focused on the delayed response to the flooding of New Orleans, and the subsequent state of 
chaos in the southern part of Louisiana (Thevenot and Gordon, 2006). Within days of Katrina's 
August 29, 2005 landfall, public debate arose about the local, state and federal governments' role 
in the preparations for and response to the hurricane. Criticism was initially prompted by 
televised images of visibly shaken and frustrated political leaders, and of residents who remained 
stranded by flood waters without potable water, food or shelter. In accordance with federal law, 
then-President George W. Bush directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, 
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Michael Chertoff, to coordinate the Federal response. Chertoff designated Michael D. Brown, 
head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as the Principal Federal Official to lead 
the deployment and coordination of all federal response resources and forces in the Gulf Coast 
region. However, the President and Secretary Chertoff initially came under harsh criticism for 
what some perceived as a lack of planning and coordination, even Governor Blanco had 
challenged their efforts. Eight days later, Brown was recalled to Washington and Coast Guard 
Vice Admiral Thad W. Allen replaced him as chief of hurricane relief operations (Failure of 
Initiative, 2006).  
Additionally, there was strong criticism of the local and state government headed by 
Mayor Ray Nagin of New Orleans and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco respectively. Nagin 
and Blanco were criticized for failing to implement New Orleans' evacuation plan and for 
ordering residents to a shelter of last resort without any provisions for food, water, security, or 
sanitation. Perhaps the most important criticism of Nagin was that he delayed his emergency 
evacuation order until 19 hours before landfall, which led to hundreds of deaths of people who, 
by that time, could not find any way out of the city. The destruction wrought by Hurricane 
Katrina raised other, more general public policy issues about emergency management, 
environmental policy, poverty, and unemployment. The storm's devastation also prompted a 
Congressional investigation, which found that FEMA and the Red Cross did not have a logistics 
capacity sophisticated enough to fully support the massive number of Gulf coast victims (Failure 
of Initiative, 2006). 
The disaster response system for Hurricane Katrina was a significant failure in terms of 
securing citizen‘s lives and welfare. These conditions resulted from the lack of a coordination 
structure, the breakdown of the communication system, the inappropriate leadership in creative 
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adaptation, and the lack of resources for an effective operation. Since the failure of Hurricane 
Katrina, the United States government committed significant resources, attention, and time to 
establish a more effective disaster response framework and to improve performance of system. 
According to a Congressional report on policy changes since Hurricane Katrina (CRS report, 
RL33729), the United States government changed the structure of disaster management system, 
recalibrated FEMA‘s mission and responsibility, reinforced retention program for the better 
leadership, adopted strategic human capital plan for the training and education, and revised its 
procurement procedures. Three years after Hurricane Katrina‘s landfall, Hurricane Gustav made 
its landfall in almost the same region geographically and tested the integrity of the newly revised 
disaster response system.  
4.1.2 Hurricane Gustav (August-September 2008) 
Hurricane Gustav formed on the morning of August 25, 2008, about 260 miles southeast of Haiti 
and rapidly strengthened into a tropical storm that afternoon, and into a hurricane early on 
August 26. Later that day, it made landfall on the island of Hispaniola near Haiti, inundated 
Jamaica, ravaged Western Cuba and then steadily moved across the Gulf of Mexico. Once into 
the Gulf, Gustav gradually weakened due to increased wind shear and dry air. It weakened to a 
Category 2 hurricane late on August 31, and remained at that intensity until landfall on the 
morning of September 1 near Cocodrie, Louisiana. By 10 PM CDT, Gustav had been 
downgraded to a Tropical Storm with winds of 60 mph about 20 miles southwest of Alexandria, 
Louisiana and by 4 AM CDT on September 2 Gustav had diminished to a Tropical Depression 
with a threat of severe flooding in the lower Mississippi Valley and eastern Texas (National 
Hurricane Center, 2008).  
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After the severe criticism regarding the lack of preparation for Hurricane Katrina, all 
emergency management agencies were on alert before the landfall of Hurricane Gustav. On 
August 31, the National Hurricane Center predicted with 45% probability that Gustav would 
remain at Category 3 or above on September 1. This influenced preparations, although in fact 
Gustav had dropped just below the Category 3 threshold to Category 2 by landfall, and Category 
1 shortly afterwards. On the morning of August 26, with Gustav still over Haiti, Louisiana 
emergency preparedness officials met several times to discuss predictions that Gustav would 
reach the state as a major hurricane in three to five days (Times Picayune, 2008).  
 
       Source: Weather Underground (http://www.wunderground.com) 
 
Figure 4-2 Trace and the change of strength of Hurricane Gustav 
 
Several areas of Louisiana planned for evacuations and parishes in the New Orleans area 
announced plans for voluntary evacuations beginning Saturday, August 30. New Orleans Mayor 
Ray Nagin said that it was possible that thousands of people who needed city help could start 
leaving on Saturday as the first wave of a full-scale evacuation. Later, he ordered the mandatory 
evacuation of the whole of New Orleans commencing on the morning of August 31, calling 
Gustav "the storm of the century ... the mother of all storms." on August 31 (MSNBC, 2008). 
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Nagin also declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew and the cessation of city assistance in evacuations by 
the afternoon (Times Picayune, 2008). By that afternoon, 1.9 million people had evacuated 
southern Louisiana, with 200,000 of them being residents of New Orleans alone, making it the 
largest evacuation in the history of Louisiana. Officials had finalized evacuation plans which 
proposed assisted evacuations as early as August 29, consisting of contraflow lane reversal on all 
major highways and 700 buses to help move evacuees. Wary of repeating the mistakes of 
Hurricane Katrina, authorities chose not to use the Louisiana Superdome and New Orleans 
Convention Center as emergency shelters (Times Picayune, 2008). The following day, Louisiana 
governor Bobby Jindal declared a state of emergency, activating between 3,000 and 8,000 
members of the Louisiana National Guard.  
In spite of a more advanced level of preparedness and coordination for disaster response 
activities, communities in Louisiana suffered severely from Hurricane Gustav mainly due to the 
strong wind and heavy rainfall resulting in a wide-range blackout of electrical services. Wind 
damage was severe enough to shut the city down for several days. Most businesses remained 
closed through September 5th, five days after landfall. Power lines along Baton Rouge's tree-
lined streets were easily brought down as thousands of trees were uprooted and snapped in half 
by Gustav's fierce winds. Entire sections of the city were cut off by the mountains of debris. It 
would be two weeks before power was restored to all residents. Around 1.5 million people were 
without power in Louisiana on September 1 (Courier, 2008).   
The responses to Hurricane Gustav were better prepared and coordinated than those of 
Hurricane Katrina. In this context, the comparison of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav 
created an unprecedented chance for comparative analysis, rare in social science. As discussed in 
the chapter 3, the storms affected almost the same region and mobilized the entire disaster 
 92 
management system. With this comparative study, it is possible to assess whether there is any 
sign of organizational/systemic learning from the earlier experiences of Hurricane Katrina. 
Estimating the effectiveness of disaster response and mitigation for two hurricanes, I extracted 
the critical factors and applied them to the design of a more resilient disaster management system. 
Table 3-1 summarizes and compares the two hurricanes response systems.  
Table 4-1 Comparison between hurricane Katrina and hurricane Gustav 
 
  Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Gustav 
Landfall  
August 29th, 2005, near Buras about 55 
miles south of New Orleans 
September 1
st
, 2008, near Cocodrie, about 
70 miles Southwest of New Orleans. 
Strength (Saffir-Simpson 
Hurricane Scale) 
Category 3 
Category 2 & category 1 shortly 
afterwards 
Damage Over $100 billion (2005 USD) Over $6.61 billion (2008 USD) 
Fatalities 1,464 112 direct, 41 indirect 
Strom surge Estimated at 27 feet high. Reported at 12 feet high. 
Evacuation  No assisted evacuation before the storm. Assisted evacuation as early as August 29. 
Emergency declaration  Declared 2 days before the storm. Declared 6 days before landfall. 
Leadership change 
FEMA headed by Michael Brown. FEMA headed by David Paulison. 
New Orleans Mayor: Ray Nagin New Orleans Mayor: Ray Nagin 
Louisiana Governor: Kathleen Blanco Louisiana Governor: Bobby Jindal 
Level of law enforcement Law enforcement weak Twice law enforcement than Katrina. 
Levee status Levees broke Levees did not break 
4.2 ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS OF HURRICANE 
RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
4.2.1 Assessment of legal factors: disaster management laws and plans  
The operations and collaborations of organizations in the Hurricane Katrina response system 
were guided and regulated by National Response Plan (2004) that was the national plan to 
respond to emergencies such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks. It came into effect in 
December 2004, and was superseded by the National Response Framework on March 22, 2008 
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after the several revisions since the failure of Hurricane Katrina. The federal government first 
actively engaged in emergency management by passing the Congressional Act of 1803, which 
provided relief after a devastating fire in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. For the about the next 
150 years, the federal government took a reactive role in emergency response until passing the 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. But the problem of the previous disaster management plans 
was that there was no comprehensive plan for federal emergency response until 1979, when 
President Carter signed an executive order creating the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). 
FEMA was first charged to take emergency response duties from multiple agencies in 
disjointed plans. In 1988 the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford 
Act 1988) was enacted. The Stafford Act established a system of federal assistance to state and 
local governments and required all states to prepare individual Emergency Operations Plans. 
Under the Stafford Act, the initial response efforts to disasters are the major responsibility of 
local agencies. The problem, especially for the response to Hurricane Katrina, was that the strict 
application of Stafford Act prevented organizations from collaborating in the initial stage of 
preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina. This interpretation of the Act caused a severe 
lack of resources and limited joint collaboration for the first responders such as Parish 
governments and American Red Cross. The Stafford Act authorized the Director of FEMA to 
prepare a Federal Response Plan (FRP, 1999). Initially, the FRP brought multiple federal 
organizations together to assist states with disaster preparedness and response; it was augmented 
by the National Contingency Plan (NCP, 1990) through the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).  
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Since that time, the United States government started to build nation wide and extensive 
disaster management plans by combining separate plans into united and synthesized ones. The 
NCP, in existence since 1968, was initially a blueprint for responding to oil spills, but was 
expanded to include hazardous materials in 1972 with the passing of the Clean Water Act. In 
1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
more commonly known as "Superfund," further expanded the scope of the NCP to include 
emergency removal actions at hazardous waste sites and required regulated facilities to submit 
contingency plans. The federal government helped state and local officials protect public health 
and the environment in the event of a hazardous material release or emergency through the NCP. 
In 1992, FEMA took an all-hazards approach and integrated various disaster management plans 
to emergency planning. In 1994, the Stafford Act was amended to incorporate most of the former 
Civil Defense Act of 1950. Also, in 1996 the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 
(FRERP) was signed into law. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and FEMA prepared 
a plan outlining the federal government‘s response for peacetime radiological emergencies 
within the U.S. or its territories. Accordingly, by 1996, FEMA developed a guide for individual 
states to develop individual Emergency Operation Plans known as the Guide for All Hazards 
Emergency Operations Planning (1996).  
Another critical change in disaster management plans is the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was formed following the September 11 
terrorist attacks and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) put FEMA under its authority 
when it was established in 2003. The DHS administered the National Response Plan (NRP) 
when it came into effect in December 2004 just several months before the landfall of Hurricane 
Katrina. But as many official reports and research papers pointed out (FEMA, 2006; White 
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House, 2006; House of Representatives, 2006), the National Response Plan did not function well 
in preparing, coordinating, and mitigating the adversarial impacts from Hurricane Katrina. Due 
to the lack of proper cognition of the magnitude of situation, the pro-activation of National 
Response Plan was not possible.  
According to Failure of Initiative (2006), including the office of President, top public 
officers in federal governments did not recognize the situation immediately and accordingly 
failed in timely activation of National Response Plan. More critical issue was the plan itself. 
With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since September 11 terrorist 
attack and the development of the National Response Plan (NRP), an additional layer of 
management and response authority was placed between the President and FEMA, and 
additional response coordinating structures were established which, in the case of Hurricane 
Katrina, blocked the effective information flow and resulted failure in coordinating activities. 
According to the Failure of Initiative (2006), the Secretary of Homeland Security became the 
President‘s principal disaster advisor responsible for enabling the President to use his authority 
under the Stafford Act to direct all federal agencies, particularly the Department of Defense 
(DOD), to respond in a coordinated and expeditious fashion. But, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security did not function appropriately as critical response decision point mainly due to his lack 
of disaster management experiences. Even though there were plenty of advance warning from 
the National Hurricane Center (NHC) and simulated analysis for the breakdown of levees system 
prior to that, the Homeland Security Operations Center failed to provide valuable situational 
information to the White House and key operational officials during the disaster.  
Since the failure of getting proper situation awareness, it has become clear to agencies 
that the response to Hurricane Katrina was not unified and the coordination among local, state, 
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and federal authorities failed in several areas. The National Response Plan and National Incident 
Management System were supposed to serve as a pre-established unified command structure for 
response to such a catastrophic disaster. For the seamless execution of the NRP, each agency 
needed to develop effective operating procedures essential to satisfying that agency‘s roles and 
responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. Some agencies such as The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Department of Transportation had well developed standard operating 
procedures and made it aligned with each other (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ESF #3 Field 
Guide, 2001). The efforts for the alignment of disaster management plans between federal and 
state agencies and between state and local agencies were not effective due to the lack of 
coordinated plans. Many Parish governments had no disaster management plans at all 
(Ascension Parish 2006) and this situation caused the failure in coordination in the initial stage 
of response and mitigation.  
Due to the lack of sufficient operating procedures for their responsibilities under the NRP, 
many local agencies referred to related sections of the NRP when asked for operating procedures. 
But since the NRP was not developed to the level of an operational plan itself, this led to 
problems with execution of Emergency Support Function (ESF) responsibilities of local agencies. 
With this lack of coordinated plans and the failure of FEMA in coordinating response activities, 
the Department of Defense took the unified command function by taking requests from the State 
of Louisiana directly (Senate Comm. Hearing at 70-72, 2005). These ad-hoc activities of core 
coordinating organizations sometimes successfully complement the lack of disaster management 
plans, but in many cases, resulted in a duplication of efforts and a delay in the responses to 
Hurricane Katrina. Unplanned and unreported interactions between agencies created many 
difficulties in managing well-logged inventories of available resources. An additional notable 
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problem of the National Response Plan was the lack of clear communication procedures between 
core organizations, a condition that disrupted the overall information flow and situational 
awareness. In summary, Hurricane Katrina exposed numerous deficiencies in the National 
Response Plan, and various failures delayed appropriate federal, state, and local responses to 
Hurricane Katrina. Organizations were ill prepared and they did not understand their required 
roles and responsibilities as prescribed by the NRP. As a result, the expected coordination by 
FEMA was not sufficient to integrate the efforts of each agency into an effective response 
system.  
Since the failure and criticisms on National Response Plan, it was updated on May 25, 
2006 following the lessons from the experience of responding to Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and 
Rita in 2005. On March 2008, DHS replaced the National Response Plan with the National 
Response Framework (2008). The National Response Framework as a part of the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security presented the guiding principles enabling all levels of domestic 
response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and 
emergencies. Building on the existing National Incident Management System (NIMS) as well as 
Incident Command System (ICS), the NRF's coordinating structures aimed to provide an 
effective implementation at any level for local, state, and national emergency or disaster  
response. In developing a new disaster management plan, the DHS focused on the following five 
principles to make their new disaster management system more operable under stress. First, DHS 
emphasized an ―Engaged partnership” which means leaders at all levels of organizations 
collaborate to develop shared goals and align capabilities. This change is designed to prevent any 
level of agencies from being overwhelmed in times of crisis. Second, under the National 
Response Framework, the responsibilities of first response are still in local agencies. The 
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National Response Framework presents the principle of ―Tiered response” which focused on the 
efficient management of incidents, so that such incidents are handled at the lowest possible 
jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities only when needed. But the National 
Response Framework also focused on ―Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational 
capabilities” for implementation according to changes in size, scope, and complexity of 
incidents, so that the responses to disasters adapt and meet the requirements under ICS/NIMS 
management by objectives. Third, the NRF suggested ―Unity of effort through unified 
command.” Unity of effort in NRF refers to the state of harmonizing efforts among multiple 
organizations working towards a similar objective (Lawrence, 1995). This prevents organizations 
from working at cross purposes and it reduces duplication of effort. Instead of revising the main 
feature of Stafford Act, organizations in charge of Incident Command System or National 
Incident Management System are supposed to respect for each participating organization's chain 
of command with an emphasis on seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of 
common objectives. This seamless coordination is guided by the effective and interoperable 
communication protocol between organizations in ICS/NIMS command structures and assigned 
resources to coordinate response operations among multiple jurisdictions that may be joined at 
an incident complex.  
With these principles, organizations still were required to collaborate under the command 
system of Incident Management System, but the National Response Framework applied learning 
from the failure of National Response Plan and emphasized the dynamic transparent fashion of 
collaboration and also the ability for adaptation. Like the National Response Plan for the 
response to Hurricane Katrina, the National Response Framework was activated several months 
before the landfall of Hurricane Gustav. Due to its clarity in mission, communication protocol, 
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and the pro-activation of proper part of the plan, the National Response Framework was effective 
in response to Hurricane Gustav.    
4.2.2 Assessment of technical factors: levees system, wetland use policy, and 
communication system   
As many Hurricane Katrina related reports pointed out, the levee system breakdown was a 
second, but the most critical blow to the Hurricane Katrina response system. Since Hurricane 
Katrina hit New Orleans and its neighboring region in August 29, 2005, there were over 50 
failures of the levees and flood walls during Hurricane Katrina. The levee and flood wall failures 
caused flooding in 85% of New Orleans and also severely damaged the communication 
equipment of organizations in the response system. As a result, millions of gallons of water 
spilled into vast areas of New Orleans, flooding thousands of homes and businesses with 10 feet 
or more of water (IPET, 2006). More specifically, the storm surge caused breaches in 20 places 
on the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal (MR-GO)
23
 and caused flooding of the entire Saint 
Bernard Parish and the East Bank of Plaquemines Parish. Also, three major breaches occurred on 
the Industrial Canal; one on the northeast side near the junction with Gulf Intracoastal Waterway 
and two on the southeast side along the Lower Ninth Ward, between Florida Avenue and 
Claiborne Avenue (IPET 2006). On the east side of New Orleans, the 17th Street Canal levee 
breached 4 feet (1.2 m) below design specs on the New Orleans side near the Old Hammond 
                                                   
23
 Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal is the 76 mi (122 km) channel constructed by the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers in the mid-20th century that provided a shorter route between the Gulf of Mexico and New Orleans's 
inner harbor Industrial Canal via the Intracoastal Waterway. In 2005, the MR-GO channeled Hurricane Katrina's 
storm surge into the heart of Greater New Orleans, contributing significantly to the subsequent multiple engineering 
failures experienced by the region's hurricane protection network. 
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Highway Bridge. The London Avenue Canal breached in two places, near Robert E. Lee 
Boulevard, and near the Mirabeau Avenue Bridge. 
These multiple failures of the levee system caused widespread inundation and significant 
damage, hampering rescue and recovery efforts. The problem from a disaster management 
perspective is that the storm surge over the levees was much anticipated from the various 
technical reports and simulated analysis before the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. This well-
known threat was the motivation for FEMA to sponsor the ―Hurricane Pam‖ exercise in 2005. In 
this previous exercise, flooding as the result of overtopping of levees and the breaches in 
floodwalls was predicted for a storm stronger than a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane. That is, it 
was expected that some water would flow over the levees and floodwalls based on Katrina‘s 
forecasted strength. Although the city did not receive Katrina‘s strongest force head-on, the levee 
and floodwall infrastructure‘s capability to protect the city was exceeded (CRS Report for 
Congress, 2005).  
Before the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans already faced frequent flooding 
threats from the Mississippi River, coastal storms, and intense precipitation; the system of levees 
and floodwalls around the city was designed to provide a certain level of protection from those 
threats (Times-Picayune, 2005). Also, the complementary system of pumps and canals is 
designed to remove water trapped in the city, but the historical experience of successful response 
to flooding with the existing pumping system prevented more investment on extensive 
restructuring of the levee system. The storm damage reduction infrastructure around New 
Orleans consists of levees and floodwalls, and represents a combination of federal and local 
investments and responsibilities. Most of the nation‘s flood and storm damage reduction  
infrastructure was supposed to be maintained by local governments and local levee districts; 
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some of the infrastructure was locally built, while other projects were built by the federal 
government. And this heterogeneity in building and managing the levee system limited an 
integrated response to the failure of levees and water walls.  
The principal federal agency responsible for constructing flood, storm, and shore  
protection infrastructure was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In August 2002, the Corps 
completed a reconnaissance study of whether to strengthen coastal Louisiana‘s hurricane damage 
reduction projects, including the New Orleans projects, to protect against Category 4 and 5 
storms (CRS Report RS20866). If implemented, coastal Louisiana would have the only Category 
5 protection system in the country (CRS Report RL32064). But, Hurricane Katrina has resulted 
in some questioning why a Category 4 or 5 hurricane storm damage system was not already in 
place for New Orleans. Partially, the levee system had not be maintained with full funding over 
decades.  
For example, with the completion of MR-GO in 1965, the Port of New Orleans advanced 
a plan to largely abandon its wharfs along the Mississippi River and relocate its activities to the 
inner harbor created by the Industrial Canal, the Intracoastal Waterway, and the MR-GO. This 
vast project, termed ―Centroport U.S.A.‖ never secured sufficient funding and was quietly 
jettisoned by the port in the mid-1980s. The France Road Container Terminal and the Jourdan 
Road Wharf were the only two elements realized according to the Centroport plan (U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, 1997). Also, once construction of the levees was 
completed by USACE, the responsibilities for operating and maintaining the levees were split 
among many local and state organizations, which prevented the standard cooperation agreement 
for carrying out flood control projects statewide. The costs of constructing these projects were 
shared, with operation and maintenance being a 100 percent local responsibility. These included 
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levee boards in each parish, as well as separate water and sewer boards. The number of 
organizations involved, and disagreements among them, made accountability diffuse and created 
potential gaps and weaknesses in parts of the flood protection system (Failure of Initiative 2006). 
Also, local sponsors did not have control over all factors that could affect their parts of the levee 
system.  
Despite the well-known importance of the levees, and the consequences of failure, the 
local levee boards responsible for maintaining and operating the levees did not have any warning 
system in place. While federal regulations required that they monitor levees during periods of 
potential flooding, the requirement was impractical to implement during the response to 
hurricane Katrina. In addition to no warning system, the loss and breakdown of communications 
worsened the situation. Although there were some sporadic reports of flooding from a variety of 
information sources, the poor and broken communication system made it difficult for 
coordinating agencies such as LOHSEP and FEMA to confirm that there were actual breaches in 
the levees. These factors, combined with the physical difficulties of getting to the breach sites, 
delayed repair of the levee breaches.  
Since the failure of levee system, there have been some significant improvements to the 
levees of New Orleans. The Army Corps of Engineers reinforced the structures of the levee 
system in New Orleans area and increased the height of the levees to make them to withstand 
overtopping without catastrophic failures. When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf area, levees were 
susceptible to erosion by overtopping, by edified flow, and by undercutting. Once flood waters 
overtopped an embankment they quickly scoured the land-side toe of the embankment, and 
scoured deep holes that develop on either side of the ―hydraulic jump.‖ So, the Army Corps of 
Engineers adopted geogrid-wrapped hay bales or gravel filled HDPE baskets that can be used as 
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facing elements for mechanically-stabilized embankments. Also, when the levee system was 
exposed to storm surge, the new levee system made them to be more efficient energy dissipation 
systems, not just simple barriers. With structural changes, the holes have been fixed and 
strengthened, the walls have been built up an additional three feet, and new pumps have been 
installed for better drainage (CNN, 2008). Another step to protect levees system from disasters 
was to improve communication protocols between local governments who were in charge of 
management and the Army Corps of Engineers. For example, the levee officials and the corps 
met every two weeks to discuss and inspect flood-control projects designed to guard against a 
100-year storm before then landfall of Hurricane Gustav. The revised communication protocol 
was to ensure a smooth transition as the Corps designs and builds $4 billion worth of levees, 
floodwalls, floodgates and pumping stations that operated and maintained by the levee district, 
formally known as the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority. The inspection teams 
include representatives from the Corps and the levee district as well as the state Department of 
Transportation and Development and the Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration. These 
efforts for the coordinated preparation and response to disasters and strengthened structure of 
levees were not tested by Hurricane Gustav.  
In the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic disruption of Hurricane Katrina, 
communication channels broke down and could not be reestablished as rapidly so that individual 
efforts for emergency response could not be fully coordinated. More significantly, as Comfort 
mentioned (2007), the common operating picture that was critical to joint operations was not 
available to core organizations in the response system. Accordingly, due to the lack of advanced 
technology in managing resources and the breakdown of the communication system, effective 
collaboration and coordination was not possible. First, organizations in the hurricane Katrina 
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response system were suffered from the lack of available communication equipment. For 
example, cell towers were typically not equipped with sufficient emergency power backup 
capacities, and backup generators with long-distance switches did not tolerate flooding caused by 
the levee system breakdown. As a result, both mobile phone and long-distance phone terrestrial 
communication suffered an almost complete disruption in Katrina's wake. In comparison, 
satellite communications remained quantitatively operational and were utilized within minutes of 
the disaster by FEMA, the National Guard and the Red Cross, as well as by state and local first 
responders, utility workers, and people in search of relatives (Wireless IQ, 2005). More than 
20,000 Global-star, Iridium and Mobile Satellite Ventures satellite phones and terminals were 
deployed in the affected region within 2 days after the event. Within the first 72 hours the 
Iridium network traffic surged by 3000% and the subscriber base rose by 500%. The provider 
Globalstar was activating 1400 devices/day, as compared with a typical rate of about 80 devices 
per day. Mobile Satellite Ventures reported an increase in traffic in the affected region of more 
than 400% (Leitl, 2005), and supplied satellite terminals to a number of emergency responders 
(e.g. FEMA's Urban Search and Rescue teams). 
Like this, Hurricane Katrina devastated an infrastructure such as cell phone towers and 
radio antennas, that depends on aboveground structures. A 400-foot antenna built to withstand 
150 mile-per-hour winds fell during the storm, crippling communications for the sheriff‘s office 
in Jefferson Parish. A majority of the public-safety systems serving police and fire departments 
in the Gulf Coast region ceased functioning, severely hampering the coordination of rescue 
efforts. The New Orleans Police Department‘s system was largely inoperative for 3 days 
following the hurricane. These failures left many key emergency response personnel with no way 
of communicating with one another during a time when coordination of rescue efforts was most 
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important. In New Orleans, hundreds of police officers were left trying to communicate on two 
radio channels using a back-up system, which resulted in delays before their messages could get 
through (Piper & Ramos, 2006).  
Many of these failures of communication occurred because of poor planning processes, 
with key generators placed on ground floors vulnerable to flooding. However, at least one 
transmission site operated by the New Orleans police flooded despite being 10 feet off the 
ground. Other communications systems that stopped functioning due to loss of power resulting 
from damaged generators couldn‘t be repaired for days because technicians were not allowed 
past state police roadblocks. Also, backup systems became overwhelmed due to high volume and 
phone lines proved vulnerable to Katrina, with almost 2 million phone lines and cell phones 
experiencing interruptions or being out of service along the Gulf Coast. New Orleans residents 
trapped in their homes by floodwaters couldn‘t call for help and family members couldn‘t call to 
find out if they had escaped. This combination of failed backup generators (either flooded or out 
of fuel), downed telephone lines, flooding in the switch offices that route calls, and overwhelmed 
phone lines resulted in a defunct phone system.  
While emergency services radio towers in the area, built to resist sustained winds within 
the 200 MPH range, largely remained functional, cell phone services broke down due to tower, 
antennae, and equipment damage. A mobile cell service was not fully deployed. Text messaging 
on cell phones however, worked remarkably well. Radio and TV stations, for the most part, 
successfully stayed on the air, often employing satellites. The major BellSouth Internet hub in 
New Orleans went remarkably unscathed, but there were serious problems at the user-connect 
end. In areas that sustained power outages, DSL likewise went down. BellSouth had not installed 
a battery backup, knowing that batteries would be insufficient to power a system of such 
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magnitude. In summary, Hurricane Katrina tested all modes of communication technology 
during and after the Hurricane Katrina. Immediately following the storm, there was severe chaos 
in information sharing. Some of this can be attributed to poorly mapped channels of 
communication flow at local, state, regional, and particularly federal levels, and some of it was 
due to equipment damage and malfunction. As a result, the information that was critical to 
collaboration among organizations was not available to managers of core organizations. 
Combined with the lack of proper technology for resource management, the level of technology 
was not sufficient to meet the impending needs from organizations in the Hurricane Katrina 
response system.   
4.2.3 Assessment of political and social factors  
As delineated in the National Response Plan (2004), disaster response and planning is first and 
foremost a local government responsibility. When local government exhausts its resources, it 
then requests specific additional resources from the parish level. The request process proceeds 
similarly from the parish to the state and from state to the federal level as additional resource 
needs are identified. Many official reports and research papers show that the political leadership 
necessary for the effective coordination of individual activities was not exerted in responding to 
Hurricane Katrina (The Federal response: Lessons learned, 2006). For example, Michael 
Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, decided to take over the federal, 
state, and local operations officially on August 30, 2005, citing the National Response Plan 
(California Chronicle, 2006). But this attempt was refused by Governor Blanco who indicated 
that her National Guard could manage the situation. Also, FEMA provided housing assistance to 
more than 700,000 applicants—families and individuals. However, only one-fifth of the trailers 
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requested in Orleans Parish have been supplied, resulting in an enormous housing shortage in the 
city of New Orleans (Times Picayune, 2005), the shortage resulted partially because many local 
areas voted to not allow the trailers, and many areas had no utilities, a requirement prior to 
placing the trailers.  
From previous examples of coordination failure, there were strong criticisms, especially 
for the failure in coordinating multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral activities in response to 
Hurricane Katrina. The criticisms primarily consisted of cases of mismanagement and lack of 
leadership in the relief efforts in response to the storm and its aftermath. For example, the 
severely delayed responses to the flooding of New Orleans, and the subsequent state of chaos in 
the Superdome were the most critical failure of coordination and collaboration. Within days of 
Katrina's landfall, public debate arose about the local, state and federal governments' role in the 
preparations for and response to the hurricane.  
Many critics have noted that while Mayor Nagin gave a mandatory evacuation order on 
August 28, before the storm hit, they did not make sufficient prevention and provisions to 
evacuate the homeless, the poor, the elderly, the infirm, or the carless households (Statement on 
Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana, 2005). Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, 
on August 27, the White House issued a statement,
 
effective August 26, authorizing federal 
emergency assistance for Louisiana. The statement authorized the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to coordinate disaster 
relief and required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save 
lives, protect property and public health and safety in the 39 parishes in the State of Louisiana. 
But, the President had not yet authorized FEMA to enter the coastal areas despite the governor's 
request including parishes in the southern coastal areas (Office of the Governor, Press release 
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2005). Facing this situation, the Governor‘s efforts activated the National Guard at August 26, 
State of Emergency Declaration
 
and Red Cross relief in New Orleans but those activities were 
not well coordinated with the federal efforts.  
According to the Louisiana Evacuation plan (Louisiana State Emergency Management 
Plane 2005), evacuation was mainly left up to individual citizens to find their own way out of the 
city. It was known that many residents of New Orleans lacked cars, especially for the poor 
residents. It is also believed that many citizens, having survived previous hurricanes, did not 
anticipate the impending catastrophe and chose not to ride out the storm. Even so, a 2000 census 
revealed that 27% of New Orleans households, amounting to approximately 120,000 people, 
were without privately owned transportation. Additionally, at 38%, New Orleans has one of the 
highest poverty rates in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). These factors may have 
prevented many people from being able to evacuate on their own. State and city evacuation plans 
(New Orleans Emergency Operation Plan, 2004, Part 1 Section C and part II-2) mentioned the 
emergent use of school buses for evacuation, but as Mayor Nagin admitted, it was not clear 
whether these buses were owned by the city or by a private contractor to which the city had 
outsourced school bus services and city of New Orleans had no control over them.  
The most important criticism of Nagin was that he delayed his emergency evacuation 
order until 19 hours before landfall, which led to hundreds of deaths of people who (by that time) 
could not find any way out of the city (A Failure of Initiative, 2006). Related with this, many 
residents of New Orleans region blamed state and local governments (75%) more than at the 
Federal government (67%), with 44% blaming Bush's leadership directly (ABC Poll, 2005). This 
problem of the lack of political leadership and resulting inadequate preparedness caused the 
failure of the flood protection system in 53 different places in metro New Orleans that were 
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designed and built by the US Army Corps of Engineers (IPET 2006). When Hurricane Katrina 
passed east of New Orleans, it was a weakening Category 4 storm and the levee system was not 
prepared for large size hurricanes. Questions have been raised about sufficient funding for the 
Corps of Engineers, which was in charge of many hurricane-protection programs across the 
United States. Due to the budget cut by Bush Administration, the Corps had performed only last-
minute and substandard reinforcement of levees, some of which subsequently failed. For 
example, In 2005, President Bush proposed cutting the Corps' budget by 7%, and in 2004 
proposed a 13% cut (Washington Post, 2005; Times Picayune, 2005). This lack of adequate 
funding to construct and manage levees systems caused severe second impact to the response 
system to Hurricane Katrina.  
Many local emergency managers defended FEMA against the charge of lack of political 
leadership and federal agencies‘ unpreparedness pointing out that the Bush Administration has 
since 9/11 reduced the agency's budget, mission, and status. FEMA, which was elevated to 
cabinet-level status under President Bill Clinton‘s administration and later, incorporated into the 
Department of Homeland Security, placed high priority on counter-terrorism and disaster 
preparation (Comfort, 2006) rather than natural disasters. Before Hurricane Katrina‘s landfall, 
the International Association of Emergency Managers (2007) had predicted that FEMA could not 
adequately respond to a catastrophe due to the integration and staffing overlaps. Also, President 
Bush was criticized for appointing Michael D. Brown as FEMA director who had no experience 
in disaster relief prior to joining FEMA. The entire disaster response system before the landfall 
of Hurricane Katrina was not activated or sufficiently resilient to such a large scale crisis. 
Besides the effect of political factors on the performance of hurricane Katrina response 
system, also social factors such as race, social class, and culture affected severely the 
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organizational response to crisis. As Elliott and Pais argued (2006), although residents of the 
Gulf South share a common region, their responses to Hurricane Katrina varied in non-random 
ways reflective of racial and class divisions that have taken root and grown in the area over time 
(Fothergill et al., 1999). Since media images showed that nearly all those left behind to suffer 
and die were African Americans (CNN, 2005), the social effects of race and social class ignited 
the debates on the effect of race and economic class on evacuation. Some alleged that race, class, 
and other factors contributed to delays in government response. The percentage of black victims 
among storm-related deaths was 49%, below their proportion in the area's population (approx. 
60%, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, 2005). Also, some researchers argued that 
poor residents were not able to afford homes in safer flood-protected areas and did not have the 
resources to evacuate easily (Lavelle & Feagin, 2006). 
Demographically, two-thirds of the residents of New Orleans are African Americans, and 
New Orleans is one of America's poorest cities with more than 25% of residents and 40% of 
children living at or below the poverty line (GAO, 2006). More critically, within the city of New 
Orleans, the poorest tended to live in the lowest parts that are most vulnerable to flooding. Also, 
98% of residents in the Lower Ninth Ward, which was flooded by a catastrophic breach in the 
nearby Industrial Canal, were poor and African-American. Many of the poor depend on welfare, 
Social Security, or other public assistance checks, which they receive on the first of each month, 
meaning that Hurricane Katrina made landfall just when many of the poor had exhausted their 
resources. Thus, many of the city's poor simply couldn't afford to flee the city before the 
hurricane struck. Also, social and economic class affected the performance of the response 
system because those families most able to afford homes in safer flood-protected areas had the 
resources to evacuate more easily than poorer families. Elliott and Pais argued that race and class 
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are inextricably intertwined primarily because of a long history of well-institutionalized poverty 
combined with race in the city of New Orleans. Due to the long rooted history of slavery and 
poverty, economic and political power has been held primarily by the white elite (Elliott, 2006). 
With respect to race, there are two broad areas where racial differences seem to have mattered. 
The first involves timing of evacuation and sources of emotional support, that is, behavior more 
or less under the control of individuals themselves. Related with pure race issue, some researcher 
argued that education and their economic status need to be considered together. Forman (2006) 
argues that African-American in the City of New Orleans were less inclined than whites to 
evacuate before the storm, mostly because they did not believe that the hurricane would be as 
devastating as it eventually was. Or culturally, Elliott found that African-Americans were more 
likely to report ―leaning on the lord‖ while whites were more likely to report relying on friends 
and family. Like this, the issue of race needs to be interpreted with their economic and cultural 
factors together. In summary, the differences in race, economic class, and culture affected the 
performance of Hurricane Katrina response system while there are hot debates regarding the 
extent of effects.  
4.3 SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT OF CONTEXT SURROUNDING TWO 
HURRICANE RESPONSE SYSTEMS  
Since 9/11/2001, the United States Government has committed significant resources, attention, 
and time to establish a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve security for the 
nation. But DHS‘s ineffectiveness in responding to the 2005 hurricanes on the Gulf Coast led to 
wide public criticism of its performance, and further concerns whether the United States disaster 
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response system actually learns from the previous crises and effectively adapts to rapidly 
changing conditions. The newly established disaster response system since 9/11 terrorist attack 
was seriously tested by the adversarial impacts from Hurricane Katrina in various ways.  
For the disaster management laws and plans, the National Response Plan (NRP 2004) 
was not fully reliable for effective organizational responses to Hurricane Katrina. It was not fully 
developed to define coordination procedures among multi-sectoral and multi-jurisdictional 
organizations. Also, the disaster response personnel were not well educated and trained to apply 
core features of the National Response Plan to their actual responding efforts. The lack of 
cognition of the magnitude of situation by DHS worsened the situation and caused severe delay 
in the activation of national level disaster response system. Facing the National Response Plan‘s 
ineffectiveness, it was superseded by the National Response Framework (2008) after the several 
revisions since the failure of Hurricane Katrina. The National Response Framework was the 
national level disaster response plan and, as many suggested, it was well developed using lessons 
from Hurricane Katrina and effectively implemented for the response to Hurricane Gustav in 
2008. The deficiencies of the National Response Plan were not overcome by experienced 
leadership. Even though there was plenty of advance warning from the National Hurricane 
Center (NHC) and simulated analysis for the breakdown of the levee system, including the office 
of President, top public officers in federal and State governments did not recognize the risk and 
accordingly failed in timely activation of the National Response Plan.  
Due to the lack of clear communication procedures in the NRP and physical damage from 
the flood and levee collapses, the failure of the communication system for the Hurricane Katrina 
triggered failure in the response system. Failures in communication between core organizations 
disrupted the overall information flow, the common situational awareness and hindered in 
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coordinating activities. In comparison, many pieces of communication equipment remained 
operational and were utilized within minutes of the disaster in response to the Hurricane Gustav 
due to the organizations‘ investments on the advanced communication system. Combined with 
the failures of communication system, the levee system breakdown was the second, but the most 
critical damage to the Hurricane Katrina response system. Despite the well-known importance of 
the levees, and the consequences of failure, the local levee boards did not have any warning 
system in place and the responsibilities of maintenance were scattered. This heterogeneity in 
building and managing the levee system caused the lack of integrated response to the failure of 
the levees and water walls. Since the failure of the Hurricane Katrina, the boards and the Army 
Corps of Engineers developed a new levee system to be more efficient energy dissipation 
systems, not just simple barriers. Also, they revised communication protocols to ensure smooth 
coordination and collaboration. These efforts for coordinated preparation and response to 
disasters and strengthened structure of levees were not tested by Hurricane Gustav. 
What made the effective coordination more difficult were the social factors that were 
specific to the State of Louisiana. The NRP and the Stafford Act delineated that disaster response 
and planning was first and foremost a local government responsibility. But the high poverty level 
of the State of Louisiana proved that it could not stand alone in the case of such a large disaster. 
The racial and class divisions that have grown in the area over time made an integrated response, 
especially for the implementation of evacuation, hard to achieve. Consideration for social and 
racial factors needs more time to be reflected in the disaster response systems. 
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5.0  THE HURRICANE RESPONSE SYSTEMS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
MAJOR PROBLEMS  
This chapter examines how organizations in the hurricane response system operated individually 
and jointly to address the problems from complex conditions. With descriptions for Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems, I identified the major problems that the system 
faced during its response to the hurricanes. This chapter uses two data sources from content 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. The newspaper reports on response operations in the 
Times-Picayune, and the situation reports recorded by the LOHSEP (and GOHSEP for the 
Hurricane Gustav) were used as the data sources for content analysis. These sources provide 
empirical data to identify the patterns of actual interactions on a daily basis and the dynamic 
changes of the disaster response systems for both hurricanes. From content analysis, this chapter 
documents how many organizations joined the disaster response systems by date, what kinds of 
information and resources were exchanged, and how this interaction pattern evolved within the 
timeline of this analysis. Also, the content analysis reveals critical problems to be addressed for 
future disaster response systems. The findings from semi-structured interviews verify and 
complement the problems identified from the content analysis and examine critical points more 
closely in which the Hurricane Katrina disaster response system failed. It provides 
complementary descriptions of the kinds of challenges that organizations needed to address and 
how those problems affected the entire performance of disaster response systems.  
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5.1 THE HURRICANE KATRINA AND HURRICANE GUSTAV RESPONSE 
SYSTEMS  
5.1.1 The descriptions of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems 
Hurricane Katrina, a more severe storm that triggered secondary devastation from flooding 
caused by the collapsed levees, generated a larger response system with 533 organizational 
actors, than did Hurricane Gustav with 332 organizational actors identified from newspaper 
reports. There are small differences in the number of organizations in the system by level of 
jurisdiction: Public 57% (Katrina) vs. 57.5% (Gustav), Private 15.9% (Katrina) vs. 22% (Gustav), 
and non-profit 26.5% (Katrina) vs. 20.5 (Gustav). The changes in the total number of private and 
non-profit organizations reflect the difference in size and severity of damage caused by the two 
hurricanes. Due to its comparatively small size that resulted in less damage to the region, the 
Hurricane Gustav response system includes a smaller number of non-profit organizations. But 
due to changes in procedures for securing resources in preparation phase, there are more private 
organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system.  
Table 5-1 Frequency Distribution of Organizations Identified in the Hurricane Katrina Response System* 
 
Level of 
Jurisdiction 
Source of Funding 
Public Private Non-Profit Special-Interest Totals 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
International 11 2.1 3 0.6 5 0.9 0 0 19 3.6 
National 0 0 24 4.5 75 14.1 1 0.2 100 18.8 
Federal 67 12.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 12.6 
Regional 1 0.2 7 1.3 26 4.9 0 0 34 6.4 
State 79 14.8 7 1.3 4 0.8 2 0.4 92 17.3 
Sub-Regional 11 2.1 12 2.3 9 1.7 0 0 32 6.0 
Parish/County 55 10.3 3 0.6 1 0.2 0 0 59 11.1 
District 27 5.1 2 0.4 0 0 0 0 29 5.4 
City 53 9.9 27 5.1 21 3.9 0 0 101 18.9 
Totals 304 57 85 15.9 141 26.5 3 0.6 533 100.0 
Source: Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 27 – September 19, 2005. (Comfort & Haase, 2006) 
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Table 5-2 Frequency Distribution of Organizations Identified in the Hurricane Gustav Response System 
 
Level of  
Jurisdiction 
Source of Funding 
Public Private Nonprofit Special Interest Totals 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 0.3 1 0.3 1 0.3 0 0 3 0.9 
National 0 0.0 39 11.8 13 3.9 0 0 52 15.7 
Federal 25 7.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 7.5 
Regional 3 0.9 8 2.4 4 1.2 0 0 15 4.5 
State 39 11.8 5 1.5 17 5.1 0 0 61 18.4 
Subregional 3 0.9 1 0.3 4 1.2 0 0 8 2.4 
Parish/County 77 23.2 2 0.6 7 2.1 0 0 86 25.9 
District 13 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 3.9 
City 30 9.0 17 5.1 22 6.6 0 0 69 20.8 
Totals 191 57.5 73 22.0 68 20.5 0 0 332 100.00 
     Source: Times-Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 26 – September 21, 2008. 
 
As table 5-1 and 5-2 shows, Hurricane Katrina was a more severe disaster that generated 
more difficult conditions to challenge the response system. Moreover, the secondary impact of 
the levee collapse led to the mobilization of the entire nation‘s disaster response system which 
led many organizations to participate spontaneously in the response system. The other difference 
between the two hurricane response systems is that, recognizing that the first response to any 
disaster event is necessarily local, it reveals that the proportion of organizational actors from the 
local jurisdictions – city, district, and parish – was 35.4% in the Katrina response system, in 
contrast to being over half (50.6%) of the actors in the Gustav response system. Similarly, the 
proportion of national and federal organizations participating in the Katrina response system was 
markedly higher at 31.4% in contrast to 23.2% for the Gustav response system. This also 
indicates that the relatively small size of Hurricane Gustav did not activate the entire federal and 
national agencies to the same extent to the Hurricane Katrina, although the number of activated 
state level organizations in the system was nearly equal.    
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5.1.2 The changing pattern of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems 
This section shows the changing pattern of interactions among organizations in the Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems. While much of the data was consistent between 
the two systems, more detailed situation reports that show actual resource exchange patterns by 
date were not made available by GOHSEP for Hurricane Gustav. The available situation reports 
for Hurricane Gustav mainly recorded the major actions taken by state and federal governments 
in a style akin to a newspaper article. For this reason, the depth of content analysis is not 
compatible with that of Hurricane Katrina, and due to this limitation in data for the Hurricane 
Gustav content analysis, I combined the two separate data sources together for the response to 
Hurricane Gustav before conducting the content analysis. 
Table 5-3 shows the distribution of organizations sorted by source of funding and by 
dates for Hurricane Katrina. And based on this table, Figure 5-1 presents the changing pattern of 
the Hurricane Katrina response system. Similarly, Table 5-4 and Figure 5-2 show the distribution 
of organizations sorted by source of funding and by date for Hurricane Gustav and its changing 
pattern over time. The noticeable difference in their changing pattern is that a higher percentage 
of organizations had already activated and participated before the landfall of Hurricane Gustav 
while the highest peak of the Hurricane Katrina response system is one day after the hurricane 
landfall. This pattern shows that the level of preparedness for the Hurricane Gustav disaster 
response system was higher than that for Hurricane Katrina. The pattern for the Hurricane 
Gustav response system also shows that organizational action was much more concentrated in 
the initial stage of response when compared to that of Hurricane Katrina. This concentrated 
effort in the initial stage of response means that it minimized the dispersion of energy within the 
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hurricane response system and thus contributed to the improvements in performance of 
organizations.  
Another difference in the changing patterns by dates is the consistent entry of new 
organizations into the system for Hurricane Gustav. According to Figure 5-1, the total number of 
new organizations entering into the system dropped after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina with 
another peak at September 15th, roughly two weeks after landfall. But, Figure 5-2 reveals that 
the number of new organizations entering the system, unlike that for Hurricane Katrina, did not 
drop significantly after landfall. The second highest peak of the number of organizations was 
reported just one week after landfall for Hurricane Gustav. This pattern for Hurricane Gustav is 
favorable when compared to the second peak of the Hurricane Katrina response system which 
occurred in September 15, 2005, almost three weeks later of the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. 
Also, the steady increase in the entry of new organizations means that the entire disaster 
response system has support from the outer environment of Hurricane Gustav response system.  
This support contributed to the increase of the available resources and support by the 
organizations in the larger disaster response system. Usually, for disaster response and mitigation, 
new organizations entering into the system bring new resources, and this helps existing 
organizations in the system survive and recover from the disaster more rapidly, resulting in a 
higher level of resilience of the disaster response system. 
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Table 5-3 Frequency Distribution of Organizations by source of funding, Hurricane Katrina 
 
Date 
Source of funding 
Public Non-Profit Private Special Interest Total 
  N % N % N % N % N % 
8/27/2005 15 4.9 0 0.0 9 6.4 0 0.0 24 4.5 
8/28/2005 30 9.9 6 7.1 7 5.0 0 0.0 43 8.1 
8/29/2005 5 1.6 0 0.0 9 6.4 0 0.0 14 2.6 
8/30/2005 25 8.2 7 8.2 3 2.1 0 0.0 35 6.6 
8/31/2005 5 1.6 2 2.4 8 5.7 0 0.0 15 2.8 
9/1/2005 21 6.9 10 11.8 18 12.8 0 0.0 49 9.2 
9/2/2005 16 5.3 6 7.1 10 7.1 0 0.0 32 6.0 
9/3/2005 31 10.2 5 5.9 15 10.6 0 0.0 51 9.6 
9/4/2005 11 3.6 1 1.2 1 0.7 1 33.3 14 2.6 
9/5/2005 11 3.6 0 0.0 3 2.1 0 0.0 14 2.6 
9/6/2005 11 3.6 2 2.4 8 5.7 0 0.0 21 3.9 
9/7/2005 26 8.6 1 1.2 2 1.4 0 0.0 29 5.4 
9/8/2005 3 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.6 
9/9/2005 8 2.6 7 8.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 2.8 
9/10/2005 5 1.6 4 4.7 2 1.4 0 0.0 11 2.1 
9/11/2005 6 2.0 0 0.0 6 4.3 0 0.0 12 2.3 
9/12/2005 8 2.6 5 5.9 6 4.3 0 0.0 19 3.6 
9/13/2005 9 3.0 3 3.5 8 5.7 0 0.0 20 3.8 
9/14/2005 12 3.9 1 1.2 6 4.3 0 0.0 19 3.6 
9/15/2005 21 6.9 15 17.6 7 5.0 0 0.0 43 8.1 
9/16/2005 7 2.3 3 3.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 10 1.9 
9/17/2005 5 1.6 1 1.2 5 3.5 1 33.3 12 2.3 
9/18/2005 5 1.6 3 3.5 5 3.5 1 33.3 14 2.6 
9/19/2005 8 2.6 3 3.5 3 2.1 0 0.0 14 2.6 
Total 304 57.0 85 15.9 141 26.5 3 0.6 533 100.0 
       Source: Times-Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 27 – September 19, 2005. 
 
 
 
Source: ―The Dynamics of Disaster Recovery: Resilience and Entropy in Hurricane Response Systems‖ Louise K. Comfort, 
Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, September 2009, Public Organization Review, volume 9: pp309-323, Springer, USA. 
 
Figure 5-1 Number of organizations activated by date and source of funding, hurricane Katrina 
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Table 5-4 Frequency Distribution of Organizations by source of funding, Hurricane Gustav 
 
Date 
Source of Funding 
Public Private Nonprofit Total 
N % N % N % N % 
8/26/2008 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 
8/27/2008 10 5.2 1 1.4 0 0.0 11 3.3 
8/28/2008 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.4 1 0.3 
8/29/2008 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
8/30/2008 25 13.1 10 13.9 3 4.3 38 11.4 
8/31/2008 6 3.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 1.8 
9/1/2008 4 2.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 1.2 
9/2/2008 7 3.7 0 0.0 2 2.9 9 2.7 
9/3/2008 14 7.3 15 20.8 4 5.8 33 9.9 
9/4/2008 13 6.8 10 13.9 1 1.4 24 7.2 
9/5/2008 18 9.4 3 4.2 5 7.2 26 7.8 
9/6/2008 14 7.3 5 6.9 4 5.8 23 6.9 
9/7/2008 2 1.0 1 1.4 8 11.6 11 3.3 
9/8/2008 30 15.7 0 0.0 1 1.4 31 9.3 
9/9/2008 5 2.6 3 4.2 7 10.1 15 4.5 
9/10/2008 4 2.1 4 5.6 3 4.3 11 3.3 
9/11/2008 7 3.7 2 2.8 6 8.7 15 4.5 
9/12/2008 4 2.1 1 1.4 0 0.0 5 1.5 
9/13/2008 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 
9/14/2008 10 5.2 8 11.1 7 10.1 25 7.5 
9/15/2008 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.4 1 0.3 
9/16/2008 2 1.0 0 0.0 1 1.4 3 0.9 
9/17/2008 0 0.0 1 1.4 1 1.4 2 0.6 
9/18/2008 12 6.3 2 2.8 12 17.4 26 7.8 
9/19/2008 1 0.5 6 8.3 1 1.4 8 2.4 
9/20/2008 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 
9/21/2008 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.4 1 0.3 
Total 191 57.5 72 21.7 69 20.8 332 100.0 
    Source: Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 26 – September 21, 2008. 
 
 
Source: ―The Dynamics of Disaster Recovery: Resilience and Entropy in Hurricane Response Systems‖ Louise K. Comfort, 
Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, September 2009, Public Organization Review, volume 9: pp309-323, Springer, USA. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Number of organizations activated by date and source of funding, hurricane Gustav 
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5.2 PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED FROM THE CONTENT 
ANALYSIS OF SITUATION REPORTS FOR HURRICANE KATRINA 
5.2.1 Lack of preparedness for the response to Hurricane Katrina  
This study uses two types of situation reports recorded by the Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). The first one is the daily situation report that 
was recorded, updated and released to the public briefly through the website of LOHSEP. This 
brief situation report provided the information on the initiating organizations and responding 
organizations and the content of their interaction likely to newspaper articles. At the same time, 
LOHSEP recorded the more detailed data that includes the transaction time, the types of 
resources to be allocated, and the status of resource allocation for its internal use. Using this 
second type of situation reports, I coded interactions between agencies within the state of 
Louisiana. 
Table 5-5 shows the total number of interactions listed in the situation reports for 
Hurricane Katrina by date and by level of jurisdiction. Based on this table, Figure 5-3 shows the 
pattern of fluctuations in the number of interactions in the Hurricane Katrina response system. 
Only 15 requests for assistance from parishes were registered on August 27, 2005, two days 
before landfall. That number increased to 80 requests on August 28, 2005, with 25 requests from 
state agencies. Only on August 30, 2005, the day after Katrina made landfall, was there a 
significant increase in requests for assistance initiated by parish, state, and regional jurisdictions, 
with a modest number, 36 requests, initiated by agencies at the federal level. This small number 
of interactions shows that the overall collaboration level for the preparation of Hurricane Katrina 
was significantly low. As discussed in the chaos theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984), the initial 
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condition of any system is crucial for its later evolution and adaptation, and the low level of 
preparedness for Louisiana and the City of New Orleans indicates potential problems for its 
response operations during Hurricane Katrina. The official report, ―The Failure of Initiative” 
verifies the low level of preparedness of Hurricane Katrina response system by pointing out that 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the state agencies were not well prepared: 
―…despite extensive preparedness initiatives, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not 
prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina… .‖ The main reason for this 
low level of preparedness, it can be assumed, is that the response system for Hurricane Katrina 
had never experienced such a large scale disaster, and so they had neither a relevant disaster 
management plan nor personnel in the system with sufficient experiences. 
Table 5-5 Number of requests for assistance registered in Situation Reports by date and level of jurisdiction 
Level of 
Jurisdiction 
City Parish Regional State Federal International Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
26-Aug 0 0.0 15 1.13 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 0.47 
27-Aug 0 0.0 80 6.01 0 0.0 25 1.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 105 3.27 
28-Aug 0 0.0 106 7.96 2 6.5 105 6.7 4 2.0 0 0.0 217 6.75 
29-Aug 7 9.3 319 23.97 5 16.1 466 29.8 36 17.6 0 0.0 833 25.92 
31-Aug 2 2.7 163 12.25 3 9.7 198 12.7 26 12.7 0 0.0 392 12.20 
1-Sep 13 17.3 71 5.33 2 6.5 83 5.3 8 3.9 1 16.7 178 5.54 
2-Sep 18 24.0 96 7.21 3 9.7 103 6.6 18 8.8 1 16.7 239 7.44 
3-Sep 20 26.7 179 13.45 7 22.6 240 15.3 34 16.6 2 33.3 482 15.00 
4-Sep 3 4.0 38 2.85 2 6.5 80 5.1 21 10.2 1 16.7 145 4.51 
5-Sep 12 16.0 264 19.83 7 22.6 264 16.9 58 28.3 1 16.7 606 18.86 
Total 75 100 1331 100 31 100 1564 100 205 100 6 100 3212 100 
Source: Situation Reports, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, August 27 – September 6, 2005 
 
 
 
Source: Situation Reports, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, August 27 – September 6, 2005.  Situation 
Reports were not available for August 31, 2005. (APPAM 2008 Conference Paper ―Designing adaptive system for disaster mitigation and 
response‖ by Louise K. Comfort, Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, and Steve Scheinert) 
 
Figure 5-3 Number of requests for assistance registered in Situation Reports by date and level of jurisdiction 
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This low level of preparedness could have been anticipated by the outcome of the 
simulated operations exercise, Hurricane PAM. In the summer of 2004, FEMA ran a disaster 
simulation exercise in which a fictional hurricane named Pam hit the New Orleans area. The 
purpose of the Pam simulation was to help FEMA and local authorities in hurricane-prone areas 
prepare for future disasters. The result of FEMA's Hurricane Pam simulation could have 
provided a plan of action to prepare for real disasters like Hurricane Katrina. But there is very 
little evidence of organizational learning after this exercise. It predicted an almost accurate level 
of damage by suggesting possible scenarios, but the disaster response entities in the system did 
not change their standard operating procedures nor improve their operational and collaborative 
capacity. The lack of learning caused serious problems in collaboration during the actual 
response phase to Hurricane Katrina. 
5.2.2 Problems identified in response to the request for resource allocation  
The content analysis of the Hurricane Katrina situation reports further documents the system‘s 
ineffectiveness in allocating requested resources to other organizations. The data show that the 
available resources requested to support disaster operations after landfall were not identified, 
delivered, tracked, and stored effectively for the use of other organizations in the system. As a 
result, requests for resources were either delayed or failed to elicit timely responses. In fact, most 
organizations suffered either from late delivery or they got ―no response (NR)‖ to their requests. 
Table 5-6 shows the frequency distribution of requests for assistance by mission status 
reported to LOHSEP. All transactions were classified by their emergency support functions 
(ESFs) including: Search & Rescue, Damage Assessment, Supplies, Transportation, Evacuation, 
Shelter, Security, Emergency Response, Medical, Utility, Heavy Equipment, Light Equipment, 
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Personnel, and Communication & Coordination, based on the emergency support functions 
(ESFs) defined in the national response plan (2004). This analysis shows that during the period 
of August 27–September 6, 2005 there were 3,034 transactions that passed through the resources 
coordinating system of LOHSEP. The major role of LOHSEP for Hurricane Katrina was to 
coordinate and bridge the resource allocation between local and state/federal agencies. It also 
coordinated the resource allocation activities through the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact (EMAC)
24
. Thus, LOHSEP allocated resource requests among organizations and 
maintained records of the logistics available in any specific time period.  
Once there was a request for resource allocation from local governments, LOHSEP first 
assigned that request to the organization designated to perform that responsibility under the State 
Emergency Plan. If the designated organization cannot fulfill the request, LOHSEP sought an 
available organization that had the requested resources. If LOHSEP identified an organization 
with available resources, it assigned the request to that organization to provide resources. To 
complete this task successfully, LOHSEP had to be equipped with several critical capacities. 
First, it needed to communicate effectively with all local, state, and federal partners to check 
resource needs and process this information with accuracy and timeliness. Second, it needed to 
have the capacity of identifying and keeping track of available resources that are being used by 
other organizations in their operations. Third, it needed to be able to update requests and correct 
errors that are inevitable under the urgent, stressful context of disaster. These three tasks required 
LOHSEP to be equipped with a well designed supply chain management system, highly 
advanced resource management technology, and also a reliable communication system.  
                                                   
24 EMAC, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, is a congressionally ratified organization that provides 
form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through EMAC, a disaster impacted state can request and receive 
assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues upfront: liability and 
reimbursement. (http://www.emacweb.org) 
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Tables 5-7 and 5-8 show how LOHSEP, as a primary coordinating organization, failed in 
managing the requests for resource allocation for the response to Hurricane Katrina. Among 
3,034 requests for resources, only 4.6% (status of from ‗requested‘ to ‗Enroute‘, ‗On-Scene‘, 
and ‘Released‘) of total requests were actually delivered to the requesting organizations and the 
remaining 95.2% were not delivered in a timely manner. Of this set of requests, 56.1% remained 
at the stage of ‗requested‘. These requested resources were neither identified nor processed by 
LOHSEP and could not be delivered to the requesting organization. Also, the status of ‗Pending‘ 
meant that requests for resources were submitted and assigned to a state organization or referred 
to a federal organization, but they were not accepted for action by that organization. While 
pending, many resource requests had been cancelled. This high pending and cancellation rate 
shows that the state-wide resource management system was significantly damaged and 
ineffective, and the large volume of duplicated and unnecessary requests caused congestion in 
the information processing channel of LOHSEP. Combined with the communication system 
breakdown, an overloaded LOHSEP could not process critical information in a timely manner 
and transmit it to the other organizations effectively. 
Also, Table 5-8 shows the high ratio of ‗no-response (NR)‘ to the requests by parish 
governments to LOHSEP. Again, this finding reveals that local parish governments did not 
receive timely support from state and federal agencies. If LOHSEP were equipped with an 
efficient communication system and advanced technology for resource management, it could 
have processed the requests more effectively. This capacity would have likely increased the 
resilience of the Hurricane Katrina response system significantly.  
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Table 5-6 Frequency Distribution of Requests for Assistance by Mission Status reported to Emergency Operation Center, State of Louisiana 
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N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
No Response 27 14.8 3 37.5 166 25.0 40 21.5 8 57.1 45 19.0 104 20.6 21 25.0 63 35.4 58 25.7 130 28.3 16 19.8 28 20.9 20 26.7 729 24.0 
Action 
Required 
95 52.2 7 87.5 414 62.3 99 53.2 12 85.7 115 48.5 207 41.0 45 53.6 141 79.2 115 50.9 245 53.4 36 44.4 71 53.0 38 50.7 1640 54.1 
Operation 
Pending 
98 53.8 2 25.0 248 37.3 65 34.9 3 21.4 83 35.0 248 49.1 36 42.9 26 14.6 100 44.2 157 34.2 38 46.9 47 35.1 24 32.0 1175 38.7 
Cancelled 15 8.2 1 12.5 37 5.6 26 14.0 1 7.1 28 11.8 36 7.1 4 4.8 21 11.8 35 15.5 60 13.1 5 6.2 27 20.1 4 5.3 300 9.9 
On-Going 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.3 19 0.6 
En Route 5 2.7 0 0.0 9 1.4 5 2.7 0 0.0 12 5.1 27 5.3 5 6.0 1 0.6 28 12.4 9 2.0 2 2.5 4 3.0 0 0.0 107 3.5 
On Scene 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 3.8 0 0.0 36 15.2 51 10.1 2 2.4 3 1.7 1 0.4 24 5.2 7 8.6 0 0.0 10 13.3 141 4.6 
Released 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.5 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.4 0 0.0 1 0.6 8 3.5 1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.7 1 1.3 18 0.6 
Total 
Transactions 
182 6.0 8 0.3 665 21.9 186 6.1 14 0.5 237 7.8 505 16.6 84 2.8 178 5.9 226 7.4 459 15.1 81 2.7 134 4.4 75 2.5 3034 100 
 
Source: Situation Reports, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, August 27 – September 6, 2005 (APPAM 2008 Conference 
Paper ―Designing adaptive system for disaster mitigation and response‖ by Louise K. Comfort, Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, and Steve Scheinert) 
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Table 5-7  Change in Status of Requests for Assistance, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 
 
 
Search  
& Rescue 
Damage  
Assessment 
Supplies 
Trans- 
portation 
Evacuation Shelter Security 
Emergency  
Response 
Medical Utility 
Heavy  
Equipment 
Light  
Equipment 
Personnel 
Communication  
& Coordination 
Row 
Totals  
Number of Requests,  
Required to Pending  
26 1 30 6 1 9 30 3 2 20 6 4 5 N/A 143 
Total number of hours in Status  1254.0 107 5208.0 112.0 4 290.0 981.0 101.0 52.0 1740.0 128.0 156.0 256.0 N/A  
Mean Number of Hours in 
Status 
48.2 107 173.6 22.4 4.00 32.2 32.7 33.7 26.0 87.0 21.3 39.0 51.2 N/A  
Median Number of Hours in 
Status 
12.0 107 192.0 15.5 4.00 27.0 37.0 32.0 26.0 93.0 17.0 42.5 39.0 N/A  
Std. Deviation 122.8 N/A 48.6 15.1 N/A 32.9 14.1 20.6 5.7 33.2 14.6 29.5 53.1 N/A  
Range 627.0 N/A 179.0 38.0 N/A 105.0 72.0 41.0 8.0 124.0 35.0 67.0 130.0 N/A  
Minimum 0.0 N/A 67.0 6.0 N/A 2.0 0.0 14.0 22.0 20.0 4.0 2.0 14.0 N/A  
Maximum 627.0 N/A 246.0 44.0 N/A 107.0 72.0 55.0 30.0 144.0 39.0 69.0 144.0 N/A  
Number of Requests,  
Required to (Pending) to 
Cancelled  
7 1 12 8 1 10 19 2 12 15 28 2 11 2 130 
Total number of hours in Status  79.0 50 568.0 344.0 108 468.5 494.0 89.0 721.5 1004.0 2141.5 130.0 365.5 41.0  
Mean Number of Hours in 
Status 
11.3 50 47.3 43.0 108.0 46.9 26.0 45.0 60.1 66.9 76.5 65.0 33.2 20.5  
Median Number of Hours in 
Status 
4.0 50 39.5 21.0 108.0 40.8 26.0 44.5 8.5 46.0 61.0 65.0 29.0 20.5  
Std. Deviation 16.9 N/A 29.3 51.4 N/A 40.3 25.5 60.1 82.2 51.8 57.5 83.4 19.7 16.3  
Range 41.0 N/A 111.0 136.0 N/A 138.0 94.0 85.0 188.5 148.0 188.0 118.0 71.0 23.0  
Minimum 0.0 N/A 3.0 4.0 N/A 6.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 6.0 9.0  
Maximum 41.0 N/A 114.0 140.0 N/A 144.0 94.0 87.0 192.5 150.0 190.0 124.0 77.0 32.0  
Number of Requests, 
Required to Completed 
(Enroute+On 
Scene+Released) 
2 N/A 6 3 N/A 11 35 2 1 28 6 1 N/A 1 96 
Total number of hours in Status  2.00 N/A 112.0 8 N/A 370.0 762.0 56 37 1810.0 193.0 2.0 N/A 14.0  
Mean Number of Hours in 
Status 
1.00 N/A 37.3 2.70 N/A 33.6 21.8 28.0 N/A 64.6 32.2 2.0 N/A 14.0  
Median Number of Hours in 
Status 
N/A N/A 25.0 2.00 N/A 19.0 19.0 28.0 N/A 39.0 24.5 2.0 N/A 14.0  
Std. Deviation N/A N/A 39.0 3.05 N/A 38.8 24.6 12.7 N/A 47.5 34.5 N/A N/A N/A  
Source: Situation Reports, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, August 27 – September 6, 2005 (APPAM 2008 Conference 
Paper ―Designing adaptive system for disaster mitigation and response‖ by Louise K. Comfort, Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, and Steve Scheinert) 
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Table 5-8 Types of Ratio for Changes in Status, Requests for Assistance in Disaster Operations, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 
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Number of  
'No Response' 
27 3 166 40 8 45 104 21 63 58 130 16 28 20 729 
Number of Total Requests 182 8 665 186 14 237 505 84 178 226 459 81 134 75 3034 
Ratio of NR to Requests 14.84 37.50 24.96 21.51 57.14 18.99 20.59 25.00 35.39 25.66 28.32 19.75 20.90 26.67 24.03 
H
o
ld
in
g
 R
a
ti
o
 Number of  
'Action Required to Pending' 
26 1 30 6 1 9 30 3 2 20 6 4 5 N/A 143 
Number of Total Requests - 
No Response 
155 5 499 146 6 192 401 63 115 168 329 65 106 55 2305 
Ratio of Action Required to 
Pending 
16.77 20.00 6.01 4.11 16.67 4.69 7.48 4.76 1.74 11.90 1.82 6.15 4.72 N/A 6.20 
C
a
n
ce
ll
a
ti
o
n
 R
a
ti
o
 Number of  
'Action Required to 
Cancelled' 
7 1 12 8 1 10 19 2 12 15 28 2 11 2 130 
Number of Total Requests - 
No Response 
155 5 499 146 6 192 401 63 115 168 329 65 106 55 2305 
Ratio of Action Required to 
Cancelled 
4.52 20.00 2.40 5.48 16.67 5.21 4.74 3.17 10.43 8.93 8.51 3.08 10.38 3.64 5.64 
C
o
m
p
le
ti
o
n
 R
a
ti
o
 
Number of  
'Action Required to Enroute, 
On Scene, and Released' 
2 N/A 6 3 N/A 11 35 2 1 28 6 1 N/A 1 96 
Number of Total Requests - 
No Response 
155 5 499 146 6 192 401 63 115 168 329 65 106 55 2305 
Ratio of Action Required to  
Enroute, On Scene, and 
Released 
1.29 N/A 1.20 2.05 N/A 5.73 8.73 3.17 0.87 16.67 1.82 1.54 N/A 1.82 4.16 
Legend: No Response Ratio = Number of ‗No Response‘ / Number of Total Requests by Transaction Category; Holding Ratio = Number of ‗Action Required to Pending‘ / (Number of Total Requests by Transaction 
Category - Number of No Response); Cancellation Ratio = Number of ‗Action Required or Pending to Cancelled‘/ (Number of Total Requests by Transaction Category – Number of No Response); Completion Ratio = 
Number of ‗Action Required to Enroute, On-scene, and Released‘ / (Number of Total Requests by Transaction Category – Number of No Response. 
Source: Situation Reports, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, August 27 – September 6, 2005 (APPAM 2008 Conference Paper ―Designing adaptive system for 
disaster mitigation and response‖ by Louise K. Comfort, Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, and Steve Scheinert) 
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Findings from this analysis reveal where delays in resource delivery occurred, that is, 
where the bottlenecks are. A bottleneck is a critical point that causes delay in the interdependent 
process of emergency response, hindering the operations of the whole system. This inquiry seeks 
to identify points in the critical process of an evolving response system where delay by one 
organization triggers a cascade of delay throughout the set of organizations participating in 
response operations. The source of the delay could be technical, organizational or both. But if 
these bottlenecks can be identified in an actual response system, the response process can be 
redesigned to operate more efficiently in future disaster operations.  
To identify the bottlenecks, this study focused on the responding organizations because 
they receive requests from the initiating organizations and are responsible for taking the next step 
of action and distributing the incoming information and resources to other organizations in the 
system. To identify the bottlenecks in this process, I counted the total number of hours that a 
request for assistance spent in one phase before it was shifted to the next phase in the response 
process. Table 5-7 shows the system‘s late response to requests for resources allocation through 
data on the processing of change in status categories, or the number of hours that requests were 
held in each action status category before moving to the next. These data provide a profile of the 
pace of disaster operations and the amount of delay involved in meeting requests for action. The 
data document the sizeable delay in assigning the requests to an agency for action - the change 
from ―action required‖ to ―pending‖ - for even the most urgent requests.  For example, the delay 
for ―search and rescue‖ (Mean = 48.2 hours) was more than two days and ―emergency response‖ 
(Mean = 33.7 hours) was more than a day.  For less immediate requests, such as ―utilities‖, the 
time delay was 3.6 days, and for ―supplies‖ the time delay was even longer, an average of 7.2 
days.  
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According to this analysis, clearly, the EOC at LOHSEP was overwhelmed. The 
categories with the largest number of requests (security, search & rescue, and supplies) had 
significant delays, indicating disconnected linkages in the interdependent disaster response 
network. Two types of requests for assistance made to LOHSEP received a higher rate of 
completion than the others: security and utilities. While the requests detailed in the situation 
reports were initially intended for Louisiana state agencies, the cumulative delay in response 
indicates the inability of the state to meet these requests without federal assistance. This finding 
further indicates a low capacity of the state‘s emergency response system to absorb threatening 
information and communicate it effectively among its members. 
The delay in transition from one status to the next status of resource allocation can be 
structured like Table 5-9 to place more focus on status transition time. As shown in Table 5-9, 
the total number of hours for the entire system to shift from ―action required‖ to ―pending‖ is 
10,389 hours with the mean of 72.7 hours and standard deviation of 30 hours. Although there are 
no data for the status change from ―on-scene‖ to ―released‖, the recorded time delay was lengthy 
in shifts from ―action required‖ to ―pending‖ and from ―pending‖ to ―cancellation.‖ After 
LOHSEP received the initial and unverified information from initiating organizations, agency 
staff needed to verify the incoming request and assign it to a response agency. This procedure 
was established to validate the request and ensure that scarce resources were allocated 
appropriately. During this period of verification, the request was classified as ‗pending.‘ But, in 
an event the scale of Hurricane Katrina, the workload of LOHSEP staff in processing the 
incoming requests for assistance quickly increased to the point that the requests were stalled in 
the pending phase. As a result, quick and effective decision-making was severely limited. In this 
time-dependent process, the time lag increased dramatically in the subsequent status shifts.  
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Table 5-9 Total time delay in hours reported for each change of status 
Source: Situation Reports, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, August 27 – 
September 6, 2005 (APPAM 2008 Conference Paper ―Designing adaptive system for disaster mitigation and 
response‖ by Louise K. Comfort, Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, and Steve Scheinert) 
 
To identify the organizations that created bottlenecks in resource allocation, this study 
counted the accumulated time period in hours for each responding organization to estimate the 
length of time it took for these organizations to shift to the next stage in response operations. For 
example, if it took 35 hours for FEMA to shift from ―action required‖ to ―pending‖ and 10 hours 
to shift from ―pending‖ to ―on scene‖, and again took 12 hours from ―on scene‖ to ―released‖, 
then the total accumulated number of hours in this case is 57 hours and the mean is 19 hours. 
One possible criticism for this approach is that if any one organization has a higher number of 
response requests than other organizations, then the accumulated time would increase 
accordingly. By dividing the accumulated number of hours over the response process by the 
number of interactions, this study calculated the mean time of the delay between an initial report 
of ‗action required‘ and the shift to the next stage of action. The results are reported in the 
following Table 5-10. The organizations listed in Table 5-10 represent the set of organizations 
identified in the situation reports as the primary actors in the disaster response system that 
emerged following Hurricane Katrina. Each organization interacted with other organizations in 
the performance of the fourteen categories of response actions. These fourteen categories 
 
Number of 
Transactions 
Total Time 
Elapsed (Hours) 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum Range 
Action Required to 
Pending 
143 10389 72.7 32.0 30.0 150.0 0.0 150.0 
Pending to Enroute 23 938 40.8 39.0 47.0 150.0 0.0 150.0 
Enroute to Onscene 21 353 16.8 19.0 7.6 43.0 8.0 35.0 
Onscene to Released N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Action Required 
(Pending) to Released 
13 893 68.7 44.0 54.3 150.0 2.0 148.0 
Action Required to 
Cancellation 
88 5031 57.2 39.0 51.2 192.5 0.0 192.5 
Pending to 
Cancellation 
42 1569 37.4 15.5 46.4 162.0 0.0 162.0 
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represent subsets of actions taken within the entire disaster response system. Table 5-10 
summarizes the accumulated time, total number of requests for assistance, and means of 
response time for each organization. None of the organizations reported rapid mean response 
records, but compared to one another, the Louisiana National Guard, Louisiana Office of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and the Louisiana State Police were more 
efficient in their roles. These findings document the lower time lag for the organizations 
responsible for security at the state level in comparison to the other categories. Other 
organizations that received a significant number of requests, such as the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, and FEMA, were much slower in their response. 
Table 5-10 Total time lag for each responding organization 
 
Name of Organization 
Accumulated Total 
Delay, When 
Responding (Hours) 
Number of 
Transactions 
Mean 
(Hours) 
Department of Health and Hospitals, Louisiana 730.5 5 146.1 
American Red Cross:  Louisiana Southeast Chapter 144 1 144.0 
Department of Transportation and Development, Louisiana 152 2 76.0 
Army Corps of Engineers 4571 64 71.4 
Louisiana Emergency Operations Center 283 4 70.8 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States 1477 25 59.1 
Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Louisiana 955 18 53.1 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Louisiana 791.5 20 39.6 
Parish of East Baton Rouge 39 1 39.0 
Civil Air Patrol - Louisiana Wing 76 2 38.0 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact 37 1 37.0 
Louisiana State Police 145.4 4 36.4 
Homeland Security Division of LOHSEP 64 2 32.0 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 862 27 31.9 
Louisiana Army National Guard 312.5 10 31.3 
Louisiana National Guard 2915.5 105 27.8 
Louisiana Air National Guard 183 10 18.3 
Source: Situation Reports, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, August 27 – 
September 6, 2005 (APPAM 2008 Conference Paper ―Designing adaptive system for disaster mitigation and 
response‖ by Louise K. Comfort, Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan, and Steve Scheinert) 
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5.3 PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS VERIFIED AND IDENTIFIED FROM THE 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Using semi-structured interviews, this study verified the problems identified from the content 
analysis of situation reports and tried to examine critical points more closely in which the 
Hurricane Katrina response system failed. For this reason, findings from the semi-structured 
interviews were used to confirm the problems identified in the previous content analysis. This 
analysis revealed several more problems that organizations actually faced in their response to 
Hurricane Katrina. Table 5-11 identifies the frequencies that managers of different organizations 
mentioned the major problems in the organizations‘ operation and collaboration activities for 
Hurricanes Katrina.  
Figure 5-3 shows the five most critical problems that managers faced in response to 
Hurricane Katrina. As identified by the content analysis of situation reports, the failure in 
maintaining a reliable communication system made it difficult for organization to develop 
situation awareness and this contributed to the ineffective performance of organizations in the 
disaster response system. With the collapse of the communication system, organizations could 
not manage their personnel and resources effectively, and this failure exacerbated the problems 
that interfered with their ability to operate and collaborate with their partners in the system. 
Finally, the lack of proper disaster response plan and also the insufficient resources for their 
operations were another critical problem they needed to address.  
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Table 5-11 Structured codes identified for major problems in disaster management 
 
Category Concept Code Description Frequency 
Number of 
Organization 
Problems in 
Operation 
Failure in 
human resource  
management 
Staffing 
Lack of enough personnel for 
operation 
10 7 
Deteriorated personnel 
working conditions 
Insufficient facilities and resources 
that weaken personnel morale 
7 4 
Inexperienced personnel 
Inexperienced personnel with 
insufficient training 
19 14 
Turnover in major position 
Replacement of personnel in major 
positions 
6 5 
Total    42  
Failure in 
resource  
management 
Delayed or partial delivery Delayed or partial resource delivery 21 15 
Inaccurate estimation of needs 
Lack of exact resource estimation 
system  
12 9 
Failure in vendor management 
Unreliable resource delivery by 
private vendors in a timely manner 
6 4 
Lack of available resources 
Lack of resource in the disaster 
management system 
20 13 
Total    59  
Lack of proper 
management  
plan/procedures 
Lack of clear disaster 
management plan 
Lack of proper disaster management 
plan 
24 15 
Lack of flexibility for 
adaptation 
Inflexibility of plan for adaptation 3 3 
Lack of aligned plan 
Incompatibility of plan among 
organizations  
4 4 
Total    31  
Insufficient 
funding 
  Insufficient funding for operation 5 3 
Difficulties in 
getting big 
operation 
picture 
Lack of 
situational 
awareness 
Failure in transmitting action 
knowledge 
Problems in diffusing action 
knowledge 
7 13 
Difficulty in processing and 
producing action knowledge 
Organizational incompetency in 
processing and producing action 
knowledge for collaboration 
5 7 
Total    12  
Problems in 
communication 
system 
Communication system 
breakdown 
Communication system breakdown  36 20 
Lack of communication 
equipment 
Lack of extra communication facilities 
for redundancy 
22 15 
Lack of communication 
channels 
Lack of clear communication channels 
and partners 
7 5 
Lack of proper technology for 
communication 
Lack of proper communication 
technology 
6 5 
Total    71  
Problems in 
collaboration 
Lack of 
collaborative 
attitudes 
Rivalries among organization 
Territorialism or competing interests 
for authority 
10 9 
Competition in resources 
Competition among organizations for 
the same resources  
6 5 
Ego (Personality) 
Personal tendency to refuse 
collaboration 
14 10 
Total    30  
Institutional 
barriers 
Lack of transparency in its 
operation 
Hidden agenda preventing 
collaboration 
5 5 
Bureaucratic incompetence 
Lack of collaboration due to the 
bureaucratic incompetency 
6 5 
Lack of coordinating structure 
Lack of a coordinating institutional 
structure 
6 4 
Unexpected intervention from 
political leaders 
Unexpected intervention from political 
leaders which disrupt the entire 
operation 
3 2 
Lack of collaboration 
experiences 
Lack of collaboration experiences 11 5 
Total    31  
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Figure 5-4 Top five identified problems by managers of core organizations  
5.3.1 Communications system breakdown 
As indicated in the frequency distribution, the most critical problem for the Hurricane Katrina 
response system was the collapse of the communications system. Many interviewees agreed that 
the breakdown of the communications system severely hampered their organization‘s operation 
and collaboration with partners in the system. Because of this breakdown, they could not 
understand the exact situation at the site and could not formulate the common operating picture 
that is necessary for effective coordination and collaboration. As a result, each organization in 
the system was isolated from others, could not transmit valid information to others, and was 
unable to operate in a coordinated manner. 
Among the 36 organizations included in the sample, 27 (75%) respondents reported that 
their capacity to communicate with other organizations totally collapsed due to various reasons. 
These reasons ranged from lack of equipment and the lack of current technology to a lack of 
written, practiced procedures. As a result, the entire system for Hurricane Katrina could not 
develop the timely situational awareness that is necessary for a coordinated response to disasters. 
According to Table 5-11, 20 organizations that were positioned at critical points in the 
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collaboration structure could not adequately produce and transmit information necessary for 
coordination and collaboration. These factors prevented each organization from processing and 
producing actionable knowledge for other organizations in the system. Without accurate and 
timely information, the communications system for Hurricane Katrina was not stable and 
redundant. Rather, it was vulnerable to outside impacts from the disaster conditions.  
5.3.2 Lack of experienced personnel in the Hurricane Katrina response system  
In addition to the failures of the communication system, the disaster response system of 
Hurricane Katrina suffered from several problems in organizational operation. These problems 
included: lack of experienced personnel (failure in human resource management), lack of 
available resources (resource management), lack of appropriate disaster management plans and 
procedures (failure in planning), and funding for operations.   
First, the response system for Hurricane Katrina had an inadequate level of personnel. 
Because of frequent turnover in major positions after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bergel, 2007 and 
Washington Post, 2007), the level of expertise and the morale of employees in the disaster 
management field had been severely downgraded. And these vacant core positions caused by 
frequent turnover were not filled by experienced personnel at the time of Hurricane Katrina. 
Thus, many organizations in the Hurricane Katrina disaster response system were exposed to a 
lack of leadership and experience.  
…we lost a lot of people, we‘d lost a lot of experience, and we weren‘t as big as we were in the 
‗90‘s. We weren‘t as big as we were, say, for 9/11. We didn‘t have as many full-time employees 
and that definitely caused problems during Katrina because we just didn‘t have enough people… 
(FEMA)  
 
In this situation, the personnel in the system needed to operate with this limited number 
of inexperienced personnel. Moreover, the burden for each individual in the organization was 
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increased to an unmanageable level due to the overload of information processing requests. In 
extreme cases, some personnel deserted their positions in the response phase of Hurricane 
Katrina. As the superintendent of the New Orleans Police said, there was a severe under-staffing 
problem for the response to Hurricane Katrina and the personnel in active service were 
overloaded with work. This made all information processes and disaster response operations 
slow down significantly. 
More than 200 officers deserted during the storm and were fired or suspended. Many veteran 
officers retired, and some of the youngest officers quit and left town. As a result, the size of the 
force has dropped to about 1,400 officers on the street now, from nearly 1,700 before the hurricane. 
Recruiting replacements is difficult, partly because it is hard for candidates to find affordable 
housing, Mr. Riley said… (New York Times, June 2006) 
 
…We‘re understaffed. We take an approach of multitasking or multi-missioned approach. So 
we‘re always, we‘re never appropriately resourced either with infrastructure, with our assets, our 
capital assets, and not with people…. (U.S. Coast Guard, USCG) 
 
But, at the same time, this lack of personnel and increased workload was used as a chance 
for breeding experienced personnel for future disasters. Especially, some managers in active 
service during Hurricane Katrina could develop its leadership, and creative ways of adaptation to 
changing conditions. But this improvised leadership was not enough for organizations to fill the 
gap created by the lack of experienced personnel at the time for the response to Hurricane 
Katrina.  
…it forces our people to be very innovative and to move forward with new ideas to be able to 
improve but sometimes the cost of that is that you lose some of the lessons learned… (U.S. Coast 
Guard, USCG) 
 
Further, the situation for disaster response organizations was made more difficult by a 
lack of consideration for the welfare of personnel. Personnel working during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina had to operate in very poor working conditions. They had to operate without 
facilities for sleeping, bathing, or dining. Also, supplies, especially to first responders, were 
insufficient for normal operations. 
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…welfare of everybody at this facility. In other words, let me give you a scenario. We allowed 
people to work 18 to 20 hours, exhausted, so now we implemented an internal management 
procedure for scheduling and hours worked… (St. Tammany Parish) 
 
In summary, disaster management organizations suffered from a lack of personnel during 
the response to Hurricane Katrina. This lack of personnel and the low level of experience 
combined with the inferior working conditions exacerbated the harsh conditions caused by 
Hurricane Katrina. With this lack of personnel, the workload of core organizations in the system 
increased to levels so high as to cause the malfunction of those organizations.   
5.3.3 Lack of available resources  
With the failure of human resource management, physical resource management during 
Hurricane Katrina proved to be ineffective. In particular, the notorious delays and failures to 
respond to the requests for resource allocation were identified as one of the major problems for 
the Hurricane Katrina response system by the content analysis of situation reports. According to 
the coded segments of the semi-structured interviews, there were several different but related 
problems in resource management responding to Hurricane Katrina. First, physical resources 
were scarce throughout the entire disaster response system. According to the Stafford Act, the 
initial responsibility for the response to a disaster lies at the local level of government. If 
additional resources are needed, the federal and other state agencies are to be contacted to get 
available resources from outside the local and state disaster management system boundary. 
However, findings from the content analysis and semi-structured interview data show that 
resource allocation within local and state boundaries, with outside organizations at the federal 
level, and with other state agencies failed. And this caused difficulties in securing necessary 
resources for organizations in the system.  
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…local and state government had no assets to provide support to anyone therefore they couldn‘t 
collaborate (Ochsner Hospital) 
 
Because there were not enough resources available within the initial boundaries of the 
local and state response system for Hurricane Katrina, organizations needed to rely upon 
resources from outside of the system. Why resources were so scarce in the system was not clear 
from the content analysis of situation reports. According to the semi-structured interviews, 
agencies in the system could not estimate the need for resources accurately. This is mainly due to 
the lack of experience in coping with large disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. After Hurricane 
Andrew‘s landfall25 in August 1992, the Gulf area had not been hit with such a large-scale 
hurricane in over 10 years, so the working memory and experience from that event were not 
retained by the disaster management system for the response to Hurricane Katrina. This failure in 
estimation of need reveals the absence of advanced technology for the resource management and 
the resource management activities could not be integrated into the operations of other 
organizations within the system. Accordingly, pre-positioning of available resources, a critical 
element of disaster management, was not possible for the Hurricane Katrina disaster response 
system.  
…Yeah, I think the biggest problem was that there was a perception of need as opposed to a true 
need. In other words, government can perceive that they need fuel and that they shouldn‘t be 
selling it to the public because we need it but if you‘re not really short on it, do you really need it? 
So it was more of a perception… (Washington Parish) 
 
A second reason for the system‘s failure in securing sufficient resources for disaster 
response was a lack of vendor or supply chain management needed for maintaining a steady 
supply of resources. Without reliable and stable partners for supplies, the disaster response 
                                                   
25 Hurricane Andrew struck the northwestern Bahamas, southern Florida at Homestead (south of Miami), and 
southwest Louisiana around Morgan City in August. Andrew caused $26.5 billion in damage ($38.1 billion in 2006 
US dollars), with most of that damage cost in south Florida, although other sources put damage between $27 billion 
to $34 billion in total costs. Its central pressure ranks as fourth-lowest in U.S. landfall records and Andrew was the 
costliest Atlantic hurricane in U.S. history until surpassed by Hurricane Katrina of the 2005 season.
  
 140 
system for Hurricane Katrina would not have sufficient resources. One example of the failure of 
vendor management is a bus company‘s failure to show up at the promised site and time that was 
preset for evacuation. For the evacuation of the southern parishes, each parish government and 
the Department of Social Services required hundreds of buses for residents‘ evacuation, but some 
buses did not show up as promised. Also, the local and state governments could not maintain a 
constant relationship with vending partners for the reliable supplies of resources.  
…Our problem came in the inability of pre-negotiated contracts of commercial buses to be 
executed in a timely manner. We knew that it could be a possibility so we had a back up to that 
with the utilization of school buses but that cost some confusion in there… (Governor‘s Office of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, GOHSEP) 
  
These failures in vendor management, the lack of available resources, and the inaccurate 
estimation for needs caused, as mentioned in the content analysis chapter, delayed or led to 
partial delivery of requested resources to the end-nodes of the disaster response system. 
…it was so confusing, working, the supplies didn‘t come because it took us two weeks to hold 
what we needed food and water and then when it would come they would send everything to one 
spot, drop the trailer off and leave with the truck and I‘m sitting with three trucks of water up here, 
don‘t need the water in the northern end of the parish, need the water in the southern end of the 
parish but now it‘s in the northern. Made our job harder trying to move it from here to there… 
(Lafourche Parish) 
5.3.4 Lack of disaster management plan/procedure  
In addition to the mismanagement of the important resources of personnel and supplies, the 
disaster response system also suffered from the absence of clear disaster management plans and 
operating procedures. In many cases, organizations did not have clearly defined procedures in 
their disaster management plans. This was particularly true regarding resource allocation among 
organizations in the system, the contact points at the local, state and federal levels for resource 
and information sharing were not clear enough to interact quickly.  
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The problems could be attributed to the absence of plans for specific response activities, 
and sometimes, they the lack of exercise and education for existing plans and procedures. Many 
interviewees (15 organizations out of 36) complained that there was an entire absence of any 
kind of disaster response plans for Hurricane Katrina. Considering that the National Response 
Plan (NRP) was introduced to the system only in December of 2004, organizations were still not 
familiar with its details in time for Hurricane Katrina. This also contributed to the lack of 
exercises and training before Hurricane Katrina. Other interviewees pointed out that the existing 
disaster response plans were not clear enough to be used as a basis for the organizations‘ 
operations.  
…You hate to say it but it was again there was no planning. It was poor for Katrina… (Ascension 
Parish)…What we called our City Assistant Evacuation plan which we did not have for Katrina… 
(Orleans Parish)… Well because before then we really never had a plan for hurricane Katrina… 
(New Orleans Fire Department) 
 
…the National Response plan and NIMS had just come out in early 2005 so really by the time 
Katrina hit the organization, the state, the nation really hadn‘t had a chance to implement many of 
those systems and all… (Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 
GOHSEP) 
 
In addition to the absence of effective disaster response plans, the existing plans were not 
flexible enough to allow managers to exert their creativity in efforts to adapt to the changing 
conditions. When the normal disaster management plan does not work, new working procedures 
for collaboration are required, and managers in major disaster management organizations need to 
demonstrate a competency in sense-making for adaptation (Weick 1995). But the rigidity in 
disaster management plans inhibited them from exerting that kind of leadership for the creative 
response to Hurricane Katrina.  
…The Stafford Act is not good for major emergencies whenever designed for the amount of 
disaster we had for Katrina. It needs to be improved. It needs to allow the freedom to a lot of 
different things but most of the Stafford Act is to repay after the damages… (Orleans Parish)    
 
A third major problem was the lack of alignment among plans for disaster response and 
mitigation. Each plan‘s timeline, main partners, working procedures, and disaster fighting 
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equipment were not compatible with each other, and sometimes, there was competition among 
organizations for the procurement of resources instead of collaboration. For example, the 
timeline of evacuation of the southern parishes and the shelter preparation timeline of the state 
governments were not aligned with each other for response to Hurricane Katrina. As a result, 
many evacuees suffered due to unprepared or missing shelters over one week.  
…That was a state call, they sent them to Texas but Texas, their policy says they only hold them 
for two days. So in two days Texas said: ―Get back on the bus, you‘re going home.‖ And them 
people are ready to go home, so they got on the bus… (Lafourche Parish) 
5.3.5 Lack of collaborative mind and culture  
The problems identified in semi-structured interviews mirror those of identified by the content 
analysis of situation reports.  This study sorted the findings from the content analysis and semi-
structured interviews into two parts by their effects on the failure in collaboration. The first one 
is the lack of a collaborative mindset and personal attitude, and the second one is the 
institutionalized structural barriers that are basically stemming from the bureaucratic or 
hierarchical structure of the Hurricane Katrina response system.  
The most critical problem was the lack of a collaborative mindset on the part of the 
managers taking the commanding positions in disaster response organizations. This lack of 
collaborative attitudes can be attributed to several reasons. First, a manager‘s ego or personality 
simply did not allow collaboration with other organizations. Why some managers in disaster 
response organizations refused to collaborate with others was uncertain and hard to determine 
from these semi-structured interviews, but many interviewees pointed out that a manager‘s 
ego/personality was the main reason for the failure of collaboration.  
…Policemen are a different mentality. They really are. They‘re trained to do it on their own. 
They‘re trained as a single body, you take care of yourself. Firemen are trained to work as teams. 
It‘s a little bit easier to do the unified thing because we from the get-go are trained to work as 
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teams. Whereas the policeman are trained to work independently and you get into the swat teams 
and those type of teams on the police department… (New Orleans Fire Department) 
 
In addition to this personality issue, rivalries among organizations were another source of 
problems. Someone described this problem as a ‗turf battle‘ or ‗territorialism‘, and others as 
‗politics‘ that can be defined as competition among organizations to increase their own power in 
the phases of disaster response and mitigation. With this turf battle or territorialism, effective 
coordination among organizations was not achieved in the response to Hurricane Katrina.  
…there is probably some internal turf battles within the various state agencies that are, turf battles 
and what I mean by that, you have them responsible for one area and you have another group that 
may have an overlap and there may be some controversy about who‘s in charge of what area… 
(Entergy) 
 
This problem of personal ego and territorialism became explicit when each organization 
was isolated and suffered from a lack of resources during the initial stage of the response to 
Hurricane Katrina. Sometimes there were several organizations competing over setting priorities 
for the same resource allocation. In the extreme case, when resources passed through their 
authority, some local agencies intercepted them without coordinating those procedures with 
LOHSEP or other state and federal agencies.  
…I know the political, legislative branch was fighting, not fighting but jockeying to get those 
resources in those communities, the communities they represent. So yes, there was definitely some 
influence trying to get those resources where they need them until the state actually got enough 
people… (Assumption Parish) 
 
Combined with personal factors, institutional barriers that prevented effective 
collaboration also played a critical role in the poor coordination and collaboration. The most part 
of institutional barriers is related to rigid bureaucratic principles in collaboration. Moreover, due 
to the lack of collaboration experiences, organizations did not make their operations clear and 
open to other organizations. And this lack of transparency hampered a development of a system-
wide collaboration protocols. 
…Hidden agendas from other agencies. For instance there‘s GOHSEP, has enormous hidden 
agendas sometimes. Not sure why. Hidden agendas mean you know taking the planning effort 
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down the road that only benefits them and puts the other agency in a poor light… (Department of 
Transportation and Development, LA) 
 
Rather than collaborating, some organizations, or managers of those organizations, relied 
on the traditional command and control system and sometimes went far beyond the limits of 
legal authority for intervention in the command and control system. As a result, some political 
leaders stepped into the officially defined procedures for interaction and they, intentionally or 
unintentionally, distorted and caused confusion in collaboration.  
…people from higher levels of government or maybe local politicians and local leaders that aren‘t 
a part of that, when the planning and preparation is going on, then when the actual event happens, 
that‘s when they get interested in it and decide that ―I‘ve got to get involved in this and start 
calling the shots‖ and they come in and say ―well do this, do this, do this‖ and you have to go 
―wait a minute sir, we‘ve got a plan to do that, but that‘s not it. This is how we planned to do it, 
this is how we plan on doing this.‖… (Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, LA) 
 
Combined with bureaucratic incompetency and irrelevant interaction structures that 
hampered collaboration among agencies, the collaboration links among agencies were weakened 
by the level of isolation. During the most critical period of the response, organizations in the 
system could not exchange necessary information and resources with other organizations.  
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6.0  EVIDENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN PERFORMANCE AND 
INTERACTION STRUCTURE 
In chapter 5, I presented the findings from content analysis of situation reports and semi-
structured interviews and identified the major problems that organizations faced during their 
adaptation to changing conditions. Organizations were not prepared for as large a disaster as 
Hurricane Katrina, and, accordingly, their capacity for communication and collaboration for 
information and resource allocation was severely damaged. This chapter checks the evidence of 
organizational learning between two hurricane response systems. To address the challenges from 
rapidly changing conditions and to improve their performance under complexity, organizations 
invested enormous resources and revised their interaction structure. The three year term between 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav tested the stability and resilience of this newly 
established system for disaster response and mitigation. But the problem is, as proven by the 
failure of Hurricane Katrina response system, various structural changes and investments do not 
always secure improvement in collaboration and effective operation in response to major 
disasters. Thus, I combined the organizational changes since Hurricane Katrina with the evidence 
of performance improvements and checked how intended changes could contribute to the entire 
system‘s response operations to Hurricane Gustav. I started from a comparison of each hurricane 
response systems‘ structure and their formation, and identified changes in core organizations and 
core collaboration links in the response systems. 
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6.1 EVIDENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN INTERACTION 
STRUCTURE AND FORMATION 
This study uses comparative analysis of two hurricane response systems (Hurricanes Katrina and 
Gustav) to identify the difference in interaction structure among organizations in each response 
system. This comparison of the interaction structure of two response systems is possible with the 
structured data set prepared from content analysis of newspaper articles and situation reports. 
Using this structured data, this study creates network maps using UCINet (Borgatti et al, 2002). 
The network map of each response system provides a visualization tool that allows the direct and 
intuitive comparison of two network maps of response systems. But, at the same time, due to the 
number of organizations and complexity in their interactions, this network map does not work as 
an appropriate tool for comparative analysis. To identify the formation of the entire network and 
the core actors/collaboration links, this analysis complements the findings from network maps 
with measures of social network analysis. 
6.1.1 Size of network of hurricane response systems 
Table 6-1 provides the description of two hurricane response systems. It shows that the total 
number of non-isolated organizations is 329 for Hurricane Katrina and 222 for the Hurricane 
Gustav response system. The total number of links is 758 for Katrina and 302 for Gustav, with 
the average number of links at 2.35 for Hurricane Katrina and 1.36 for Hurricane Gustav 
respectively. Relationships are coded as interactions if any two organizations exchange 
information or resources or otherwise operate together during the preparation and response phase 
of either hurricane. 
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Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav management networks 
 
Number of 
Actors 
Number of non-
isolated actors 
Network Size  
(Total Number 
of Ties) 
Average Ties 
per Actor 
Existence of Tie 
Direction 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
533 329* 758
*
 2.35
* 
Yes 
Hurricane 
Gustav 
332 222* 302* 1.36* Yes 
* After removing isolated nodes from the entire network  
* Source: Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 25 – September 19, 2005 for Hurricane Katrina, and Times   
   Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 26 – September 21, 2008 for Hurricane Gustav. 
 
With this descriptive statistics of two hurricane response systems, a network map can 
give this study an intuitive interpretation for the identification of core actors and collaboration 
links. To determine and identify the features of both networks in more detail, this study removed 
isolated nodes (nodes with degree 0) to generate a new network map. This network maps in 
Figures 6-1 and 6-2 visualize the broad picture of interactions in both hurricane response systems. 
According to these figures, organizations in the Hurricane Katrina response system have a 
comparatively small number of brokering networks and accordingly, the peripheral organizations 
have formed links with other organizations relatively freely. However, the interaction structure 
of the Hurricane Gustav system shows the relationship of peripheral organizations in the system 
are quite strictly coordinated by parish, state, and federal brokering organizations. Also, the 
network map for Hurricane Katrina shows a larger system that is characterized by some critical 
or central nodes connecting other organizations. Contrary to that, the network map of the 
Hurricane Gustav response system shows that there were several core or central organizations 
that coordinated the overall response to Hurricane Gustav. 
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* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
Figure 6-1 Full Network Map for Hurricane Katrina Response System* 
 
Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.186 
Network Centralization: 12.8% 
Overall Density: 0.0065 
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* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
 
Figure 6-2 Full Network Map for Hurricane Gustav Response System* 
 
Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.231 
Network Centralization: 20.75% 
Overall Density: 0.0062 
 150 
As clearly shown in figure 6-1, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), the New 
Orleans Police Department (CNOPD), the Governor‘s Office of Louisiana (GOVLA), and the 
Office of the President of the United States (POTUS) played key roles coordinating activities of 
various other state and local organizations of Hurricane Katrina response system. Some parish 
governments such as Jefferson Parish (Parjef), some state departments such as the Louisiana 
Department of Social Services (DSSLA), some federal agencies such as the United States Public 
Health Service (USPHS), and other groups such as the Louisiana International Airport (LAIA), 
the Louisiana National Guard (LANG), and the Louisiana regional electricity company, Entergy 
(Entergy) played bridge roles connecting other local groups within Louisiana and other state 
agencies to the core organizations in the system.  
Similarly, figure 6-2 shows the full network map for the Hurricane Gustav response 
system. The size of the entire disaster response system for Hurricane Gustav is smaller than that 
of Hurricane Katrina mainly due to the actual size of the hurricane. Organizations such as the 
Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSSLA), the Office of the Louisiana Governor 
(OGLA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) took the core coordination 
roles in the Hurricane Gustav response system. As in the Hurricane Katrina management system, 
some organizations such as Jefferson Parish (PARJEF), the Salvation Army (SALVA), the 
American Humane Association (AHA), the American Red Cross (ARC), and government 
organizations such as the US Coast Guard (USCG), the Louisiana National Guard (LANG), and 
the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (DWFLA) took bridging roles for the 
Hurricane Gustav response system.  
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But the most noticeable difference is that the activities of organizations involved in the 
evacuation and sheltering missions played critical roles in the Hurricane Gustav response system. 
Considering the size of evacuation - 2 million residents in the southern parishes - it is not 
surprising that the southern parish governments, the Louisiana Department of Social Services, 
the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and some nonprofit organizations such as 
the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army took central roles.  
Also, figures 6-1 and 6-2 present some basic measures that were calculated to describe 
the two hurricanes‘ response systems respectively: density, total degree centrality, and clustering 
coefficient. The reported overall graph clustering coefficient is 0.186, network centralization is 
12.8% and overall density is 0.0065 for the Hurricane Katrina response system. However, for the 
Hurricane Gustav response system, the overall graph clustering coefficient is slightly higher as 
0.231, network centralization is much higher than that of Hurricane Katrina response system 
(20.75%), and there is small difference in the overall density (0.0062). The higher clustering 
coefficient and network centralization shows that the organizations in the Hurricane Gustav 
response system formed more cliques and depends more on the planned coordination procedures. 
The higher density of the Hurricane Katrina response system is mainly due to the 
organizations‘ need to seek available collaboration partners for information and resources 
sharing. When they faced collapses of entire system and were isolation from the main body of 
coordination and collaboration system, they did not just follow the planned interaction 
procedures, rather, managers of each organization exerted leadership and actively created new 
collaborative partnership with any organizations that had necessary information and resources. It 
surely helped the entire Hurricane Katrina response system recover from the collapse of official 
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response system, but from the system management perspective, it reveals the system‘s weakness 
and vulnerability in response to crises.  
The difference in the formation and shapes of clusters between hurricane response 
systems presents interesting implications. As discussed in the measurement of density, the 
clustered organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system formed mostly in accordance to 
the disaster management plan. Contrary to that, the clustered organizations in the Hurricane 
Katrina response system did not follow the official disaster response procedures and showed 
irregular pattern of interactions. Accordingly, the network type in the Hurricane Gustav response 
system looks more like a ‗cellular network‘ than the Hurricane Katrina response system. 
6.1.2 The comparison of interactions among organizations common to both response 
systems: Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) analysis  
Using measures of social network analysis provides very rough differences between the two 
hurricane response systems. More accurately, those measures of social network analysis: density, 
network centrality, and clustering coefficient are calculated to be network description tools, not 
designed for purposes of network comparison. Accordingly, there is no criterion, like the p-value 
in statistics, to determine the significance of different values of measurement. To overcome this 
problem, I selected common organizations from each hurricane response system and conducted a 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) analysis, I then checked whether there is any significant 
difference in interacting structure of hurricane response systems.  
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* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
Figure 6-3 Interaction of Common Organizations, Hurricane Katrina (Louisiana, 2005) 
 
* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
Figure 6-4 Interaction of Common Organizations, Hurricane Gustav (Louisiana, 2008) 
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Also, the network comparison with common organizations is to keep the same number of 
organizations for both hurricane response systems to ensure accurate QAP analysis. The QAP 
analysis is to measure the degree to which the structures of two networks are significantly 
correlated with each other. Like Pearson‘s Correlation in statistics, the QAP analysis checks 
whether the interaction structure of two separate networks has high correlation and accordingly 
identical interaction structure. If the interaction patterns of two response systems are statistically 
identical, this study can say that the p-value of QAP analysis is significant.  Figure 6-3 and 6-4 
present the network maps of organizations that participated in both Hurricanes Katrina (2005) 
and Hurricane Gustav (2008). 
Table 6-2 Comparison of Network Statistics and Change among the Four Hurricane Response Systems 
 
 Katrina Gustav 
Overall Density 0.0391 0.0292 
Number of Ties 173 114 
Total Degree Centrality 2.955 3.365 
Clustering Coefficient 0.229 0.249 
Number of Cliques (minimum size =3) 17 31 
QAP correlation (p-value) 0.041 (p-value: 0.034) 
    * P-values is significant when alpha is 0.05 
 
Table 6-2 shows some descriptive statistics of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav 
response systems with QAP correlation (p-value). The network measures such as overall density, 
total degree centrality, and clustering coefficient are not much different from those of the entire 
network of two hurricane response systems. Interestingly, the output of QAP analysis shows a 
significant difference in organizational interaction structure between the response systems that 
evolved following Katrina and Gustav (QAP correlation is 0.041 and its p-value is 0.034) and 
this means that the collaboration and coordination structure of Hurricane Gustav response system 
is statistically different from that of Hurricane response system. In the following sections, this 
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study compares the two systems with the identification of core organizations and the formation 
of entire hurricane response network. 
6.1.3 Identification of changes in status of core organizations  
The most common way to identify the core actors in a disaster response network would be the 
use of several measures of centrality with the combination of intuitive interpretation of a network 
map (sociogram). Traditionally, as Freeman (1979) suggested, there are three basic centralities: 
degree, closeness, and betweeness for the identification of core actors in a network. For example, 
it is quite intuitive to say that the organizations with the largest number of links in the entire 
system can be considered core organizations in the system. But as Burt (1992) argued, 
organizations that take the brokerage role and distribute important knowledge and resources in 
the system can be core organizations because power can be originated from the ability to bridge 
actors and activities. For measuring the centrality of an organization within a network, there 
seems to be no dominant centrality measurement. In other words, each centrality measurement is 
a partial one and has its own strengths and weaknesses in identifying core actors. A particular 
organization can be central in the sense that it has the most number of ties with other nodes in 
Degree Centrality
26
. Others can be powerful because they display the closest geodesic distance 
from other actors in Closeness Centrality
27
. At the same time, the length of paths between nodes 
also can matter in Betweeness centrality‘28.  
                                                   
26
 Degree Centrality is based on adjacency and how many immediate ties, such as dyadic relations, a node has. The 
strength of Degree Centrality is that it is useful in finding dominant actors in the network.  
27
 The Closeness Centrality is a measurement based on the geodesic distances. It emphasizes the distance of actor to 
all others in the network. According to Hanneman (2001), this concept is useful because it considers the relationship 
with all other nodes in the network.  
28
Betweeness Centrality shows an actor who is located between actors and on whom other actors depend for 
exchanges such as information and resources. Hanneman (2001) said that Between-ness Centrality assumes that the 
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Among these three centrality measures, total degree centrality can be considered as a 
primary criterion for choosing core actors, but considering the complex characteristics of the 
disaster response networks for Hurricanes Katrina and Hurricane Gustav; this analysis needs 
various conceptual standards more than the total degree of centrality. Facing a severe 
communication breakdown, some organizations took important coordinating roles in information 
diffusion and resources allocation and created many collaborative links with other organizations. 
At the same time, some organizations channeled important responding activities between local, 
state, and federal, or similarly between public, private, and non-profit organizations, and these 
organizations cannot be underestimated in identifying core organizations. So, while focusing on 
the concept of total degree centrality, I also consider the betweeness and closeness centrality at 
the same time. Table 6-3 shows the three most common measures of centrality of the top 13 
organizations in the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems.  
Due to the differences of network size, the value of each centrality measure differs by 
hurricanes, and thus, the core organizations identified by the three centrality measures are not 
consistent. In particular, the organizations that have a high closeness centrality are quite different 
from the organizations identified as core organizations by total degree centrality and betweeness 
centrality. The core organizations identified by cross-centrality measures are the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (fema), the Office of the President of the United States (potus), 
the Louisiana Office of Governor (govla), the New Orleans Police Department (cnopd), the 
Office of New Orleans Mayor (mayno), and the Louisiana National Guard (lang) for both 
hurricane systems. One major difference is that, due to the focus on large-scale evacuation for 
Hurricane Gustav, the local governments, such as Jefferson Parish and Plaquemines Parish, are 
                                                                                                                                                                    
actor who is located in important geodesic paths is considered significant under the assumption that if any node has 
a Betweeness location in the path, it can increase its leverage in the exchange activities. 
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viewed as core actors in the Hurricane Gustav response system. This is in contrast to the 
Hurricane Katrina response system in which most of the identified core actors were federal and 
state agencies. However, some military agencies such as the Louisiana National Guard (Lang) 
are identified as core actors for both systems. 
Table 6-3 Measures of centrality of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav management network 
 
Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Gustav 
Degree 
Centrality
1
 
Closeness 
Centrality
2
 
Betweeness 
Centrality3 
Degree  
Centrality
1
 
Closeness  
Centrality
2
 
Betweeness 
Centrality
3
 
fema 46.00 usmc 0.936 Fema 22.335 govla 23.077 stjcc 0.593 govla 3.908 
potus 22.00 brmap 0.932 Govla 8.175 dssla 19.457 entergy 0.59 fema 2.825 
govla 21.00 nhc 0.931 Parjef 7.752 fema 10.407 cws 0.586 mayno 1.087 
cnopd 20.00 flourcorp 0.929 Potus 7.469 ng 7.24 cconco 0.586 dssla 1.073 
parjef 15.00 fema 0.926 Cnopd 6.889 mayno 6.787 ebrla 0.583 ace 1.033 
lang 14.00 laang 0.926 Lang 6.868 ace 6.335 srsi 0.583 hsepla 0.827 
fna 13.00 parplaema 0.925 Dhsus 6.413 parpla 4.977 ng 0.581 ng 0.512 
sd 13.00 govla 0.924 Mayno 5.693 amr 4.525 lang 0.58 parpla 0.505 
mayno 12.00 potus 0.924 sd 4.382 parjef 4.072 parjef 0.58 parjef 0.422 
lohsep 11.00 mayno 0.924 pmcfh 4.136 lang 4.072 pajefshe 0.58 spdla 0.362 
dhsus 10.00 dodus 0.924 entergy 3.827 aha 3.62 lbbld 0.58 hotmt 0.35 
laia 10.00 lang 0.923 lsu 3.483 laia 3.167 westcc 0.548 opusa 0.305 
ace 10.00 dhsus 0.923 arc 3.132 parsttam 3.167 arc 0.546 salva 0.288 
1 cutting point for degree centrality: 10.00 1 cutting point for degree centrality: 3.167 
2 cutting point for closeness centrality: 0.923 2 cutting point for degree centrality: 0.546 
3 Cutting point: 3.132 3cutting point for degree centrality: 0.288 
Source: Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 25 – September 19, 2005 for Hurricane Katrina, and Times 
Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 26 – September 21, 2008 for Hurricane Gustav. 
 
Notably, the level of measures mentioned above is based on the individual actors. 
Another approach I consider is the identification of core actors from the entire network level 
perspective. Knoke‘s K-Core approach (1990) is relevant for this study. Knoke argues that an 
influence needs to be considered in a relational dimension and suggests the concept of coreness. 
For the identification of core organizations from the entire network level, I adopt the concept of 
‗network robustness‘ combined with the previous centrality measures. Table 6-4 shows the core 
organizations identified by K-coreness analysis. The cut point of both hurricane systems was set 
as 3, and organizations have higher K-core value than 3 were recognized as core organizations. 
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Table 6-4 K-Coreness values for each node 
 
Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Gustav 
Organization Name K-core Value Organization Acronym K-core Value 
Army Corps of Engineers 3 Army Corps of Engineers 4 
Police Department, New Orleans  3 Department of Social Services, LA 4 
Department of Homeland Security, US 3 Fema 4 
Department of Natural Resources, LA 3 Louisiana National Guard 4 
Department of Defense, US 3 National Guard 4 
Department of Transportation and  
Development, LA 
3 Office of Governor, LA 4 
Entergy 3 Office of Mayor, New Orleans 4 
Fema 3 Parish of Jefferson 4 
Florida National Guard 3 Parish of Plaquemines 4 
Office of Governor, LA 3 Parish of St. Bernard 4 
Louisiana National Guard 3 Parish of St. John 4 
Louisiana Emergency Operation Center 3 Parish of St. Tammany 4 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security  
and Emergency Preparedness 
3 American Red Cross 3 
Louisiana State Police 3 Amtrak 3 
Office of Mayor, New Orleans 3 Department of Agriculture and Forestry, LA 3 
National Guard 3 Department of Agriculture, US 3 
Parish of Jefferson 3 Department of Homeland Security, US 3 
Parish of Lafourche 3 Entergy 3 
Parish of Plaquemines 3 
Office of Homeland Security and  
Emergency Preparedness, New Orleans  
3 
Parish of St. Bernard 3 Parish of Lafourche 3 
Parish of St. John 3 Parish of St. Charles 3 
Office of President, US 3 Parish of East Baton Rouge 3 
United States Army  3 Louisiana State Police 3 
Cut Point, Hurricane Katrina 3 Cut Point, Hurricane Gustav 3 
 
According to table 6-4, unlike the three centrality measures, the Army Corps of 
Engineers emerges as the actor with highest core value for both hurricane response systems. Also, 
there are several common organizations identified as core organizations using K-coreness 
measures, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (fema), the Office of President 
of the United States (potus), the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness (lohsep), and the Louisiana National Guard (Lang). Still, the most significant 
difference between the two hurricane systems is that the local parish governments such as 
Jefferson Parish, St. Bernard Parish, Plaquemines Parish, and St. Tammany Parish take core 
positions in the response system for Hurricane Gustav. This means that the local parish 
government successfully coordinated its subordinate organizations within its boundary with other 
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parish, state and federal agencies in the system. And again, this shows that, in the disaster 
response system for Hurricane Gustav, the local parish governments played a critical role in 
brokering resources and information for the large-scale evacuation.  
This finding further supports the cellular feature of the Hurricane Gustav response system 
and that the Hurricane Gustav response system operated under predefined plans of disaster 
management more so than in Hurricane Katrina. The structure of interaction under major disaster 
management plans takes the form of a cellular network in which some brokering organizations 
connect the pedant organizations to the partnering organizations in the other cellular sub-
structure. The organizations identified as power brokering organizations for the Hurricane 
Gustav response system are Jefferson Parish, National Hurricane Center, Lafourche Parish, 
Ochsner hospital, Office of President of the United States, and New Orleans Office of Mayor. 
This list of organizations is similar to those that were identified by pre-defined disaster 
management plans. Contrary to that, the power broker organizations in the Hurricane Katrina 
response system are quite different from organizations identified by centrality measures. This 
means that newly emerging organizations in the Hurricane Katrina response system took the role 
of coordination.  
In summary, the results of the identification of core organizations using various measures 
and approaches are not consistent for analyzing the Hurricane Katrina response system. 
Specifically, the organizations identified by coreness value do not seem to be core organizations 
from the perspective of the centrality measures. Contrary to that, the organizations identified as 
core actors in the Hurricane Gustav response system by various measures are quite consistent 
across measures. This means that the collaboration and coordination structure of the Hurricane 
Gustav response system followed the disaster management plan more consistently. This finding 
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shows the stability of interaction structure of Hurricane Gustav response system. The 
organizations identified as core actors in the hurricane response systems can be used as the nodes 
for strategic intervention in the agent-based simulation of this study.  
6.1.4 Differences in network formation between the hurricane response systems: Clique 
analysis  
In this section, I conducted a clique analysis to identify the sub-groups in the Hurricane Katrina 
and Hurricane Gustav response systems. This analysis reveals how large hurricane response 
systems were formed from the small components (cliques) of organizational interactions. By 
comparing the formation of cliques or interaction patterns between cliques, this analysis checks 
whether there is any evidence of organizational learning in network formation since the landfall 
of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  
As Hanneman argues (2005), many approaches to understand the structure of a network 
emphasize examining how dense connections are built-up from simpler dyads and triads to more 
extended dense clusters such as "cliques." This view of network formation focuses on how 
solidarity and connection of large social structures can be built up out of small and tight 
components. Using this technique of clique analysis, I examined the embedded relationships of 
core organizations and the relationships between subgroups. With a minimum size set at 3, the 
number of cliques in the Hurricane Katrina response system is 34, and the number of cliques in 
the Hurricane Gustav response system is 60. There are a greater number of cliques in the 
Hurricane Gustav response system, again implying the cellular network of the system because, 
by definition, the organizations interact more frequently within the subgroup than other 
organizations outside of cliques. The comparatively small number of subgroups in the Katrina 
response system shows that each organization in the system quite freely interacted with other 
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organizations that were not in the same clique. Consequently, the coordination structure for the 
response to Hurricane Katrina broke down and organizations needed to find collaboration 
partners. Table 6-5 shows all cliques in the Hurricane Katrina response system.  
According to table 6-5, there are several organizations that have co-membership with 
various subgroups of the system. Among them, FEMA has 15 co-memberships, the Louisiana 
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) has 7 co-memberships, 
the Office of the President of the United States has six co-memberships, and the New Orleans 
Police Department also has six co-memberships in the Hurricane Katrina response system. This 
set of organizations with multiple memberships across the various subgroups conducted the 
brokerage role in the hurricane management system. FEMA coordinated and bridged actions 
between federal agencies and state/local agencies, similarly the Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) brokered between federal/state and local 
organizations in the system. When each subgroup is sorted by the level of jurisdiction, there are 
four subgroups comprised of interactions among federal agencies, four subgroups of federal and 
local agencies, seven subgroups with federal and state agencies, 10 subgroups comprised of 
federal, state, and local agencies, six subgroups of state and local agencies, and three subgroups 
purely comprised of local agencies. In those subgroups comprised of organizations with multiple 
levels of jurisdiction. This analysis confirms that agencies with co-membership played a 
brokerage function. 
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Table 6-5 List of subgroups (cliques) of Hurricane Katrina response system 
Group No. Organization 1 Organization 2 Organization 3 Organization 4 Category
1 Department of Defense fema Office of President US Congress Federal
2
Department of Homeland 
Security, US
fema Office of President Federal
3 fema Louisiana Office of Governor Office of Mayor, New Orleans Office of President Federal+State+Local
4 fema Parish of St.Bernard Office of President Federal+Local
5 City of New Orleans fema
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Preparedness
Federal+State+Local
6 Army Corps of Engineers City of New Orleans fema Federal+State+Local
7 fema
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Preparedness
Parish of Lafourche Federal+State+Local
8 fema
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Preparedness
Parish of Plaquemines Federal+State+Local
9 fema
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Preparedness
Parish of St.Bernard Federal+State+Local
10 fema
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Preparedness
Parish of St. Tammany Federal+State+Local
11 fema Louisiana Office of Governor National Hurricane Center Federal+State
12
Department of Homeland 
Security, US
fema National Hurricane Center Federal
13 fema Louisiana Office of Governor National Hurricane Center Federal+State
14 Army Corps of Engineers fema Parish of Plaquemines Federal+Local
15 Army Corps of Engineers fema Parish of St.Bernard Federal+Local
16 Army Corps of Engineers fema The Shaw Group, Inc Federal (Private)
17
Baton Rouge Metropolitan 
Airport
Delta Airlines
Louis Armstrong 
International Airport
National+State (Private)
18
Centers of Disease Control 
and Prevention
Department of Health and 
Human Services, US
Louis Armstrong 
International Airport
Federal+State
19
City of New Orleans Fire 
Department
City of New Orleans, Police 
Department
Wal-marts Local (Private)
20
City of New Orleans, Police 
Department
Department of Public Safety 
and Corrections, Louisiana
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Preparedness
State+Local
21
City of New Orleans, Police 
Department
Department of Public Safety 
and Corrections, Louisiana
Parish of Jefferson State+Local
22
City of New Orleans, Police 
Department
Louisiana National Guard National Guard Federal+State+Local
23
City of New Orleans, Police 
Department
Louisiana State University 
Department of Psychiatry
Office of Mayor, New Orleans State+Local
24
City of New Orleans, Police 
Department
Office of Mayor, New Orleans New Orleans Hornets Local
25 County of St. Louis, Missouri
Regional Assistance Center 
for the County of St. Louis, 
Missiouri
Salvation Army State+Local
26
City of Slidell Police 
Department
Parish of St. Tammany Slidell Memorial Hospital Local
27
Department of Health and 
Hospitals, Louisiana
Department of Homeland 
Security, US
Parish of St. Gabriel, Morgue Federal+State+Local
28
Department Natural 
Resources, LA
Office of President US Army Federal+State
29
Department of the Treasury, 
Louisiana
Louisiana Office of Governor Office of Senator David Vitter Federal+State
30
Fertility Institute of New 
Orleans
Louisiana Office of Governor
Office of State Representative 
John Alario
State+Local
31
Louisiana Emergency 
Operation Center
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Preparedness
Parish of Plaquemines State+Local
32
Department of Homeland 
Security, US
National Broadcasting 
Corporation
Parish of Jefferson Federal+Local
33 Louisiana Office of Governor Office of Senator David Vitter
Office of Senator Mary 
Landrieu
Office of President Federal+State
34 Louisiana Office of Governor Office of Mayor, New Orleans Office of President United States Secret Service Federal+State+Local
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Based on clique analysis, I drafted a network map of interactions among subgroups. 
Figure 6-5 shows one main group and three small groups that are isolated from the main group in 
the Hurricane Katrina response system. Among these three isolated groups, the organizations in 
the first group performed medical functions with local hospitals and the Salvation Army, and the 
organizations in the third group worked for the air transportation of special medical needs 
evacuees (the function of the second groups is not clear). Except those separated sub-groups, the 
other organizations form a big cluster of subgroups together.  
To determine which organizations act as nodes that connect the graph and which are 
isolated from groups, the analysis reported in figure 6-6 shows that Office of President of the 
United States, Office of Mayor of New Orleans, FEMA, New Orleans Police Department, 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), and 
Governor‘s Office of Louisiana played core roles in connecting subgroups together. Figure 6-6 
further shows how the large disaster response system for Hurricane Katrina was comprised of 
small components including federal, state, and local organizations. This formation is primarily 
set by the master plan for disaster response and mitigation. In those plans, local agencies cannot 
interact directly with other state and federal agencies for resource allocation. Similarly, almost 
no state agencies can directly contact other state and federal agencies for resource exchange 
without coordination by LOHSEP, so their coreness comes from the structure of disaster 
management plans.  
This structure constrains the entire system for the Hurricane Katrina response system. 
One organization, which is not considered as a core organization by the plan but is identified as a 
broker by this clique analysis is the New Orleans Police Department. According to figures 6-5 
and 6-6, the New Orleans Police Department has links with federal and state military authorities 
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and emergency management agencies and connects them for the security functions of the 
Hurricane Katrina response system.  
 
* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
Figure 6-5 Clique diagram of Hurricane Katrina management system (Using Cliqueoverlap.##D) 
 
* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
Figure 6-6 Clique diagram of Hurricane Katrina management system (Using Cliqueset.##D) 
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This study conducts the same clique analysis for Hurricane Gustav response system, and 
also, based on clique analysis, it creates network map to examine the collaboration patterns 
between cliques or subgroups. The total number of subgroups identified by clique analysis for 
Hurricane Gustav response system is 59 when the minimum size of the organizations set as four. 
The list of subgroups of the Hurricane Gustav response system is shown in table 6-6. According 
to table 6-6, there are several organizations that have core membership with various subgroups of 
the system. Among them, the Department of Social Services has co-membership with 31 out of 
59 subgroups. Also, the Office of Governor, Louisiana (specifically the Governor‘s Office 
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, GOHSEP, which replaced LOHSEP after 
Hurricane Katrina) has co-membership with 47 cliques out of 59. FEMA has co-membership 
with 15 cliques, and the New Orleans Office of Mayor has eight co-memberships with various 
subgroups.  
The high number of co-membership between LOHSEP and the Department of Social 
Services reveals that they had a very close working relationship to support the operation of 
parish governments, especially for their large scale evacuation of two million residents from 
southern parishes before the landfall of Hurricane Gustav. As reported, an unprecedented total 
evacuation and sheltering of residents was the most important mission of organizations in 
Hurricane Gustav response system. A total of 47 subgroups were formed from the firm 
collaboration links between Department of Social Services, Governor‘s Office Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness, and individual parish EOCs (DSSLA-GOHSEP-parish). 
FEMA occasionally joined this close working relationship for the provision of federal level 
support to the evacuation and sheltering functions. Also, non-profit organizations such as the 
American Red Cross and local faith-based organizations often joined these subgroups to support 
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them. The clique analysis of the Hurricane Gustav response system showed three subgroups 
worked with Entergy, regional electricity company, because the long lasting blackout was one of 
the critical issues and problems of the Hurricane Gustav response system. 
When the subgroups are sorted by level of jurisdiction, again in table 6-6, 21 subgroups 
were comprised of federal, state, and local agencies and 29 subgroups were comprised of state 
and local agencies. Most notably, there was no subgroup solely composed of federal agencies, 
unlike the Hurricane Katrina response system (4 subgroups were comprised of federal agencies 
only). This means that the response system for Hurricane Gustav was highly managed and 
operated by state and local organizations. Three subgroups were composed of federal and local 
agencies, and five subgroups are composed of federal and state agencies. There is just one 
subgroup composed solely of local agencies in the system.  
To examine how the large network of Hurricane Gustav response system was composed 
of sub-groups, figures 6-8 and 6-9 show that, similar to the Hurricane Katrina response system, 
there is one big group and three small groups that are isolated from the main group. The first one 
is composed of organizations that took the transportation function for the evacuation of residents 
out of state of Louisiana; the organizations in the second clique collaborated for the security 
function that was composed of three local fire departments. The third cannot be clearly defined 
by function. To determine which particular actors connect the graph, figures 6-8 and 6-9 show 
that FEMA, the Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 
(GOHSEP), the Department of Social Services, and the New Orleans Office of Mayor play the 
roles of core organizations that connect various subgroups together.  
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Table 6-6 List of subgroups (cliques) of Hurricane Gustav response system 
 
Group 
No.
Organization 1 Organization 2 Organization 3 Organization 4 Category
1 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. James Federal+State+Local
2 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. John the Baptist Federal+State+Local
3 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. Tammany Federal+State+Local
4 Parish of  Allen Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Federal+State+Local
5 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Parish of  East Baton Rouge Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Federal+State+Local
6 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA City  of  Ev angeline Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Federal+State+Local
7 Department of  Agriculture Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Federal+State
8 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Acadia State+Local
9 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Ascension  State+Local
10 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Assumption State+Local
11 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Av oy elles State+Local
12 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  East Feliciana State+Local
13 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  East Iberia State+Local
14 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  East Iberia State+Local
15 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Jef f orson State+Local
16 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Laf ourche Parish of  St. Charles State+Local
17 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Laf ourcheo State+Local
18 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Liv ingston State+Local
19 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Jail, Parish of  Orleans State+Local
20 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Plaquemines Parish of  St. Bernard State+Local
21 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Pointe Coupee State+Local
22 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Rapides State+Local
23 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. Landry State+Local
24 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. Martin State+Local
25 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. Martina State+Local
26 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Tangipahoa State+Local
27 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Terrebonne State+Local
28 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Vermillion State+Local
29 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  West Feliciana State+Local
30 Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  West Baton Rouge State+Local
31
Department of  Homeland 
Security , US
National Guard Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Federal+State
32
Department of  Homeland 
Security , US
Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans Federal+State+Local
33 Entergy National Guard Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Federal+State+Local
34 Entergy Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans Federal+State+Local
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35 Hot Meals Task Force
Louisiana Restaurant 
Association
Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA State+Local
36 Army  Corps of  Engineers f ema National Guard Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Federal+State+Local
37 Army  Corps of  Engineers National Guard Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Plaquemines Federal+State+Local
38 National Guard Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Jef f orson Federal+State+Local
39 Army  Corps of  Engineers f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. Tammany Federal+State+Local
40 Army  Corps of  Engineers f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA
U.S. Small Business 
Administration-Disaster Planning 
Of f ice
Federal+State
41 Army  Corps of  Engineers Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  Plaquemines Parish of  St. Bernard Federal+State+Local
42 f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans Parish of  St. Tammany Federal+State+Local
43 Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans Parish of  Jef f orson State+Local
44 Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans State Police Department, LA State+Local
45 Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans US Congress Federal+State+Local
46 f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Of f ice of  President, US Federal+State
47 f ema Of f ice of  Gov ernor, LA Parish of  St. John the Baptist 
U.S. Small Business 
Administration-Disaster Planning 
Of f ice
Federal+State+Local
48 American Red Cross Dept of  Social Serv ices, LA f ema Federal+State+Local
49 American Red Cross f ema Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans Federal+State+Local
50 amtrak
Department of  homeland 
security  and emergency  
preparedness, New Orleans
Regional Transit Authority Federal+State
51 City  of  New Orleans f ema Louisiana Recov ery  Authority Federal+State+Local
52 Army  Corps of  Engineers
Crown Roof ing Serv ices Inc. 
Kenner
f ema Federal+local
53
Fire Department, Assumption 
Parish
Fire Department, Terrebone 
Parish
Fire Department, St. Tammany Local
54 Friends of  the Grand Isle NOAA U.S. Geological Surv ey  Federal+Local
55 f ema Louisiana National Guard Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans Federal+State+Local
56 Louisiana National Guard Of f ice of  May or, New Orleans Parish of  Jef f orson State+Local
57
MuttShack Disaster Response 
Animal Rescue 
Louisiana National Guard New Orleans Police Department State+Local
58
Department of  Homeland 
Security , US
Louisiana National Guard New Orleans Police Department State+Local
59 Army  Corps of  Engineers f ema
S&M and Associates Inc. of  
Pascagoula
Federal+Local
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* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
Figure 6-7 Clique diagram of Hurricane Gustav management system (Using Cliqueoverlap.##D)\ 
 
* Refer Appendix C for the list of acronym of organizations 
Figure 6-8 Clique diagram of Hurricane Gustav management system (Using Cliqueset.##D) 
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6.1.5 Network robustness of hurricane response systems: Lambda set analysis  
With clique analysis, I examined how the large disaster response system is composed of small 
subgroups and which groups of organizations played key roles in connecting entire subgroups for 
the achievement of the shared goal of disaster response and mitigation. Related with that, I 
conducted the following Lambda set analysis to identify weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the 
disaster response systems for Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. If this analysis can identify those 
weak links, it will show how policy makers can strategically intervene at these weak points and 
strengthen the Hurricane Gustav response system to guide it toward more stability and resilience. 
The concept of fragmentation in network analysis asks if certain connections in the graph 
were removed, how this removal affect the structure of the network (Hanneman 2005). The 
Lambda set analysis ranks each relationship in the network in terms of importance by evaluating 
how much of the flow among actors in the network goes through each link. It then identifies sets 
of relationships which, if disconnected, would most greatly disrupt the flow among all of the 
actors. This lambda set analysis
29
 measures the robustness of a network structure when any 
major nodes are removed. This test of structural robustness can be meaningful for this study 
because, in dynamic changes of disaster response system, there is a sufficient possibility that 
nodes might be eliminated from the network by the unexpected impact of disasters.  
The output of lambda set analysis is shown in figure 6-9. Within the Hurricane Katrina 
response system, the first relationship with the highest lambda set value is the working 
relationship among Governor‘s Office of Louisiana, Office of President, and FEMA (Lambda 
                                                   
29
 A lambda set is a maximal subset of vertices with the property that the edge connectivity of any pair of vertices 
within the subset is strictly greater than the edge connectivity of any pair of vertices, one of which is in the subset 
and one of which is outside (Borgatti et al, 1999).  
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value=13). If the links among these three organizations were removed, the impact of the removal 
of this relationship would be the most significant one. The next set of organizations with high 
Lambda value is the relationship among the Governor‘s Office of Louisiana, the Office of the 
President of the United States, FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Louisiana 
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness with a score of 10. Similarly, those 
organizations such as the New Orleans Police Department, the New Orleans Office of Mayor, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, and the Louisiana National Guard can be added to the list of major 
organizations that maintained critical relationships and that if those links are removed, the 
collaboration operation of Hurricane Katrina response system would be significantly disturbed.  
 
 
Figure 6-9 Hierarchical Lambda Set Partitions, Hurricane Katrina 
 
Figure 6-10 shows the hierarchical lambda set partitions of the Hurricane Gustav 
response system. In this response system, the link between the Governor‘s Office of Homeland 
Security and the Emergency Preparedness and the Department of Social Services has the closest 
relationship with a Lambda value of 35. If that relationship were to be disconnected, the entire 
operation of activities of the Hurricane Gustav response system would have been significantly 
hampered. The overall Lambda value for the Hurricane Gustav response system is higher than 
that of the Hurricane Katrina response system, which means that the relationship among the core 
organizations of the Hurricane Gustav response system is stronger than that of the Hurricane 
13 
10 
9 
8 
7 
5 
Lambda 
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Katrina response system.  Similarly, FEMA, the National Guard, the Army Corps of Engineers, 
the American Red Cross, the New Orleans Office of Mayor, and some parish governments have 
close relationships with the Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness and the Department of Social Services with a lower lambda value of 5.  
 
 
Figure 6-10 Hierarchical Lambda Set Partitions, Hurricane Katrina 
6.2 DIFFERENCES IN NETWORK CHANGE OF HURRICANE KATRINA AND 
HURRICANE GUSTAV RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
The clique analysis and Lambda set analysis identified how the entire hurricane response 
systems were composed of small groups, how the relationships between organizations were 
embedded in the interaction structure, and where the vulnerabilities are located in their 
relationships. Also, the identification of core organizations through the various tools of centrality 
measurement allowed this study to find the critical nodes of both hurricane response systems. 
These findings of the major features of actual structure for coordination and collaboration serve 
as the basis for developing intervention strategies for guiding the adaptive evolution of a 
complex system.   
Lambda 
35 
18 
11 
10 
9 
7 
6 
5 
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Before developing strategies for intervention, I examined how the response systems for 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav evolved naturally (meaning how they evolved without 
any strategic intervention in the relationship) during the period of preparation and response phase 
because it provides the baseline of system evolution when intervention strategies apply to 
interactions. The time period and data sources for examining the natural changing pattern are the 
same as for the content analysis; one week before and three weeks after the hurricanes‘ landfall. 
But the time periods were divided into five phases instead of dividing the entire duration by days 
for a better analysis of the natural evolution of the response systems for Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Gustav. 
The first period is between the detection of the hurricane by the National Hurricane 
Center and the landfall of hurricanes; the second period falls between the landfall of the 
hurricane and three days after the landfall. Note that for the three days after landfall for both 
hurricanes, especially Katrina, each organization was isolated from the others and could not 
expect support from the other organizations in the system. Furthermore, because of flooding and 
the breakdown of the communication system following Hurricane Katrina, the regular activities 
of disaster response and mitigation were not possible. Also, local agencies such as Parish 
governments stocked just three days supplies with an expectation that the state and federal 
agency would reach to them within three days.  The third period is the first full week following 
the three days of first response after landfall and the fourth and the fifth periods are the following 
second and third weeks respectively. The identification of network change by periods is 
descriptive by periodic time frames with basic network measures employed in this chapter such 
as total degree centrality, density, clustering coefficient, and number of cliques. 
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6.2.1 Network change in the Hurricane Katrina response system  
Table 6-7 combines the network map of each time frame with basic measures of network 
analysis such as density, clustering coefficient, number of cliques, and total degree centrality. 
First, the changing pattern of the network map of Hurricane Katrina response system shows that 
it evolves from a very fragmented form of interaction in the initial preparation phase toward a 
more closely connected form, and, with the advance of time, or with the phase transition from 
response to recovery, this connected form of a network hits a high in period three and decreases 
afterwards. As confirmed by the semi-structured interviews, this evolution pattern shows the 
quite fragmented form of the Hurricane Katrina response system before, and three days after, the 
landfall of Hurricane Katrina. 
This intuitive finding from the network map can be supported by network measures: 
centrality, density, clustering coefficient, and number of cliques. Figure 6-11 shows the 
fluctuation of network measures by periods. Number of cliques and degree centrality increases 
and hits its highest point in period three and decreases again afterwards. Contrarily, the measure 
of density decreases as the Hurricane Katrina response system becomes normalized in period 
three, and also slightly increases again with the phase transition from response to recovery. The 
fluctuation pattern of the clustering coefficient is not consistent even though its pattern also 
increases until period two and decreases afterwards. This pattern is a bit unexpected, because 
given the increase of the number of cliques, it may reach a peak in period three. 
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Table 6-7 Evolution pattern of the Hurricane Katrina response system with network measures  
 
Time 
Period 
Network Sociogram Network Measures 
August  
27 - 28, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.563, Std Dev: 1.853 
Network Centralization = 32.47% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
0 
Density 0.0474 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.000 
August  
29 -31, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.5, Std Dev: 1.0 
Network Centralization = 32.47% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
2 
Density 0.0340 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.358 
September  
1 - 7, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.964, Std Dev: 2.288 
Network Centralization = 9.9% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
5 
Density 0.010 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.092 
September  
8 - 14, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.832, Std Dev: 2.515 
Network Centralization = 22.27% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
3 
Density 0.0138 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.124 
September 
15 - 19, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 0.916, Std Dev: 1.561 
Network Centralization = 5.98% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
2 
Density 0.0049 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.080 
 
*Hurricane Katrina landfall: August 29, 2008.   
Source: Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 27 – September 19, 2005. (Comfort & Hasse, 2006) 
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*Instead of the original value of density, this graph multiplied original value of density 100 times to adjust    
its scale and make its change visible.     
 
Figure 6-11 Change of network measures by periods, Hurricane Katrina 
 
Judging from these measures and network maps, the coordination and collaboration of 
the Hurricane Katrina response system was poor in the initial stages of preparation. Also, in 
period two, the first three days of the Hurricane Katrina response phase, there emerged a greater 
number of organizations in the response system, but due to the collapse of the levee system and 
the breakdown of the communication system, collaboration and coordination between agencies 
was not effective in this period. In period three, the entire response system started to adapt and 
cooperate together, its operations were normalized and there were relatively firm connections 
between organizations. During period four, the formerly connected system started to become 
disconnected again, primarily due to the phase transition from response to recovery, and possibly 
due to the preparation for the second large-scale hurricane to the Gulf area, Hurricane Rita, that 
landed on September 24, 2005. 
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6.2.2 Network change in the Hurricane Gustav response system  
The same analysis was conducted to detect network change of the Hurricane Gustav response 
system. As in Hurricane Katrina, this study divides the entire duration into five periods for the 
identification of the evolution pattern of the Hurricane Gustav response system. The first period 
is between the detection of the Hurricane Gustav and its landfall on September 1, 2008. The 
second period is the first three days after Hurricane Gustav‘s landfall. The rationale for the 
creation of this period is to make a direct comparison with the previous analysis of the Hurricane 
Katrina response system that suffered severely from system breakdown in its initial three days of 
response to Hurricane Katrina. The third period is the first week following these initial three days 
after the Hurricane landfall, and the fourth and the fifth periods are the second and third weeks 
after the three days following Hurricane Gustav‘s landfall. 
Similar to the study of Hurricane Katrina, this analysis created table 6-8 which includes 
network maps for the defined five periods and includes major network measures of network 
analysis such as centrality, density, clustering coefficient, and number of cliques operating in 
each period of the Hurricane Gustav response system. With the network maps in table 6-8, this 
study can intuitively check how the entire disaster response system for Hurricane Gustav evolved 
by periods. The first and most important difference when comparing these maps to those of the 
Hurricane Katrina response system is that the interacting organizations in the Hurricane Gustav 
response system in periods one and two were more closely connected with each other than were 
the organizations in Hurricane Katrina response system. Centering on the Governor‘s Office of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, the Louisiana National Guard, and the Parish 
of Jefferson, organizations in the preparation period had already formed an allied response to 
Hurricane Gustav. This finding corresponds to semi-structured interviews. Many interviewees 
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pointed out that the level of preparedness improved significantly for the response to Hurricane 
Gustav. Due to this increased level of preparedness, the network map of the first period shows an 
improved pattern of collaboration to that of Hurricane Katrina. 
The second difference in evolution between the Hurricane Gustav and Hurricane Katrina 
response systems is that the entire disaster response system for Hurricane Gustav was re-
activated or re-formed after period three which is the most active period during the preparation 
and response phase for both hurricanes. There are several possible explanations or hypotheses for 
this re-activation of the Hurricane Gustav response system. The first possibility is that Hurricane 
Ike, another category 2 Hurricane, made its final landfall on September 13, 2008 in the middle of 
the response phase of the Hurricane Gustav response system. While in conducting content 
analysis, this study removed all the activities for the response to Hurricane Ike from coding 
procedures, there is a reasonable possibility that the collaboration links among organizations 
such as the Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, FEMA, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, and parish EOCs were activated again to respond to and mitigate the 
mixed impact of Hurricane Gustav and Hurricane Ike arriving almost at the same time.  
Also, due to the power outages in Baton Rouge and southern parishes in Louisiana lasting 
for almost two weeks, the collaboration connections between agencies could have been adversely 
affected and then restored after the recovery from power outages. This peculiar evolution pattern 
of the Hurricane Gustav response system can be supported by the major network measures in 
table 6-8. Total degree centrality, number of cliques, and clustering coefficient increase until 
period three, decrease in period four, and increase in period five which indicates the re-activation 
of Hurricane Gustav response system. Contrary to that, density decreases until period three and 
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increases slightly again in period four. This fluctuation pattern of major network measures for 
the each period of Hurricane Gustav management system is shown in figure 6-13.  
Table 6-8 Evolution pattern of the Hurricane Gustav response system with network measures  
Time 
Period 
Network Sociogram Network Measures 
August  
26 - 31, 2008 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.5, Std Dev: 1.086 
Network Centralization = 13.96% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
0 
Density 0.0291 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0 
September 
1 -3, 2008 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.73, Std Dev: 0.973 
Network Centralization = 32.47% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
1 
Density 0.0255 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.099 
September  
4 - 9, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 2.426, Std Dev: 4.723 
Network Centralization = 28.25% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
11 
Density 0.0091 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.044 
September  
10 - 14, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.49, Std Dev: 1.036 
Network Centralization = 11.47% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
2 
Density 0.0149 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.133 
September 
15 - 21, 2005 
 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Mean: 1.941, Std Dev: 2.086 
Network Centralization = 15.47% 
Number of Cliques 
(Minimum size = 3) 
7 
Density 0.0151 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
0.216 
* Hurricane Gustav landfall: September 1, 2008.   
 Source: Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA. August 26 – September 21, 2008. 
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*Instead of the original value of density, this graph multiplied original value of density 100 times to adjust 
its scale and make its change visible.     
 
Figure 6-12 Change of network measures by periods, Hurricane Gustav 
6.3 EVIDENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN IMPROVING 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITIES  
In the previous section, this study checked evidence of organizational learning in building new 
structure for effective coordination/collaboration and also examined how each response system 
evolved by periods. In addition to this evidence of organizational learning in renewing the 
interaction structure, this section explores complementary evidence of organizational learning in 
the improvement of organizational capacities and their operations in response to Hurricane 
Gustav. This analysis uses the data set from semi-structured interviews.  
Federal, state, and local organizations‘ efforts to design a new system since Hurricane 
Katrina and to make the disaster response system more resilient had been significant and proved 
to be successful, judging from its response activities to Hurricane Gustav. First, the preparation 
level was improved significantly since Hurricane Katrina, mainly because organizations worked 
on the new disaster management plan and let their employees become accustomed to those 
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changes in plans and procedures through year-round exercises and training. More importantly, 
these exercises were conducted in a joint manner, so the lack of preparedness that was evident in 
the Hurricane Katrina response system was sufficiently addressed in time for the response to 
Hurricane Gustav. Also the disaster response system for Hurricane Gustav invested enormous 
amounts of resources to improve the reliability and stability of its communication system. With 
new communication equipment, organizations could share information more accurately and 
accordingly, quickly allocate resources during their response to Hurricane Gustav.  
Managers who participated in the semi-structured interview stated that organizations in 
the Hurricane Gustav response system retained more highly experienced personnel, secured more 
resources to the proper level of operation, and followed clearer disaster response plans and 
procedures with more reliable communication systems. These improvements also allowed for 
smoother collaboration between partners during the response to Hurricane Gustav. Table 6-9 
listed the major changes in organizational capacities for effective coordination and collaboration 
in response to Hurricane Gustav. 
Table 6-9 Structured codes for the part of improvements since Hurricane Katrina  
Category Concept Code Description Frequency 
Number of 
Organization  
Improved 
Organizational  
Capacity 
Improved 
Manpower 
Training and Education 
More required training and training 
programs 
59 29 
Improved Personnel 
Welfare 
More considerations for personnel's 
safety and working conditions 
6 5 
Adaptive Leadership 
Improved leadership based on 
learning from previous disasters 
11 7 
Increased Expertise of 
Personnel 
Increased level of expertise through 
disaster management experiences 
9 9 
Staffing 
Increased number of personnel for 
the operation of disaster management  
7 6 
Total    92   
Improved Resource 
Management 
Private Vendor 
Management 
Pre-identified and pre-contracted 
vendors for stable supplies provision  
32 15 
More Regional 
Resources for Self 
Sufficiency 
Using available regional resources to 
fill the needs gap until state and 
federal assistance  
16 10 
More Available 
Resources 
More resources for disaster response 
and mitigation in the system 
9 4 
Pre-positioning of 
Resources 
Positioning resources before 
hurricane landfall 
20 10 
Exact Estimation of 
Needs 
Estimating the exact needs of 
resources in advance   
13 9 
Total    90   
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Improved 
Communication  
for Getting 
Common Operation 
Picture 
Reliability 
Increased reliability of 
communication system  
11 7 
Clear Communication 
Procedures 
Clear contact points and procedures 
for communication 
12 9 
Application of More 
Advanced Technology 
Communication equipment or 
reporting procedures with more 
advanced technology  
26 15 
More Communication 
Equipment 
More communication equipment 31 22 
Redundancy for 
Communication 
More redundant communication 
facilities and equipments 
15 12 
Reinforced Public 
Notification System  
Reinforced information diffusion 
system for public's awareness of the 
situation  
9 7 
Utilizing LNOs for On-
site Information 
Deployment of liaison officers in 
partners' emergency operation center 
33 20 
Frequent 
Communication with 
Partners 
More communication with partners 
during disaster response 
32 17 
Total    169   
Improved  
Planning Activities 
New Operation 
Procedures 
New procedures and plans for 
operation after hurricane Katrina 
42 23 
Clear Role Definition 
Clearly defined role of each 
organization and department 
18 13 
Alignment of Plan 
among Organizations 
Coordinated plan and timeline 
among organizations in the system 
21 14 
Total    81   
More Funding for 
System 
Improvement 
  
More funding for the disaster 
management system improvement 
3 3 
Improved 
Collaboration 
Partnership 
Building Rapport 
Keeping Constant 
Working Relationship 
Constant interactions with partners 
for building rapport 
28 21 
Improved 
Collaboration through 
Co-planning 
Co-planning with other partner 
organizations 
25 13 
Trust through Co-
exercise 
Co-exercises with other partner 
organizations 
25 16 
Total    78   
Improvement in 
Interaction 
Structure 
Collaboration under 
Unified System 
Establish unified system for better 
coordination among organizations 
14 8 
bureaucratic layers in 
decision making 
High ranking personnel involvement 
for quicker decision making  
7 6 
Building New Units 
for Coordination 
Building new coordinating units in 
the system for better collaboration  
4 2 
Total    25   
Improved Supports  
from Partners 
Support from Political 
Leaders 
Support from political leaders for 
better collaboration 
9 7 
Supports from 
National Network 
Partners 
Personnel and resources within 
national network partners 
10 7 
Support from 
Local/Regional 
Partners 
Personnel and resources from 
partners in the same region 
19 10 
Support from Partners 
in Civil Sector 
Personnel and resources from civil 
sector partners 
25 13 
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6.3.1 Improved level of preparedness of the Hurricane Gustav response system  
As shown in figure 6-13, the average level of preparedness for Hurricane Katrina was rated as 
2.94 (between poor and moderate) out of 5, but closer to moderate. For Hurricane Gustav, the 
total level of preparedness of the system increased from 2.94 to 4.44 (between good and very 
good). When organizations were sorted by level of jurisdiction, the level of preparedness has 
improved from 2.75 to 4.5 for federal/national, from 3.5 to 4.67 for regional, from 2.63 to 4.46 
for state, and from 3.08 to 4.31 for parish/county organizations. Over 90% of interviewees 
agreed that this increased level of preparedness contributed significantly to the improved 
performance of the Hurricane Gustav response system.  
 
 
Figure 6-13 Improvement in level of preparedness between hurricanes 
  
More specifically, this increased level of preparedness can be attributed to several factors 
such as: more detailed and clear planning for disaster response and mitigation, pre-positioning of 
resources, regular exercises and training, and increased expertise of personnel. Among those 
factors, 28% of interviewees pointed out the pre-positioning of resources was very critical in 
their successful response to Hurricane Gustav. The lack of available resources in the initial stage 
of response to Hurricane Katrina was the most severe criticism that the new disaster response 
system was required to address. For three years after Hurricane Katrina, the organizations in the 
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disaster response system revised resource management procedures and exercised those 
procedures regularly. These actions increased the level of available resources for the Hurricane 
Gustav response system.  
…we work to address that gap (lack of available resources in the initial response stage), how can 
we solve that gap? We had been addressing this and pre-positioning supplies both in Louisiana 
and in Fort Worth, Texas, to be ready to respond quickly… (FEMA) 
 
…Yes, we had food, water. Equipment was pre-staged for Gustav. It was not pre-staged like that 
for Katrina… Federal government preserves food and water a year in advance. They gave it to us 
early. Instead of bringing it to us last minute, after Katrina they decided to pre-stage food and 
water in our area well before the storm. Before the hurricane season starts, we have the equipment 
in here… (Orleans Parish) 
 
With these pre-positioned resources, organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response 
system could function effectively. The effective response to Hurricane Gustav also can be 
attributed to the clearly defined organizational roles in disaster response plans. Furthermore, 
personnel from all level of organizations exercised these roles and operation procedures many 
times with other partners together. As a result, the level of preparedness throughout the region 
had improved significantly since Hurricane Katrina. As an interviewee from FEMA pointed out, 
this increased level of preparedness includes several different factors such as: improved 
communication systems and pre-positioned manpower and resources before the landfall of 
Hurricane Gustav which was not possible for the Hurricane Katrina disaster response system. 
…between Katrina and Gustav, we did a lot of improvement, wrote a lot of plans, made things 
work a lot easier. For Gustav it ran, as far as the parish government part of it, it ran much better 
than it did for Katrina… (Lafourche Parish)  
 
…Not only GOHSEP but DSS and DOT and the Guard and all the other state agencies to really 
dig down into the weeds to find out how we can be better prepared; how they can mitigate 
problems; how we can get our supplies in quicker, how we can coordinate that better; how we can 
provide better communications equipment; how we can evacuate people better, track them; how 
we can do the medical evacuations better – all these developed into more specific plans and into 
functional exercises… (FEMA) 
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6.3.2 Improvement in management of human resource 
In addition to the advanced level of preparedness, the improved performance of Hurricane 
Gustav response system is attributed to the well-trained personnel of organizations. Almost all 
organizations, 29 organizations out of 36, mentioned and agreed that their level of training 
increased significantly, and accordingly, the level of expertise of their personnel also improved. 
Personnel in each organization had full knowledge of disaster management plans and, more 
importantly, they could build rapport with personnel in other major organizations. Compared to 
the lack of organizational learning from the Hurricane Pam exercise just before the landfall of 
Hurricane Katrina, this level of organizational learning allowed personnel to have enough time 
for exercises and training, which contributed substantially to improved operations during 
Hurricane Gustav.  
Also, the increased number of exercises with partners developed adaptive leadership and 
increased expertise of personnel of core organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system. 
Many interviewees from core organizations, 16 out of 36, or 44.4%, mentioned that the increased 
leadership and experience of creatively adapting to new situations contributed to a better 
response to Hurricane Gustav.  
…but during a catastrophic event you put that book away because you need to have this 
managerial entrepreneurship and the flexibility to adapt to whatever challenges you have with that 
management of the shelter… (American Red Cross) 
 
In addition to the improved number of exercises, the organizations in the disaster 
response system for Hurricane Gustav also took employees‘ welfare into consideration in 
designing a new system. Learning from the failures of Hurricane Katrina, managers focused on 
the security of their personnel in operations. This secured environment increased the morale of 
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personnel and allowed them to commit themselves to disaster operations without having to be 
concerned about their own or their families‘ security.  
…good job of locating all our employees because that was step one, identifying all our employees 
were safe and making sure that our employees had housing, that they had a place to stay because 
clearly when an employee has personal issues going on or something like that, it‘s hard for them 
to focus on work… (Verizon Wireless)   
 
Also, to fill the positions that were vacant after Hurricane Katrina, some organizations 
increased their number of personnel.  
…we‘re much better because we have a staff. For Katrina, the staff of my emergency operations 
center was three people. Three and now I have a staff of 10 so just that alone with the numbers of 
people we have and emergency managers… (Orleans Parish) 
6.3.3 Improvement in management of physical resource 
The most critical problem for the Hurricane Katrina response system was the lack of available 
resources and the delay of promised resources from partnered organizations. So the response 
system for Hurricane Gustav tried to secure more available resources before landfall. Many 
interviewees pointed out that the level of available resources for Hurricane Gustav was much 
higher than that of Hurricane Katrina.  
…Those four locations all had boats, food, water, generators, showers, we had communications, 
satellite phones, we have a new inter-operable radio system that if it goes down, we change our 
radio channel and we hit our towers that are in other areas of the region so we would not lose 
communication. We now own thirty one boats… (New Orleans Police Department) 
 
Like this, the response system for Hurricane Gustav took great steps to increase the level 
of resources for its operation. Most importantly, organizations chose to strengthen partnerships 
with collaborating agencies within the system and activated this pre-contracted supply system 
before the landfall of Hurricane Gustav. This strategy began with the refinement of estimates of 
resource needs in response to large scale disaster such as Hurricane Katrina. To accomplish this, 
 187 
they applied more advanced technology for resource management system such as Web-EOC
30
 
which made organizations identify the requests of resource allocation and to disseminate that 
information to other organizations in a timely manner. For example, the video imaging tool of 
Web-EOC provided organizations with vivid on-site images and assisted them to capture the 
exact situation instantly. With this, the organizations in the system were able to share real-time 
information with other agencies, and this allowed them to deploy resources more rapidly and 
accurately. (MARC, 2009)  
…It was mainly just getting them access down there but I guess we did monitor the damage 
assessments because that was wanted by the governor and other people, how long it was going to 
take to get the production back up. So I guess damage assessment was part of the picture too… 
(Department of Natural Resources, LA)  
 
This application of more advanced technology to the disaster response system is evidence 
of the socio-technical approach that cyberneticists pursue in designing a more resilient adaptive 
system. Based on this more advanced resource management system, the Hurricane Gustav 
response system could position necessary resources before the landfall.  
…Well we had the misfortune of knowing what happened during Katrina and we had the ability to 
have time to plan for the prepositioning of cages and entering into contracts with the trucks and 
the MOU‘s with other organizations to stand up those shelters… (Department of Agriculture, LA)   
 
To secure a sufficient level of resources for their operations, the organizations in the 
system also strengthened their collaborative partnerships with other agencies that could provide 
them with resources when organizations are most in need. The organizations, especially the 
parish governments that were the direct target of Hurricane Katrina could not have expected the 
instant delivery of resources from state and federal agencies. Therefore, based on these harsh 
experiences, they tried to be self-sufficient or independent for the first several days after 
                                                   
30
 The Web-EOC is a metro-wide system that allows Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) to share information for 
resource allocation. It is a web-based information management system that provides a single access point for the 
collection and dissemination of emergency or event-related information. Web-EOC integrates data, video, messaging, 
and many other types of information. 
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hurricane landfall. They set up new protocols for resource exchange with regional parishes. If 
there were available resources in one parish, that parish shared its resources with other parishes 
in the same region. Parishes in southern Louisiana formed several regional collaboration systems 
and they also signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) among parish governments in the 
same region.   
…we would try to solve that problem and use our local resources, school buses and if we can get 
another parish to accept the evacuees, we‘re going to go ourselves, load them on the bus and bring 
them over here and man the whole thing as far as the staff to run the shelters, feed them, place to 
sleep the whole nine yards and that way it gives us, we have control to assist the parish and make 
sure that it‘s safe, okay to bring the citizens back… (Lafourche Parish) 
 
…I‘m trying to be independent; that way we don‘t have to depend on anybody to get our people 
out of harm‘s way. Some things you‘ve got to depend on the state and federal government for 
supplies, like fuel even though we‘ve got contracts in place but it‘s better to have more than one 
resource because if our vendors go dry we‘ve got to, you know… (Plaquemines Parish) 
 
At the same time, organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system could get more 
resources through regional private vendors. They contracted with private vendors such as Sysco, 
Wal-Mart, Lowes, and local grocery stores to provide the supplies to parish governments within 
hours after requests. This significantly increased the stability of supplies provisions to local 
organizations and also this provided redundancy in securing necessary resources to the level that 
their dependency on other state or federal agencies for resources decreased significantly.  
…what we do is we have arrangements with a business in the area and the organization we buy 
our food from, what we do is we get, like the food warehouse that provides food to us, their owner 
and two of their clerks come into our hospital, live here and survive during the storm and then 
after the storm we have total access to their warehouse because the warehouse has about a six 
month supply of food I have access to… (Ochsner Hospital) 
 
Using these strategies, the organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system 
successfully secured the necessary resources for their operations. In summary, learning from the 
failures of Hurricane Katrina, they tried to be independent during the first several critical days of 
response and strengthened their working relationships with regional and private partners. As a 
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result, the total level of available resources in the Hurricane Gustav response system was 
significantly increased compared to the levels of resources during Hurricane Katrina.    
6.3.4 Improvement in communication system 
The disaster response system for Hurricane Gustav also reinforced its communication system 
after the significant failures of Hurricane Katrina. Because the breakdown of the communication 
system, the disaster response system for Hurricane Katrina collapsed and limited coordination in 
response to Hurricane Katrina. Organizational efforts to build a reliable communication system 
can largely be divided into two parts. First, they invested sizable amounts of money to purchase 
and upgrade its communication infrastructure. As a result, they could be equipped with more 
advanced communications devices that are critical for the interoperability of disaster response 
activities.  
The advanced communication equipment of the Hurricane Gustav response system 
helped organization address the most serious problem of the communications system breakdown. 
It provided the organizations with redundancy and compatibility of communications equipment, 
resulting in a comparatively reliable communications system for the Hurricane Gustav response 
system. This capacity, in turn, contributed to better collaboration and coordination for 
information and resource exchange among organizations in the system.  
More advanced technology: …we had the interactive - all the photos, the interactive web-based 
conference calls that actually showed the hurricane on our screen and they briefed us on the 
directions, the speed all of that. We didn‘t have that for Katrina… (Ascension Parish) 
 
More communication equipment: …So one of the biggest things is we have multiple on multiple 
levels of communication infrastructure. We have cell phones, we have satellite phones, we have 
voice over IP phones, and we have our own channel on the state police radio network with our 
own repeaters. Our computer server room has two different generator backups… (Army Corps of 
Engineers) 
 
Redundancy in communication: …There was a lot more redundancy of satellite, microwaves, 
voice over internet protocol. There was a lot more robust system. More radio towers, a redundant 
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radio system. We have a 700, 800 megahertz system so [if] one is having problems we can go to 
the other. So a lot more redundancy, a lot more robustness to the system for Gustav… (Louisiana 
State Police)  
 
Secondly, organizations in the system revised their communication procedures to make 
them clearer than that of Hurricane Katrina. One of the problems identified by semi-structured 
interviews was that personnel in some organizations could not identify their communication 
partners instantly; that is, they did not know who the contact person for information sharing was. 
To address this problem, some efforts were made to make this contact point clearer and more 
easily reachable by partners in the system.   
Clear communication procedures:..Now that is something that‘s easily accomplished now because 
we‘ve planned for it, we‘ve set up communications systems to be able to do it, we‘ve planned for 
it and we do it in exercise all the time and it happens very smoothly… (Department of Wildlife 
and Fisheries, LA) 
 
Clear communication partners: …I guess the one good thing that happened after Katrina was 
everybody now knows how to get in touch with everybody and FEMA had set up a really good 
network of how to get in touch with everybody… (New Orleans International Airport) 
 
Most respondents to the questions of semi-structured interviews agreed that the revision 
of communication procedures and the clarification of contact points decreased confusion or 
entropy in the system. The communication channels were reinforced by the exercises and they 
also deployed more of their own personnel, liaisons, in their partners‘ emergency operations 
centers (EOC). More than 20 out of the 36 organizations pre-positioned their liaison officers 
(LNOs) in their partner‘s EOC, and these officers played a critical role in facilitating 
communication with partners. This shows that, even with advanced information technology, 
face-to-face interaction is still important in collaboration and coordination for effective response 
to disasters. With direct contacts with partners during the critical phase of disaster response, 
organizations could collaborate more effectively in exchanging knowledge and resources.  
LNOs in partner EOC: …I can tell you it‘s a lot smoother and faster by having [the] LNOs there. 
Of course they would love to have [the] LNOs have the decision authority and have a big truck 
full of supplies that he could pull a trigger on but we just can‘t… (Army Corps of Engineers) 
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Due to the increase in communications equipment and the application of more advanced 
technology for interoperability and redundancy, and due to the utilization of liaison officers, 
effectiveness in information and resource exchange increased significantly during the preparation 
and response phases to Hurricane Gustav. This improved communication during Hurricane 
Gustav was also possible due to the regular exercises with partners. Nearly all interviewees 
mentioned that the increased communication among organizations contributed enormously to the 
successful response to Hurricane Gustav. Also, the improved communications system for 
Hurricane Gustav was not limited to the organizations within the disaster response system. They 
devised a new communication system or notification system to the public living in the region 
that was under mandatory evacuation order. They reinforced the community notification system 
and introduced an evacuee tracking system that was not available during Hurricane Katrina.  
Greater number of communications: ……There‘s constant communication between the region and 
the states so we watch the weather channel just like the state does. We know something‘s coming 
into the Gulf so we‘re already sending liaisons… (FEMA) 
 
Public Notification system: …Things that we saw, problems that we saw within Katrina we 
prepared for Gustav. Then again we were communicating. We were talking. Who has a right to 
know? The public, so every day when we were meeting as a group, we would then talk to the news 
media so the public could see us… (Louisiana State Police)  
6.3.5 Improvement in planning activities  
The previous section noted that revised plans made the contact point and operation procedures 
clearer and that these changes contributed to improved communication during Hurricane Gustav. 
This finding goes hand-in-hand with the clear definition of organizational roles in the new 
operating procedures. These newly defined organizational roles and operational procedures were 
regularly drilled jointly with other organizations, which enabled personnel in each organization 
to understand their roles in the entire disaster response system and how to collaborate with other 
organizations in case of a large disaster like Hurricane Gustav. 
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Behind the joint operations and exercises, there was joint planning to make each 
individual organization‘s plan align with other local, state, and federal plans. As a whole, the 
disaster response system for Hurricane Gustav tried to have a system-wide plan that was 
comprised of individual but mutually coordinated plans. Since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA 
provided special assistant teams to make federal, state, and local disaster response plans aligned 
and all organizations dispatched managers or deputy managers to the simulation room in the 
Governor‘s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to build integrated 
disaster response plans. In this joint planning activity, they gathered and compared each agency‘s 
emergency management plan and made sure they were aligned and possibly coordinated in case 
of crisis. Once there were new procedures, they were practiced jointly to test whether it could 
work effectively under actual disaster conditions.  
…Katrina was kind of a disaster so we knew where our weakness was at so agencies got together 
and worked those things out. They would invite us to their meetings on how they plan to prepare 
for hurricane or any natural disaster… (Ascension Parish) 
 
…Again, Katrina opened our eyes to a lot of different things. Our plans after Katrina, all of our 
plans are in sync with each other. We all know what we‘re doing and we coordinate our plans 
together… (Orleans Parish)  
6.3.6 Summary of improvement in capacity of national response system since Hurricane 
Katrina   
The various improvements made to the response system for Hurricane Gustav were based on 
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Organizations in the disaster response system have 
worked extensively for three years on human resource management, resource management, 
planning, and the construction of advanced communication system. The improvement in 
communication for information diffusion is most significant, as the organizations have increased 
their organizational capacities by retaining more competent and experienced personnel, securing 
resources more reliably, and developing working disaster management plans. Considering the 
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significant failure in communication during the response to Hurricane Katrina, the focus on 
building reliable communication systems is very relevant.  
This advance in communications contributed to the improvement in collaborative 
partnerships. Organizations worked mostly together in a well coordinated manner and this was 
possible by building solid relationships with partners through constant interaction, co-planning, 
and co-exercises and building mutual rapport. Further, the analysis of semi-structured interview 
shows that each organization gained better support from its partners in the disaster response 
network. By improving organizational capacities in several ways, the organizations in the 
Hurricane Gustav response system made significant advances in their collaboration partnership. 
The improvements in organizational capacity allowed them to acquire, process, and transmit on-
site information more accurately and quickly to other organizations in the system. The reinforced 
collaborative partnership complements the improvement in organizational capacity and together, 
helps organizations to function more effectively in several ways.  
First, the improvement in collaborative partnership strengthens the interaction links 
among organizations. With reinforced links, the organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response 
system interacted in more stable and reliable ways with other partners. For example, when the 
collaboration procedures were not clear enough for any two organizations to interact, the 
managers of those two organizations would learn how to interact with their partners through the 
regular working relationships in exercises and planning. Similarly, if they encounter a 
breakdown of the communications system, they could develop alternative ways of collaboration 
based on working relationships or rapport that has been established through prior interactions.  
Secondly, if organizational managers build trust or rapport, the problems of collaboration, 
such as hidden agendas, rivalries among organizations, lack of transparency in operations, and 
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bureaucratic incompetency could be remedied or lessened significantly because they understood 
one another‘s strengths and weaknesses and how one agency‘s action can affect the performance 
of remaining agencies. This mutual understanding enables them to share what they know and 
what they have more effectively with partners.   
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7.0   ASSESSING EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC INTERVENTION ON THE 
PERFORMANCE OF HURRICANE RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
The findings from social network analysis that identified strengths and weaknesses of hurricane 
response systems provide suggested implications regarding where and how to intervene 
strategically to guide resilient system evolution over time. To develop intervention strategies and 
assess their effects on the performance of disaster response systems, this analysis also needs to 
develop a performance measurement metric. Using this metric, I quantitatively measured the 
changes in performance when individual or combined strategies are actually applied in a 
simulation of a  disaster response system.  
The elaboration of plausible strategies and the assessment of their effects on the system 
evolution can be analyzed with agent-based simulation because, as Simon argued (1999), the 
bounded rationality of human beings in searching and deciding the most relevant policy 
alternatives can be effectively addressed by computational simulation. This study, through 
comparative analysis of the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems, identified 
the problems that organizations faced in response to Hurricane Katrina, checked what measures 
were taken since that time to make organizations perform and collaborate more effectively, and 
explored what factors mostly contributed to the organizational adaptation under changing 
conditions of crisis. Based on the findings from social network analysis and semi-structured 
interviews, I extracted several critical parameters to be used for the design of policy alternatives 
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for effective organizational adaptation to changing conditions. Those identified factors were 
operationalized and used as an input to an agent-based computational simulation model. Briefly, 
the processes of conducting agent-based computational simulation includes the identification of 
core parameters, an operationalization of those core parameters, the exploration of simulation 
space, and the identification of the system‘s adaptive pattern to changing conditions.  
7.1 IDENTIFICATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF CORE PARAMETERS 
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATION MODEL 
7.1.1 Identification of core factors in designing policy alternatives for intervention 
Table 7-1 shows the factors that most managers suggested to be considered in designing a more 
resilient and stable disaster response system. The managers stated that reliable collaboration 
partnership among organizations and resilient system evolution can be mainly attained through 
co-training, co-planning, and maintaining a steady relationship with partners. Additionally, they 
agreed that well-trained personnel who are able to deal with changing operations are a highly 
desired resource for their adaptive operations.  
From the factors listed in table 7-1, the top 8 parameters that are most frequently noted by 
interviewees are listed in table 7-2. Those parameters are: training and education, new operation 
procedures, utilization of liaison officers for on-site information, private vendor management, 
and frequent number of communications with partners, advanced communication equipment in 
number and technology, and keeping reliable partnerships.  
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Table 7-1 Structured codes for future disaster management  
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Description Frequency 
Number of 
Organizations 
Factors for 
Better 
Collaboration 
Communication 
More communication 
with partners 
More communication during disaster response 
and mitigation 
9 9 
Application of more 
advanced technology 
Application of more advanced technology 7 6 
More communication 
equipment 
More equipment for better communication 2 2 
Total    18  
Building 
Rapport with 
Partners 
Mutual Understanding of 
Other's Role and 
Limitation 
Clear understanding of other's role and weakness  6 6 
Constant Co-training, 
Planning, Operation 
More co-planning, co-training, and co-operation 
exercises 
19 13 
Establish Working 
Relationship through 
Interaction 
Constant interactions with partners for constant 
working relationship 
24 20 
Developing Community 
Partnership 
Reinforcing partnerships with community and 
education for public benefit 
7 4 
Factors for 
Better 
Operation 
Resources 
Management 
More available resources 
in the system 
Securing more available resources for the 
system 
4 4 
Exact resource 
assessment for demands 
and supplies 
Developing resource management system for 
exact estimation  
3 3 
Total    7  
Human 
Resource 
Management 
More consideration for 
personnel welfare 
Investment in personnel welfare during disaster 
response and mitigation operations 
4 3 
Staffing More personnel for operation 5 5 
Experienced leadership 
for adaptation 
Securing more experienced managers for 
adaptation 
10 9 
More training and 
education 
More required training programs for personnel  16 14 
Total    35  
Planning 
Constant planning for 
adaptation 
Frequent updates for appropriateness of the 
disaster management plan 
16 13 
Aligned and shared 
timeline 
Aligning each disaster plan with other partner 
organizations  
10 8 
Total    26  
More Funding 
for System 
Improvement 
  
More funding for education, equipment, 
facilities, and planning 
7 6 
 
 
Table 7-2  Critical parameters identified by number of comments by interviewees 
Parameters Description Frequency 
Training and Education More required training and training programs 59 
New Operation Procedures New procedures and plans for operation after Hurricane Katrina 42 
Utilizing Liaison Officers for On-site 
Information 
Deployment of liaison officers in partners' emergency operation center 33 
Private Vendor Management Pre-identified and pre-contracted vendors for stable supplies provision 32 
Frequent Number of Communication 
with Partners 
More communication with partners during disaster response 32 
More Communication Equipment More communication equipment 31 
Keeping a Constant Working 
Relationship 
Constant interactions with partners for building rapport 28 
Application of More Advanced 
Technology 
Communication equipment or reporting procedures with more advanced technology 26 
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However, the selection of core parameters for building a computational simulation model 
cannot entirely depend on the frequency of parameters, because the frequency is also contingent 
on several other features of the organizations such as emergency support function, level of 
jurisdiction, and source of funding. For example, the Louisiana Public Service Commission 
emphasized the role of communication because its main function is to gather information on the 
management of natural gas and oil facilities on the shores of the State of Louisiana, but 
comparatively did not stress a stable working relationship with partners due to its mission pre-set 
by the state disaster response plan.  
I added one more criterion in selecting core parameters for building computational 
simulation model, the number of organizations that mentioned a given parameter during the 
interviews. The list of the top 6 parameters mentioned by the largest number of organizations 
with the highest frequencies is shown in table 7-3. The parameters identified through semi-
structured interviews have system-wide influence on organizations‘ performance and 
collaboration: training and education, new operation procedures, advanced communication 
equipment, regular working relationships, utilization of liaison officers for on-site information, 
and a high number of communications with partners. 
Table 7-3 Critical parameters identified by number of comments by interviewees 
Parameters Description Number 
Number of 
Organization 
Training and Education More required training and training programs 59 29 
New Operation Procedures 
New procedures and plans for operation after hurricane 
Katrina 
42 23 
More Communication Equipment More communication equipment 31 22 
Regular  Working Relationship Regular interactions with partners for building rapport 28 21 
Utilizing LNOs for On-site Information 
Deployment of liaison officers in partners' emergency 
operation center 
33 20 
Frequent Number of Communication with 
Partners 
More communication with partners during disaster 
response 
32 17 
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Combining the critical parameters identified in table 7-2 and 7-3, I set the five most 
critical parameters for the computational simulation as: training and education, advanced 
communication equipment, utilization of liaison officers for on-site information, clear operation 
procedures, and regular working relationships with partners. In addition to these five parameters, 
this study added one more parameter, the level of available resources that is identified in the 
content analysis of situation reports. In total, six parameters are used in building an agent- based 
computational simulation model.  
7.1.2 An operationalization of critical parameters of computational simulation model  
After the identification of core factors for the computational simulation model, this study 
operationalized each core parameter to manipulate them within the computational simulation 
model. To better operationalize core parameters, I defined the meaning of strategic intervention. 
In an effort to design a more stable and adaptive complex adaptive system, I considered two 
possible ways of intervention. The first one is the intervention for the improvement of 
organizational capacities in processing information, and the second one is the reinforcement of 
collaborative partnerships/structure in response to changing conditions. With these intervention 
strategies, I expect that organizations in the complex adaptive system can easily identify 
collaboration partners for joint responses to crisis, process information accurately, and as a result, 
allocate the required resources in a timely manner.  
Figure 7-1 clarifies the link between the core parameters of computational simulation and 
the domains of operationalization. The first parameter of training and education helps 
organizations in the system find interaction partners more quickly and accurately. Also, this 
parameter of training and education helps organizations to produce more accurate information 
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and to transmit critical information more rapidly to partnering organizations for the construction 
of a common operation picture.  
The second parameter of pre-positioning of resources, or having enough resources for the 
initial stage of disaster response, contributes to the reduced number of requests for resource 
allocation in the entire response system. Considering that the organizational capacity of core 
organizations was overwhelmed by an excessive number of requests for resource allocation in 
Hurricane Katrina, pre-positioned resources, especially for the local agencies, can reduce the 
need for resources in the initial stage of disaster response. This action decreased the burden of 
information processing and coordination of core organizations in the adaptive system.   
The third parameter, advanced communication equipment, assists organizations to 
identify interaction partners more quickly, process information more accurately, create action 
knowledge, and transmit it to other partners in the system. Also, with the investment in advanced 
communication technology and equipment, organizations communicate with redundancy and 
interoperability that can lead to reliable communication channels among organizations in the 
response system. In the same context, the utilization of liaison officers (LNOs) for on-site 
information can contribute to more rapid and accurate transmission of critical information to 
partnering organizations. With accurate on-site information, organizations in coordinating 
positions in the system can see the big picture of the operation and make faster and more 
efficient organizational decision for timely resource allocation. 
The fourth parameter of clear operation procedures helps organizations in the disaster 
response system find interaction partners faster and more accurately. With joint-training, each 
participating organization knows how and with whom it is supposed to interact and collaborate in 
response to crisis. Like this, regular working relationships between agencies helps them to find 
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partners faster and more efficiently. It also allows them to reduce the number of resource 
allocation requests to other organizations because these reliable and established relationships 
make it possible to secure promised resources without adding additional resource allocation 
requests to other organizations in the disaster response system. 
In summary, the best strategic intervention scenario to secure effective performance is to 
pre-position available resources before hurricane landfall, deploy liaison officers to major 
partnering organizations, regularly update the disaster management plans, educate and train 
personnel, and be equipped with the most advanced communication equipment. However, due to 
legal and budgetary limitations, selection and concentration of choices are inevitable in applying 
these intervention strategies. For this selection and concentration purpose, findings from social 
network analysis in finding core actors and critical links in Chapter 6 can guide this study to the 
wiser ‗selection‘ of organizations and the effective ‗concentration‘ of limited resources in 
designing a complex adaptive system. Figure 7-1 shows the links between identified parameters 
and their operationalization.  
Type of Intervention Major Parameters  Operationalization 
Strengthening of 
Organizational 
Capacity 
Training and education 
 
Finding interaction partners more 
accurately and more rapidly 
Increased level of available resources 
with pre-positioning of resources 
  
More communication equipment  Producing more accurate information 
Application of more advanced technology   
Strengthening of 
Collaboration 
Partnership 
Direct and frequent communication with 
partners 
 
Transmitting information faster 
Clear operation procedures   
Regular working relationship with 
partners 
 
Reducing the number of resource 
exchange requests to other organizations 
 
Figure 7-1 Operationalization of core parameters for building a computational simulation model 
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7.1.3 Exploration of parameter space for building a computational simulation model 
After the operationalization of core parameters, I assigned probability to each parameter because 
the effect of each parameter on the performance of an adaptive system can be explored in the 
probabilistic computational simulation space. In this section, I explored the possible value or 
probabilities of major parameters within the computational simulation model. Table 7-4 shows 
the assigned value and probability of major parameters according to the level of each parameter  
(1=high, 2=moderate, 3=low). First, the parameter of level of training and education is related to 
the amount of information that any organization can process at one time and the accuracy of 
information that this organization can produce and transmit to other partners in the system. When 
personnel are well trained, it can process 10 units of information at one time with 90% accuracy, 
5 units when moderately trained with 50% accuracy, and only one unit when poorly trained with 
10% accuracy. The number of requests that any organization can process at one time is important 
because if there are too many requests for resources allocation from partnering organizations, 
especially in a very limited time, the organization with untrained personnel cannot respond to 
those requests appropriately and eventually returns a ‗no-response‘ to those requests.  
Due to the advantage of joint training, if agencies work together for personnel training, 
organizations with highly trained personnel can find interacting partners with 90% success in the 
first trial. As described in Figure 4-6 (the algorithm of agent-based simulation model), when any 
organization failed in the first trial to identify collaboration partners, it can retrace all the 
procedures in the algorithm which means a severe delay in identifying collaboration partners. 
Similarly, the level of available resources affects the number of requests for resource allocation 
in the system. When organizations have enough resources, they have little need to request 
resource allocation to core organizations. So, when organizations have a high level of available 
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resources in the initial stage of response, organizations request resources less. In this set of 
computational simulation, this study assumes that organizations with high levels of resources 
request resources to core organizations just once per one time frame and when organizations 
suffer from a lack of resources; they initiated 10 requests per one time frame.  
 When organizations are well equipped with the most advanced communication systems, 
and organizations deploy liaison officers in major partnering organizations, they transfer critical 
information faster and more accurate, and they can find organizations for possible collaborations 
more easily and accurately. Also, when organizations have well defined operation procedures 
and plans, they can process more information and effectively identify organizations for 
collaboration. Finally, if organizations keep a regular working relationship and build trust with 
partnering organizations, they find interaction partners very effectively and quickly. All six 
operationalized core parameters and their simulation space are listed in table 7-4.     
Table 7-4. An exploration of parameter space of computational simulation model
31
 
                                                   
31 The three values of probability assigned to each parameter are 90%, 50%, and 10% to make its distribution follow Bernoulli 
distribution with α=0.1. This study expects the worst performance with 10% possibility of information process and finding 
interaction partners and the best performance with 90% possibility (Willink 2010). Each value of simulated performances can 
range between them (Carley 2010).  
Key Input Parameters   
Number of Requests for 
Resource Allocation 
Number of Requests Processed 
at One Time 
Accuracy of  Information This 
Organization 
Processed/Transmitted  
Possibility of Success in Finding 
Interaction Partners 
Level of Training and 
Education of Personnel 
      1=high   2=moderate  3=low  1=high   2=moderate  3=low  1=high   2=moderate  3=low  
      10 5 1 p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 
Level of Available 
Resources 
1=high   2=moderate  3=low                     
1 5 10                   
Level of Communication 
Equipment and 
Advanced Technology 
         1=high   2=moderate  3=low  1=high   2=moderate  3=low  
         p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 
Utilizing LNOs for On-
site Information 
            1=high   2=moderate  3=low  1=high   2=moderate  3=low  
            p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 
Clear Operation 
Procedures 
      1=high   2=moderate  3=low        1=high   2=moderate  3=low  
      10 5 1       p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 
Keeping Constant 
Working Relationship 
with Partners 
                  1=high   2=moderate  3=low  
                  p=0.9 p=0.5 p=0.1 
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7.1.4 Construction of computational simulation model 
The probability of success in requested resource allocation between organizations depends on the 
organizational capacities in processing information and the strength of their reciprocal 
collaboration partnerships. Furthermore, the organizational capacity in processing information is 
contingent on the level of training of personnel, the advanced communication equipment, and the 
level of available resources. Similarly, the collaboration partnerships depend on the deployment 
of liaison officers, regular working relationships, and clear operation procedures. Based on the 
simulation space for each core parameters, this study can construct a formula for a computational 
simulation model of this study.  
 
The formula of computational simulation can be phrased like this: 
P (success in resource allocation) = f (organizational capacity, collaborative partnership)  
And, when each component is divided into the core parameters of this study, it can be 
rephrased like this,   
Probability of Success in resource allocation = w1 (level of training and education of personnel) 
+ w2 (level of available resources) + w3 (advanced communication equipment) + w4 (utilization 
of liaison officers) + w5 (clear operation procedures) + w6 (constant working relationship) + ε 
 
In this equation, wn indicates the weight of each parameter in a computational simulation 
model that is defined by semi-structured interviews and the frequency of core parameters 
mentioned by managers in participating organizations. The following section reports the results 
of the computational simulation and examines how each intervention strategy can be applied to 
improve the probability of successful resource allocation, and eventually, to make organizations 
effectively adapt and evolve toward reliable operations.  
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7.2 ASSESSING PERFORMANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONDING TO 
CHANGING CONDITIONS WITH INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 
To measure the effectiveness in resource allocation, this study devised a performance metric, the 
ratio of resource alignment (refer to chapter 4 computational simulation section), and evaluated 
the overall network performance for each time frame. This section starts with the exploration of a 
natural evolution pattern of the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems. The 
natural evolution pattern means that there is no application of intervention strategies to the 
current system‘s evolution. The natural evolution patterns without strategic intervention serve as 
the baseline for the computational simulation and this analysis compares them against the 
evolution patterns with strategic interventions.  
To do the comparison, I constructed ―what-if‖ scenarios. First, I virtually removed the 
core nodes or organizations from the entire disaster response system and checked how an entire 
system recovers from and adapts to this sudden condition of the removal of core organizations. 
The relevance of this projection is that, due to the sudden adverse effects of a crisis, many core 
organizations may malfunction. Ensuring system recovery and returning to normal operations is 
critical to building a complex adaptive system. Similarly, I conducted a what-if analysis in a 
scenario by removing critical collaboration links. In this case, I determined how organizations 
creatively adapt to unexpected changing conditions and generate temporal links for effective 
collaboration.  
As the next step for assessing network performance in response to changing conditions, I 
applied the intervention strategies in the computational simulation. In other words, I increased 
the organizational capacities in information processing and transmission and reinforced the 
interaction links for the construction of reliable collaboration between organizations. Finally, I 
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explored possible structural changes in designing a system that could adapt to complex and 
changing conditions.  
7.2.1 The comparison of patterns of natural evolution for the hurricane response systems 
For the creation of a baseline for the performance comparison of hurricane response systems, I 
conducted an initial computational simulation with no changes from the current response systems 
for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. Figure 7-2 shows the natural evolution pattern of 
the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems when there is no strategic 
intervention to current conditions. The Y-axis represents the resource alignment ratio and the X-
axis represents the time span of the simulation.  
According to Figure 7-2, the overall resource alignment ratio of the Hurricane Katrina 
response system is around 0.26 when it plateaus after t= 73 while the overall resource alignment 
ratio of the Hurricane Gustav response system is around 0.30 when t=72. This means that 26% of 
overall resources could be successfully shared without any strategic intervention in the Hurricane 
Katrina response system, while 30% of overall resources could be successfully shared in the 
Hurricane Gustav response system. For both hurricane response systems, this resource alignment 
ratio is far from satisfactory because this means that less than 30% of resources will be delivered 
to requesting organizations under conditions of the current system of disaster response. This 
evolution pattern of the resource alignment ratio without intervention works as the base line for 
the comparison of the performance of various simulated response systems with interventions.  
Judging from the natural evolution pattern of the two hurricane response systems, I 
confirmed a favorable response to the three policy challenges in designing complex adaptive 
systems. The first challenge is to lift the overall resource alignment ratio using various types of 
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intervention strategies. The second challenge is to shorten the time period that the resource 
alignment ratio reaches the satisfactory plateau area in which there is no significant performance 
improvement from strategic interventions. Observing the severe problem of delays in resource 
allocation of the Hurricane Katrina response system, I explored possible policy alternatives for 
ensuring a speedier response to requests for resource allocation. The third policy challenge is to 
make complex systems adapt quickly to unexpected changes from environments and recover 
from the adverse impacts of crisis accordingly. For example, in Figure 7-2, the deterioration of 
the resource alignment ratio is not peculiar, but there is a significant possibility of the functional 
death of core organizations. If any core organizations cannot function properly within the system, 
other peripheral organizations in the system need to adapt to this uncertain situation and find 
possible partners for interaction and collaboration. Also, if there is a downturn in the resource 
alignment ratios in the initial stage of disaster response, relevant strategies need to be 
implemented to lead this evolution pattern upward.  
 
Figure 7-2 Natural evolution pattern Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav management system 
Time 
RA ratio 
 208 
7.2.2 The effect of critical nodes and collaboration links removal  
To assess how the entire system can evolve without core coordinating organizations, I 
investigated the effect of the functional death of core organizations. Among various intervention 
strategies such as an increased investment in communication equipment, an increased amount of 
training and education needs to be implemented over one year (over one fiscal year for the 
allocation of new budget for the advanced education). Moreover, the establishment of rapport 
and reliable working partnership among organizations cannot be attained shortly. Accordingly, if 
core organizations cannot function properly due to damages from crises, any possible partnering 
organizations need to replace them to address the possibility of quick recovery from crises. By 
doing this, organizations in the system creatively adapt to this uncertain situation and they can 
develop a new way of collaboration that would not be possible under normal circumstances. 
Due to various reasons, the response system for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav 
already experienced these unexpected malfunctions of core organizations. In Hurricane Katrina, 
this was mainly due to the communication system breakdown and the secondary flood from 
levee system breakdown. Under this condition, many core organizations could not interact 
effectively and were eventually isolated during the most critical days of first response. In 
Hurricane Gustav, the organizations faced an unexpected blackout leading to similar types of 
isolation among organizations even though the storm‘s impact was not as severe as Hurricane 
Katrina.  
There are two types of functional death in a complex adaptive system. The first type is 
the functional death of nodes and the second type is the disconnection of collaboration links 
among organizations. For the first what-if analysis of core nodes removal, I have already 
identified the core organizations using several centrality measures and clique analysis. The 
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organizations identified through these measures can be virtually removed from the network. 
Then, I examined how the removal of core nodes from the system affects the resource alignment 
ratio, and whether they rebound from the downturn and recover.  
More specifically, the core organizations that have high total degree centrality and 
coreness, such as FEMA, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 
Louisiana Office of Governor, New Orleans Police Department, Army Corps of Engineers, 
Louisiana National Guard, Office of the President of the United States, and New Orleans Office 
of Mayor were removed alternately from the simulated Hurricane Katrina response system. The 
node removal was conducted in time=10 of computational simulation. The reason for this study 
to set the removal time as t=10 is that it corresponds to the initial three days of 30 days of 
activity of the Hurricane Katrina response system. Figure 7-4 shows the recovery pattern of the 
entire response system after the removal of core nodes from the network. Also, Table 7-5 shows 
the minimum resource alignment ratio after the core nodes are removed and it shows how long it 
takes for the entire system to recover completely to the level of the previous resource alignment. 
Additionally, these projections reveal whether the entire disaster response system can fully 
recover from the damage of core node removal. For example, for the Hurricane Katrina response 
system, if the resource alignment ratio can come back to around 26% after several time units of 
recovery, this analysis assumes that the system has completely recovered from the impact of 
functional death of a core organization in the system. I removed the core organizations of FEMA, 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana National Guard, 
and Parish of Jefferson respectively.  
In addition to these core organizations identified by social network analysis, I used the 
conceptual interactions that were defined in the state emergency management plan (LOHSEP 
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2005). According to this plan, there are several local, state, and federal agencies that connect 
other organizations to the entire disaster response system as shown in Figure 7-3. I chose these 
organizations as subjects for core node removal because they had the highest centrality measures 
and they took the most important brokerage positions in the disaster response system for 
Hurricane Katrina. Thus, I selected one federal (FEMA), one state (Louisiana Office of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness), and one local (Jefferson Parish) organization 
for the core nodes removal. The Louisiana National Guard was also removed because this 
military organization acted as an additional resource provider to the disaster response system for 
Hurricane Katrina.  
 
Source: State of Louisiana Emergency Management Plan (2008)  
Figure 7-3 Bridging role of local, state, and federal agencies defined in Louisiana Emergency Management Plan 
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Figure 7-4 Resilient recovery pattern of Hurricane Katrina response system after the core node removal 
As shown in figure 7-4, when the Federal Emergency Management Agency was removed 
from network, the resource alignment ratio dropped almost 10% instantly and continued to drop 
until reaching 6.7%. After the lowest point of 6.7%, it started its recovery until the final point of 
19% around t=73. But the performance of entire system could not recover completely to the 
previous level of resource alignment ratio 26%. It shows that the system cannot be completely 
resilient after the removal of FEMA. Similarly, when the state level core organization, the 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, was removed from the 
network, the overall resource alignment ration dropped to 6.3% from 19%. This shows that the 
impact of removal of LOHSEP is of greater significance to the disaster response system. 
However, this study observed the system can recover more rapidly than in the case of FEMA 
removal. Within a 34 unit time span, the performance of the entire system recovered to the 
previous level of 19% and this is faster than the case of FEMA removal.  
The significance of the removal of the Louisiana National Guard is less than that of 
FEMA and LOHSEP. When the Louisiana National Guard was removed, the resource alignment 
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ratio dropped to 11.3%, and within a 28 unit time span, it came back to the 19% level of resource 
alignment ratio. Similarly, the impact of the removal of a local parish Emergency Operations 
Center, in this case the Parish of Jefferson EOC, did not have a significant impact on the overall 
performance of the disaster management system. Its impact is local and the disaster response 
system could easily come back to the 19% level and this recovery could be done more rapidly 
than the removal of state and federal level core organizations.   
 
 
Table 7-5 Comparison of an effect of core nodes removal 
Removed 
Nodes 
Full Organization Name 
Minimum 
RA Ratio 
Duration of System 
Disturbance  
Full 
Recovery 
FEMA 
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency  
6.70% 57 (from t=10 to t=66) No  
LOHSEP 
Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness 
6.30% 34 (from t=10 to t=43) No  
LANG Louisiana National Guard 11.30% 28 (from t=10 to t=37) Yes 
PARJEF Parish of Jefferson 15.30% 10 (from t=10 to t=19) Yes 
7.2.3 The effect of critical link removals  
Using Lambda set analysis, I examined the most critical collaboration links in the response 
systems of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav (refer chapter 6). This Lambda set analysis 
determined the most critical links that leave the system most fragmented when removed. Using 
this, this study removed all the collaboration links among FEMA, LOHSEP, the Office of the 
President of the United States, the Louisiana Office of Governor, the New Orleans Office of 
Mayor, and the New Orleans Police Department. Figure 7-5 shows the resilient recovery pattern 
of the Hurricane Katrina response system. The removal of core links also was done after t=10. 
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Figure 7-5 Resilient recovery pattern of Hurricane Katrina response system after core links removal 
 
According to Figure 7-5, the entire system recovers from the first sharp drop in the 
resource alignment ratio. To other organizations in the system, the removal of collaboration links 
between the previous core coordinating organizations means the longer geodesic distance 
between core organizations and the other organizations. Thus, after the removal of collaboration 
links among core organizations, other organizations needed to connect to the core organizations 
using several different but longer collaboration links within the system. As shown in Figure 7-5, 
this pattern delayed the recovery speed of the Hurricane Katrina response system. It shows that 
the entire system can reach to the complete recovery level around 26% of resource alignment 
ratio, but its phase toward that plateau area is quite delayed from t=73 to t=94. Therefore, the 
adverse impact of collaboration link removal would make the system less resilient to adversarial 
impacts from disasters.  
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7.3 AGENT-BASED COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATION WITH STRATEGIC 
INTERVENTION 
From the exploration and operationalization of critical parameters, I earlier defined the types of 
intervention as the following strategies: the increase in the level of training and education, the 
increase in investment for building advanced communication system, and an improvement in the 
level of available resources. Individually or combined, these factors may reduce the cognitive 
burden of organizations in the disaster response system.  
With mutual trust, the utilization of liaison officers, and the clearer operation procedures, 
the organizations in the system can find interaction partners more accurately. Additionally, these 
factors help organizations shorten interaction time because with accurate information and stable 
collaboration, organizations can easily access partnering organizations. Also, they may find 
contact points for possible resource allocation more quickly and the rapport established through a 
joint operation allows them to keep the stable collaboration partnership. Based on the discussion 
above, this study examines how those strategic interventions can help the response system evolve 
and collaborate in more effective ways.  
7.3.1 Assessment of improved organizational capacities on system’s performances 
To assess the effects of strategies for improving organizational capacities on the performance of 
complex systems, this study considers the investments on communication equipment as the first 
means of strategic intervention. As this study operationalized, organizations with advanced 
communication equipments can produce the required information more accurately and can 
transmit them faster to other organizations in the system. This strategic intervention can be 
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performed only upon the core organizations that were identified through social network analysis, 
not to all organizations in the disaster response system due to the limited resources to invest for 
communication system improvement.   
This analysis assumes that if any organization has a high level of communication 
equipment in number and technology, it can process more information at the same time (this 
study sets 10 as the maximum amount of information an organization can process at one time) 
and it can produce more accurate information, meaning it reduces the time for any organization 
to successfully exchange the necessary resources. For the assignment of probability, I assigned 
p=0.9 to any organization with highly advanced communication system. In other words, with a 
90% success probability, an organization with highly advanced communication systems can 
complete one cycle of resource allocation. If they cannot succeed, they return to the first state of 
the simulation algorithm until it completes one cycle of resource allocation. This study assumes 
that, if they return to the processes again, it takes two more unit time spans (t=2) or delays in the 
completion of resource allocation. 
Also, I expected that, with advanced communication equipment, an organization‘s 
cognitive capacity necessary for accurate and timely information processes can be increased 5 
times (when its communication equipment is moderate) or 10 times (when its communication 
equipment is high). Similarly, with a high level of communication equipment, each organization 
can complete one cycle of resource exchange at one time within t=2 with 90% probability. If not, 
the failure of getting accurate information may delay the resource exchange over t=4, 6, 8, etc. 
The other parameter, the level of training and education of personnel, works in the same way as 
the level of communication equipment. The last parameter that affects the changes to the 
resource alignment ratio is the level of available resources of individual organizations in the 
 216 
system. If there is a high level of resources available in any organization, this may reduce the 
number of requests for resource allocation in the system. In this way, I assume that this also has 
the same effect of increased capacity in the reverse because, with a small number of requests for 
resource exchange, then there is a lighter workload for core organizations.  
The result of the computational simulation with the improved organizational capacity is 
presented in Figure 7-6. According to these results, with five-time improved capacity for 
information processing and communication, organizations in the disaster response system can 
achieve a higher level of resource allocations. Its highest resource alignment ratio is around 36% 
which is much higher than the level of naturally achieved resource alignment ratio (compared to 
26% in figure 7-2). Also, it can reach the highest ratio much faster than the baseline (t=58 
compared to t=73) meaning organizations can adapt faster than the previous response systems.  
The simulation results show that, with a five-fold increase in advanced organizational 
capacities for information processes and communications, the performance of the entire disaster 
response system can be improved by approximately 34.6%. It remains unclear why a ten-fold 
improvement in organizational capacity of core organizations has a similar effect with that of 
five-fold improvement. In figure 7-6, the result shows that, when organizational capacities were 
increased ten times, the increase of resource alignment ratio takes the almost the same pattern 
with five times improvements. This implies that there can be other factors than improvement in 
organizational capacities and those factors may lead to the effective improvement in resource 
allocation among organizations in the system. In this context, I examined the effect of 
strengthening collaboration links on the improved performance of the system.    
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Figure 7-6 Evolution pattern of a disaster response system with increased cognitive capacity 
7.3.2 Effects of strengthened collaboration links between core organizations 
The three major factors included in the simulation model are: the utilization of liaison officers, 
the maintenance of regular working relationships, and clearer operation procedures. With an 
application of these factors, I anticipate that these parameters will enable the system to achieve 
more effective and timely resource allocation. Similarly to the previous analysis, with high levels 
of regular working relationships, each organization can complete one cycle of resource exchange 
at one time within t=2 with 90% probability. If not, the failure of getting accurate information 
may delay the resource exchange over t=4, 6, 8, etc. In the simulation model, it takes one 
transaction time unit (t=1) for organizations (with high level of regular working relationships 
with core organizations) to find its interaction partners. If their working relationship is moderate, 
then it takes t=4 for them to find appropriate interaction partners, and if they have a low level of 
working relationship with partners and, accordingly they do not know how and with whom to 
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interact, it takes t=8 for these organizations to find the appropriate interaction partners to get 
necessary resources.   
Figure 7-7 shows the simulated evolution patterns of the performance of a system with an 
adjusted strength of collaboration links. If any two organizations keep strong collaboration links, 
it takes just one simulation time unit (t=1) for the completion of resource exchange and this 
transaction succeeds with a 90% probability. Again, this study intervened in the system in time 
10. The system‘s evolution identified in Figure 7-7 shows that the strengthening strategy for 
collaboration links works well in improving the performance of the disaster response system. 
With this strategy, the resource alignment ratio, which means how accurately any organization 
can detect, contact, and acquire the necessary resources from other organizations for its mission 
completion, almost doubled. 
 
Figure 7-7 Evolution pattern of Hurricane Katrina response system with strengthened links 
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7.3.3 Effect of structural change on resource exchange  
In addition to the improved organizational capacities and strengthened collaboration links, this 
study explores the possibility of performance improvement through the re-engineering of the 
interaction structure. Up until the previous section, this study‘s interest was mainly in the 
improvement of organizational capacity and collaboration partnerships, not in the intervention to 
the interaction structure itself. Due to limits set by national and state level disaster management 
plans, there is little room for this study to reengineer interaction structures. So, rather than allow 
total renovations in interaction structures, I explored one possible structural change that does not 
require major revisions to major disaster management plans.  
Figure 7-4 presented the simulated fluctuation of the resource alignment ratio in response 
to the removal of core organizations in the system. From that point, I considered how 
organizations can cope with the unexpected functional death of state coordination organizations 
such as LOHSEP. According to Figure 7-4, the performance of the disaster response system 
dropped severely after the removal of LOHSEP and took multiple time spans to recover from the 
damage from this sudden removal of a core organization.  
The concept of structural intervention derived from the analysis of semi-structured 
interviews. During the semi-structured interviews, managers from parish emergency operation 
centers, such as the manager of Assumption Parish EOC, mentioned the role of the regional 
coordinator whose job was to facilitate discussion among parishes in the same regional area on 
the various regional issues. This regional discussion group does not represent governance in the 
sense that it has neither the legal authority to coordinate disaster response activities nor resources 
to mobilize in case of crisis. However, if state level coordinating organizations such as LOHSEP 
become functionally dead, then the Governor of State of Louisiana can activate these regional 
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organizations as active coordinating agencies for the replacement of core state coordinating 
agencies, instead of waiting until the core agencies come back to normal operation.   
… Exactly, to coordinate, mutual aid within the community as well as communicate with the state 
on regional issues. The regional directors, for instance, we had a meeting yesterday with the 9 
regional directors of the state so we’re the [go-]between the state and the locals for information. 
In [an] emergency, everybody communicates with the state but in our planning activities, exercises, 
we’re the ones that help coordinate that instead of the state trying to talk to 64 parishes. The 
9 regional coordinators collect the information and we go out and communicate that to the 
other parishes in our region. (Assumption Parish) 
Based on this virtual scenario, I created three regional coordinating agencies that can be 
activated just after the removal of a state coordinating agency from the disaster response system. 
Figure 7-8 compares the resource alignment ratio between the case of functional removal of 
LOHSEP and the case of replacement by regional coordinating organizations. According to the 
what-if analysis presented in figure 7-8, the gap originated from the functional death of core 
agency may quickly be filled by the activation of several regional agencies.  
The activations of three regional agencies that coordinate the responding activities of the 
southern parishes in the State of Louisiana was done in t=12 after the functional death of 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) in time 10 
(t=10). As this study determined in Figure 7-8, the entire disaster response system recovers faster 
from the absence of LOHSEP since time 10. After t=40, the disaster response system started to 
perform even better than the performance under the natural evolution over time. For the 
explanation of this improved performance, this study assumes that a reduced workload on the 
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) due to the 
dispersed number of requests for resource exchange allows the system to perform better. But the 
possible failure in coordinating overall activities in response to disasters needs to be considered.  
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Figure 7-8 Resilient recovery from the core organization removal, activation of three regional agencies 
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8.0  SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
Providing a safe and secure environment to citizens has been a fundamental, critical and 
compelling responsibility of government for a long time. Since the 9/11 terrorist attack, the 
United States government has committed significant resources, attention, and time to establish 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve national security. However, DHS‘s 
ineffectiveness in responding to the 2005 hurricanes on the Gulf Coast raised critical questions of 
whether the United States government actually learned from previous crises. Again, since 
Hurricane Katrina, the United States government engaged in further efforts to design an 
advanced national system for effective disaster response and mitigation. But, it is also proved 
that, without organizational learning, those additional efforts do not necessarily secure system‘s 
adaptation to rapidly changing conditions. 
To address the issue of successful organizational adaptation through learning processes, 
this study conducted a comparative analysis of the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav 
response systems and determined whether there is any evidence of organizational learning 
between the two storms, how those lessons were institutionalized for the revised response to 
Hurricane Gustav, and how organizations could effectively manage information and resources in 
a strategic and innovative ways. Using identified evidence of organizational learning and their 
effects on improved performance, I discuss some possible strategies or policies for facilitating 
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organizational adaptation and the creative exploitation of explored knowledge from the previous 
events (March 1991). 
8.1 IDENTIFIED MAJOR CHALLENGES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR EFFECTIVE 
ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
The major problems identified from semi-structured interviews and the content analysis of 
situation reports mirrored the findings in previous research and official reports (FEMA, 2006; 
White House, 2006; House of Representatives, 2006). From the content analysis of the semi-
structured interviews and situation reports, this study sorted the main problems into four parts: 1) 
lack of a collaborative mindset and attitude such as rivalries and territorialism between 
organizations, 2) communication system breakdown, 3) lack of experienced personnel, available 
resources, and 4) lack of proper collaboration plans, procedures. These problems became more 
explicit when organizations were isolated during the initial stage of response and mitigation and 
combined together, these factors caused a severe problem in collaboration and coordination 
during system‘s response to large scale disasters.  
8.1.1 Lack of collaborative practices and culture 
Due to the lack of collaboration experience, organizations in the Hurricane Katrina response 
system did not make their operations clear and open to other organizations. This lack of 
transparency in operation could not allow organizations to develop system-wide collaboration 
protocols for the response to Hurricane Katrina. Also, the lack of collaborative experience 
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worsened the situation and prevented organizations from collaborating when it was critical for 
the system‘s response to the disaster. Rather than collaborating, some major actors, organizations, 
or managers of those organizations, relied on the traditional command and control system and 
sometimes went far beyond the limits of legal authority for intervention. As a result, some 
political leaders stepped into the relationships between organizations which distorted and caused 
confusion in resource exchange. Combined with bureaucratic incompetency and irrelevant 
interaction structures that hampered collaboration among agencies, the collaboration links among 
agencies were weakened to the level of isolation. During the most critical period of the response, 
organizations in the system could not exchange necessary information and resources with other 
organizations. Worsening the situation were rivalries, turf-battles, or territorialism among 
organizations competing with each other to increase their own organizations‘ power in the field 
of disaster management. With this territorialism, effective coordination among organizations 
could not be achieved in response to Hurricane Katrina. 
8.1.2 Communication system breakdown 
Over 90 percent of interviewed managers in semi-structured interviews mentioned that the major 
problem they faced was the failure in maintaining a reliable communication system. With 
collapses of the communication system at multiple levels, organizations were deprived of their 
critical tool for collaboration. For the peripheral organizations, they could not transmit on-site 
information to coordinating organizations in a timely manner and, at the same time, they could 
not receive necessary resources urgently needed to operate effectively as the first responders. For 
the core coordinators such as LOHSEP and FEMA, they could not develop the common 
operating picture required for coordinated responses to disasters.  
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The main reasons for communication breakdown ranged from the lack of equipment or 
advanced technology, and unclear written and practiced procedures. These factors prevented 
each organization from processing and producing actionable knowledge for other organizations 
in the system. Without advanced technology, the communications system for Hurricane Katrina 
was not stable and redundant. Rather, it was vulnerable to outside impacts from disastrous 
conditions.  
8.1.3 Lack of experienced personnel and available resources for responding organizations  
In addition to the failures of the communication system, the disaster response system for 
Hurricane Katrina had an inadequate level of personnel and resources. Due to the frequent 
turnover in major positions after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bergel et al. 2007), the level of 
expertise and the morale of employees in the disaster management field had been severely 
downgraded and vacant core positions were not instantly filled by experienced personnel at the 
time of Hurricane Katrina. Thus, many organizations in the Hurricane Katrina response system 
were exposed to threat and they struggled with limited personnel in number and experience. 
Accordingly, the burden for each individual organization increased to an unmanageable level. 
This made all the information processes and disaster response operations slow down significantly. 
Further, the organizational responses to Hurricane Katrina worsened by a lack of 
available resources for their operations. In particular, the delays and failures to respond to 
resource allocation requests were verified as one of the most severe problems. According to the 
Stafford Act (Pub.L. 106-390, 2000) and National Response Plan (2004), the responsibility for 
the initial response lay at the local agencies. If additional resources are needed, the federal and 
other state agencies were to be contacted for the provision of requested resources. Because there 
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were not enough resources available within the initial boundaries of the system, organizations 
had to rely upon resources from outside. However, findings from the semi-structured interviews 
reveal that resource exchange within local and state boundaries, with outside organizations at the 
federal level, and with other state agencies significantly failed. Also, organizations could not 
estimate the level of need for resources in the initial stage of disaster response mainly due to the 
lack of experience in coping with such a large disaster. Furthermore, organizations in the system 
did not invest enough resources to build an advanced resource management system and failed to 
integrate it into the system‘s overall disaster response system. As a result, pre-positioning of 
available resources, a critical element of disaster management, was not possible for the 
Hurricane Katrina response system. 
8.1.4 Lack of disaster management plans/procedures  
The agencies in the disaster response system for Hurricane Katrina also suffered from the 
absence of clear disaster management plans and operating procedures. In many cases, the 
organizations could not identify and follow clearly defined plans and procedures in response to 
Hurricane Katrina. This was particularly true regarding resource allocation, and even the contact 
points at the local, state and federal levels were not clearly defined in the response plans. The 
semi-structured interviews revealed that this problem was caused by the absence of plans for 
actions and the lack of training of existing plans. Considering that the National Response Plan 
(NRP) was introduced to the system only in December of 2004, organizations were still not 
familiar with its details in time for Hurricane Katrina. But some managers answered that the 
disaster management plans were not clear and flexible enough to be used as a basis for the 
organizations‘ operations for disaster response and mitigation.  
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When the normal disaster management plan did not work and new working procedures 
for collaboration are required, the managers in major disaster management organizations needed 
to demonstrate a competency in sense-making and adaptation. But, the rigidity in applying 
disaster management plans and procedures inhibited them from exerting that kind of leadership 
for the response to Hurricane Katrina. Also, the lack of alignment of plans worsened the situation.  
Each plan‘s timeline, main partners, working procedures were not compatible with others, and as 
a result, there were unnecessary competitions among organizations for the procurement of 
limited resources instead of effectively coordinated responses to disasters.  
8.2 EVIDENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND STRATEGIC 
UTILIZATION OF LEARNING FOR EFFECTIVE ADAPTATION 
From the content analysis of semi-structured interviews and situation reports, this study could 
identify significant positive evidence of organizational learning and strategic efforts to develop 
more stable and resilient disaster response systems. They committed significant resources to 
secure a stable and interoperable communication system, reinforced collaboration partnerships, 
and updated disaster management plans through the constant fine-tuning of processes. The most 
desirable aspect of these efforts is that most changes were made in a joint manner, which clearly 
facilitated the coordinated operations in the preparation and response to Hurricane Gustav..  
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8.2.1 Improvement in human resource management 
The improved performance of the Hurricane Gustav response system is partially attributed to the 
well-trained personnel of organizations. Most organizations improved their level of training 
significantly, and accordingly, the level of expertise of their personnel also improved. Personnel 
in each organization had full knowledge of disaster management plans and, more importantly, 
they could build rapport with personnel in other major organizations. Compared to the lack of 
organizational learning from the Hurricane Pam exercise just before the landfall of Hurricane 
Katrina, this level of organizational learning from regular exercises contributed substantially to 
improved operations during Hurricane Gustav.  
Since Hurricane Katrina, most organizations introduced regular and periodic exercises for 
evacuation and sheltering of refugees, and those exercises were conducted jointly with major 
partnering organizations. This increased number of exercises with partners developed adaptive 
leadership and improved the expertise level of personnel. Also, to fill the positions that were 
vacant after Hurricane Katrina, organizations increased their number of personnel. Combined 
with the increased welfare of personnel and their family members, this contributed to the 
improved performance of Hurricane Gustav management system.  
8.2.2 More available resources and advanced communication systems 
One of the most critical problems for the Hurricane Katrina response system was the lack of 
available resources and the delay of promised resources from partnered organizations. In 
response, the disaster management system for Hurricane Gustav tried to secure more resources 
before landfall. Many interviewees pointed out that the level of resources available for the 
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response to Hurricane Gustav was much higher than that of Hurricane Katrina, partially due to 
the pre-positioning of resources. In addition to that, the disaster management system for 
Hurricane Gustav took great steps to increase resources available for its operation. First, 
organizations chose to strengthen partnerships with collaborating agencies within the system; 
this partnering strategy began with the refinement of estimated needs of resources in response to 
large-scale disasters.  
To address the problem of getting accurate situation awareness, the State of Louisiana 
had purchased Web-EOC and recommended local and state governments to use it for their 
coordinated operations. With this Web-EOC, organizations could track critical information and 
successfully form a common operation picture through intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 
and information management tools. Also, to address the failure of communication systems 
breakdown, organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system reinforced its communication 
equipment after Hurricane Katrina. First, the response system for Hurricane Gustav invested 
sizable amounts of money to purchase and upgrade its communication infrastructure. As a result, 
the organizations in the system obtained more advanced communications equipments, and they 
could achieve the interoperability of communication equipments. Second, by making contact 
points clearer and easily reachable, organizations could collaborate with less confusion in 
communications. Finally, the communication channels were reinforced by deploying more of 
their own liaisons in partners‘ emergency operations centers (EOC). This shows that, even with 
advanced information technology, face-to-face interaction is still important in collaboration and 
coordination. With this direct contact with partners, organizations collaborated more effectively 
in exchanging knowledge and resources during the response to Hurricane Gustav.   
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8.2.3 Strengthening collaboration partnership with local and non-public agencies 
The organizations, especially the parish governments that were the direct target of Hurricane 
Katrina, could not have expected the instant delivery of resources from state and federal agencies. 
Based on this failure, since Hurricane Katrina, they tried to be self-sufficient or independent 
from other agencies for the first several days after hurricane landfall. The first change that they 
made is that they set up new protocols for resource exchange with regional parishes. If there 
were available resources in one parish, that parish shared its resources with other parishes in the 
same region. Like this, parishes in southern Louisiana formed several regional collaboration 
systems and they also signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) for the rapid resource sharing 
purposes.   
At the same time, organizations could get more resources through new private vendor 
management activities. They contracted with private supply companies to secure reliable 
supplies to parish governments. This increased the stability of supplies to local agencies and also 
provided redundancy in securing necessary resources to the level that their dependency on other 
state or federal agencies for resources decreased significantly in the initial state of disaster 
response. As a result, combined with pre-positioning of state and federal resources, the total level 
of available resources for local agencies in the Hurricane Gustav response system was increased, 
compared to the levels available during Hurricane Katrina.  
The findings from content analysis, social network analysis, and semi-structured 
interview were used to develop a computational simulation model. The critical factors identified 
from semi-structured interviews were operationalized and assigned probabilities of successful 
information processing and the completion of resource allocation. To check the effect of 
individual policy alternatives developed from identified core parameters, the computational 
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simulation began by testing robustness or resilience of the un-interfered response system for 
Hurricane Katrina. The system robustness and resilience were tested with both simulated node 
and link removal. Under both of these scenarios, the analysis checked how quickly and how 
effectively the entire system restored from the adverse impact of crisis.  
In the next step of simulation, the study applied each of the developed intervention 
strategies and checked how those policy alternatives can contribute to the effective resource 
allocation and eventually help organizations be more adaptive to unexpected external changes. 
The critical parameters identified and transformed into policy alternatives included: advanced 
communication equipment, new operational procedures, and utilization of liaison officers, trust 
from a constant working relationship, increased level of resources, and improved training and 
education of personnel. In the next section, this study presents the findings in reference to the 
three research questions of this study.   
8.3 IDENTIFICATION OF CORE FACTORS AND ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS ON 
SYSTEM’S PERFORMANCE  
Through the content analysis of newspaper articles and situation reports, I identified the 
challenges that the Hurricane Katrina response system actually faced during its response to 
rapidly changing conditions. Also, using social network analysis, I identified the structural 
features of two hurricane response systems and found evidence of organizational learning in 
renovating interaction structure. According to these measures and network maps from social 
network analysis, the interaction structure of Hurricane Gustav response system took the form of 
cellular network which was more organized than that of Hurricane Katrina. This means that the 
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response operations defined by disaster response plans were more effective for the Hurricane 
Gustav compared to those for Hurricane Katrina.  
8.3.1 Examination of structural features of two hurricane response systems  
According to the examinations of interaction structure, during the communication system 
breakdown and unexpected collapse of collaboration channels, organizations in the Hurricane 
Katrina response system could not fully rely on disaster management plans and had to create 
unexpected collaboration links with any organization that could provide resources and 
information urgently required in adapting to complex circumstances. Thus, the density was high 
and the clustering coefficient and centrality was low for the Hurricane Katrina response system. 
By comparison, organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system collaborated as defined 
in the plans and the interaction pattern shows low density and high centrality and clustering 
coefficients. I further conducted a clique analysis to explore how an entire disaster response 
system evolved from small components or groups of organizations. I identified that the 
subgroups of the Hurricane Gustav response system are mainly composed of state and local 
agencies leading to close collaboration among local and state organizations. This analysis also 
presented the larger subgroup where core organizations were more connected than those of the 
Hurricane Katrina response system.  
To determine which organizations are most structurally important in networks and which 
play key network roles, I used centrality measures in social network analysis. In calculating 
centrality, I focused on the coreness from an embedded position and the coreness from a number 
of links. The one difference between Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav response systems, 
and accordingly an evidence of organizational learning, is that the identified core organizations 
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in the Hurricane Gustav response system were relatively consistent across the measures of 
centrality. But, the organizations identified as core agencies in the Hurricane Katrina response 
system were not consistent across measures. The fact that some organizations identified as core 
nodes in one measure did not take the central role in other measures reveals disorganized 
features of the Hurricane Katrina response system. 
Finally, to determine what parts of the disaster response system were comparatively 
vulnerable to impacts from the outside, I conducted fragmentation and Lambda set analysis. 
According to the results, when collaboration links are disconnected among main coordinating 
organizations, both disaster response systems for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav may 
collapse into pieces which prevent an effective collaboration between organizations in the system. 
The findings from the social network analysis reveal where strategic interventions could be made 
in the response system and how to guide organizations to adapt more creatively to complex 
conditions.  
8.3.2 Assessing intervention strategies on performance of organizations in adaptation to 
changing conditions 
Through semi-structured interviews, I identified five core factors to be considered in designing a 
complex adaptive system. These identified factors were operationalized to be developed as 
intervention strategies in a computational simulation. From this operationalization of core factors, 
I developed a simulation space, and assigned probability to identified core parameters. Also, to 
compare network performance and evolution patterns with and without intervention strategies, I 
devised a performance measurement tool, the resource alignment ratio, that measures how 
effectively available resources can be allocated in a timely manner.  
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To facilitate the resource allocation and guide the more resilient evolution of a disaster 
response system, I proposed two types of strategic intervention to test through computational 
simulation: intervention to improve organizational capacity, and intervention to reinforce 
collaboration structure. Through computational simulation, I analyzed how each policy 
alternative can be developed from core parameters and how those strategies would contribute to 
performance improvement and effective systemic adaptation. With more training and education, 
higher level of available resources, and an application of advanced communication equipment 
and technology, organizations in the system could process more information with improved 
accuracy. The simulation results show that, with intervention strategies, organizations could 
adapt to changing conditions more effectively.  
At the same time, I examined the effect of parameters that may strengthen the 
collaboration links among organizations. The parameters such as the establishment of trust 
through regular working relationship, the utilization of liaison officers, and clearer operation 
procedures, contributed to efficient and timely interactions. According to computational 
simulation results, these factors allow organizations to find interaction partners faster and secure 
timely information and resources sharing. 
Finally, in addition to these strategic interventions, I examined the effect of the possible 
recovery in interaction structure of disaster response system. From the computational simulation, 
I found that, when core coordinating organizations were removed from the entire system or when 
they were overwhelmed by enormous number of requests for resource allocation, the 
performance of disaster response system deteriorated severely and could not recover completely 
from the impact of the functional death of core organizations. To overcome this problem, I 
created virtual regional coordinating agencies and examined whether these newly created 
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coordinating agencies could provide a functional redundancy to the system and whether they 
could make system recover from the adverse effects sooner. The results were affirmative and the 
findings suggest considering the creation of regional coordinating agencies that can backup core 
coordinating organizations quickly after their functional death.   
8.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN DESIGNING ADAPTIVE SYSTEM FROM THE 
RESULTS OF THIS STUDY 
The analyses of semi-structured interviews, social network analysis, and computational 
simulation verify that there is ample evidence of organizational learning and strategic uses of that 
learning in designing new systems for disaster response and mitigation. To address challenges 
from low levels of preparedness, organizations pre-activated the response system and pre-
positioned necessary resources for better preparation to Hurricane Gustav. To overcome the 
problem of insufficient experienced personnel after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, organizations 
increased frequencies of training, introduced advanced education programs, and more 
importantly, made them a requirement for position deployment and promotion. As a response to 
communication systems breakdown, organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system 
invested resources on purchasing advanced communication equipment and communication 
systems for an effective log of transactions between organizations, and made them interoperable 
with agencies in the private and nonprofit sectors both inside Louisiana and beyond. Finally, to 
address the severe failures in coordination compounded by a lack of working plans, the 
organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system worked together to develop a new 
disaster management plan and operational procedures. These findings from various analyses 
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highlight the evidence of strategic application of organizational learning in building effective 
disaster response systems.  
One of the important implications is that organizations, for their effective adaptation, 
need to develop various tools for facilitating organizational learning when making changes. As 
discussed, organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system invested significant resources 
and efforts to restore damaged communication systems and build new effective systems for the 
creation, transformation, and transmission of critical information. With investments on 
communication systems, they need to be equipped with an extensive knowledge management 
system that maintains a permanent comprehensive record of the event or incident, and that can be 
used as a means to facilitate organizational learning. For example, with Web-EOC, organizations, 
besides obtaining real time incident related information, have capacities to access specific 
incident related data at any time during or after the incident. The advantage of obtaining and 
keeping chronological records of operation in information and resource sharing for organizations 
is that they can draw, interpret, create reports, and learn from that configurable information 
management tool.   
Under the leadership of FEMA, all local, sub-regional, and state organizations jointly 
developed new operation plans, and more importantly, they exercised those developed disaster 
management plans together. According to semi-structured interviews, the impact of joint 
operation in planning, exercising, and drilling was significant, especially from the perspective of 
strategic learning. Through several sets of joint simulated operations in regular exercises, 
organizations in the Hurricane Gustav response system built rapport that was critical in real 
collaborations. As proved in the Hurricane Gustav response system, an established trust among 
core personnel contributed to the improvement of successful coordination and collaboration. 
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Also, it helped organizations shorten the interactions time due to the pre-exercised collaborative 
relationships. Therefore, in building an adaptive system for disaster response and mitigation, 
organizations need to maintain collaborative partnerships.  
But, to make effective use of established mutual trust, adaptive systems need to address 
the problem of turnover in major positions of organizations. The failure of the Hurricane Katrina 
response system exemplified how well established trust can disappear with the turnover or 
retirement of key personnel. So, while organizations in the system work on the 
institutionalization of regular joint operations for the development of mutual trust among 
agencies, they also need to develop policies to retain experienced core personnel for effective 
collaborative operations with partners. As the semi-structured interviews suggest, organizations 
need to develop a special program for education and improve the level of welfare for their 
personnel in case of major crises.  
Third, an application of advanced technology for the effective communication, 
knowledge management, and diffusion of organizational learning is central to developing 
capacity for system adaptation. Combined with the cultivation of experienced personnel, an 
application of advanced technology is an example of the construction of socio-technical system 
that cyberneticists (such as Snook 2002) pursue in designing resilient systems. To build a socio-
technical system for organizational adaptation, organizations need to focus on the role of 
advanced communication equipment and data management tools that facilitate the processing, 
transmitting, storing, and extracting of critical information both for enhanced performance and 
organizational learning. Also, they need to focus on the training and education softwares to 
facilitate strategic learning and develop more experienced and collaborative personnel.  
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Finally, organizations need to maintain joint operations at every step of organizational 
adaptation to changing conditions. It requires organizations to invest more resources into co-
planning, co-exercising, and co-operating activities from the initial stage of operations. From a 
strategic learning perspective, the best advantage from these co-operative activities is the 
accumulated memory of collaboration. Based on accumulated experiences and memories of 
collaboration, organizations in the adaptive system can achieve a creative mental model for a 
new practice of action (Mausolff 2004). With that model, they can complement imperfect plans 
and effectively fill gaps from mismanagement or weaknesses of individual organizations. 
Through these analyses, I have developed and recommended a set of policy implications 
regarding how to design a complex adaptive system in which organizations assess the situation 
and creatively adapt to changing conditions. The application of those recommendations in the 
development of policy alternatives can be difficult due to the complex features of the 
environment and the high degree of interdependency among them. Yet, once organizations 
effectively implement those alternatives, they will create common operational bases of 
knowledge that allow them to adapt to changing conditions more effectively. With common 
operational knowledge base, organizations will access a single display of relevant operational 
information and share it with all organizations participating in the adaptive system. Especially, 
the establishment of common operational knowledge is significant for the core organizations due 
to their positions as coordinators of action among other organizations in the system. When core 
organizations are well informed by the terminal/peripheral organizations in the adaptive system, 
they can make decisions with improved accuracy in a timely manner, thereby enabling the 
system adapt to changing conditions more effectively.   
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8.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE STUDY 
To address the complex issue of designing adaptive systems to changing conditions, I conducted 
a comparative analysis of two hurricane response systems with a mixed methods approach of 
content analysis, social network analysis, semi-structured interviews, and agent-based 
computational simulation. But there are limitations in this research that limit the generalization 
of the findings from this study.  
First, the case used for the comparative analysis was just two hurricanes, Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. Also, the region that was affected by these two hurricanes was 
restricted to the State of Louisiana. To overcome this weakness in a small-N case study, and to 
generalize the findings from this study, the next research on designing adaptive systems needs to 
extend research boundaries to other states in the United States or other international disaster 
response cases. Horizontally, the next study will cover cases in which organizations in the 
interdependent response system fail to learn and adapt to complex conditions and compare those 
cases to identify the core factors for effective adaptation and the generalization of findings. For 
example, the next study could include hurricane cases in other states of the United States such as 
Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas. Vertically, the next study will consider the evolution 
patterns of previous complex adaptive systems by including the former major crises, such as 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and check how the entire system is evolving from the long-term 
perspective. 
The second challenge and limitation of this study is securing a more detailed real-time 
interaction log from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Governor‘s Office of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. Even though, I sought detailed interaction 
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patterns using various types of documentary data and semi-structured interviews, the information 
on actual resource exchange was scattered and sometimes unknown. From the lessons gained 
since Hurricane Katrina, organizations in the system used Web-EOC in their response to 
Hurricane Gustav, and they created and managed a detailed real-time interaction log for future 
reference purposes. If those records for actual interactions can be obtained, a future study for 
designing adaptive systems could be based on more accurate and well organized data for social 
network analysis and computational simulation. 
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APPENDIX A 
LETTERS TO STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
Dear ___________________________ 
Thank you for granting your time for this interview.  
I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Pittsburgh‘s Graduate School of Public and 
International Affairs working on research for my dissertation, ―Designing Adaptive System for 
Disaster Response and Mitigation.‖ My research examines the disaster management systems that 
evolved following Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. As part of my research, I am 
conducting interviews that focus on patterns of collaboration and communication among 
organizations in the two disaster management systems. Through this analysis, I seek to identify 
and compare critical factors that support organizational learning in disaster risk assessment and 
response for the future development of effective disaster management systems.  
I am contacting you because of your organization‘s involvement in responding to Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. This interview includes questions assessing your organization‘s 
strengths and weaknesses in its collaboration with other agencies in the emergency response 
system in terms of sharing resources and information. This will take approximately thirty 
minutes.  Please answer all questions according to your candid observations, judgment, and 
practice. Findings from these interviews will be used for scientific purposes only. All 
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information you provide to this research will be kept under professional standards of 
confidentiality.  
If you have any concerns or questions related with this interview, please contact me any time at 
nao2@pitt.edu. Thank you so much again for your time and thoughtful contribution for this 
interview.   
 
Sincerely,  
 
Namkyung Oh  
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APPENDIX B 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
Section 1: Assessment of Organizational Preparedness and Capacity 
 
1. What is your organization‘s mandated responsibility for responding to disasters? 
 
2. Comparison of Overall Performance:  
 
1) How would you evaluate your organization‘s overall level of disaster preparedness before 
the landfall of Hurricane Katrina? 
 
        Very Poor   Poor    Moderate          Good          Very Good 
 
2) How would you evaluate your organization‘s overall level of preparedness before the 
landfall of Hurricane Gustav? 
 
Very Poor   Poor    Moderate          Good          Very Good 
 
3) If there is any difference between two hurricanes in preparedness, what factors do you 
think caused this difference? 
 
3. What information sources alerted and prepared you in advance of the hurricanes?   
 
1) List three in order of importance (Katrina): 1________; 2________; 3_________  
 
2) List three in order of importance (Gustav):  1________; 2________; 3_________  
 
4. Will you evaluate your organization‘s capacity (including equipment) in:   
 
     Very Poor        Poor        Moderate        Good        Very Good 
Communications Equipment  1       2  3        4  5 
Managerial Entrepreneurship  1       2  3        4  5 
Number of personnel specialized   
in disaster management   1       2  3        4  5 
 
 Hurricane Katrina 
 Hurricane Katri a 
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Training level of Personnel  1       2  3        4  5 
 
     Very Poor        Poor        Moderate        Good        Very Good 
Communications Equipment   1       2  3        4  5 
Managerial Entrepreneurship  1       2  3        4  5 
Number of personnel specialized   
in disaster management   1       2  3        4  5 
Training level of Personnel  1       2  3        4  5 
 
 
 
Section 2: Collaborative Partnership in Communication and Resource Delivery  
 
1. How would you evaluate your organization‘s overall level of joint operation or collaboration 
during the response phase of;  
 
1) Hurricane Katrina? 
        Very Poor  Poor       Moderate          Good      Very Good 
          1            2  3  4  5 
 
2) Hurricane Gustav? 
        Very Poor  Poor       Moderate          Good      Very Good 
          1            2  3  4  5 
 
2. Who were your major partners (organizations) in disaster operations? Please identify them: 
 
1) For Hurricane Katrina?  
 1.____________; 2. ____________; 3. ____________; 4. Others: ____________ 
 
2) For Hurricane Gustav?  
 1.____________; 2. ____________; 3. ____________; 4. Others: ____________ 
 
3) Had you worked with these agencies on previous disasters? If so, how many times?  
 
 
3. What kinds of information/resources did your organization provide to (or receive from) these 
organizations in disaster operations? Please identify.  
 
1) For Hurricane Katrina?  
 1.____________; 2. ____________; 3. ____________; 4. Others: ____________ 
 
2) For Hurricane Gustav?  
 1.____________; 2. ____________; 3. ____________; 4. Others: ____________ 
 
4. What were the major problems in interacting with other agencies in carrying out your 
responsibilities? 
 
1) Please list the three most important for Hurricane Katrina:  
Hurricane Gustav 
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1.__________  2._____________3.____________4. Other__________ 
 
2) Please list the three most important for Hurricane Gustav:  
1.__________  2._____________3.____________4. Other__________ 
 
 
5. What actions did your organization take to address these problems during the response phase? 
Please illustrate with actual examples. 
 
1) For Hurricane Katrina?  
  
2) For Hurricane Gustav?  
Section 3: Improving Effectiveness of Future Disaster Management System  
 
1. What changes, if any, have been made to improve performance after Hurricane Katrina?  
Please list in order of importance:  
1.___________2.____________3._____________4.  Other____________ 
 
2. Do you think these changes contributed to preparedness for response to Hurricane Gustav? If so, 
in what ways were those changes affected? 
 
 
3. What do you think are the most important factors in improving effectiveness of collaboration 
among agencies in the system?  Please name the three most important, in your judgment. 
1.___________ 2.____________3.__________      4. Other____________ 
 
4. What do you think are the most important factors that inhibited collaboration among agencies in 
response operations?  Please name the three most important factors, in your judgment. 
1.___________ 2.____________3.__________      4. Other____________ 
 
5. What factors should be considered to make your organization more stable and resilient in its 
operation for the future disasters? Please name the three most important, in your judgment 
       1.___________2.____________3._____________4.  Other____________ 
 
 
Section 4: Demographic Information 
1. Name of Interviewee:  
2. Name of Organization:  
3. Position of Interviewee:  
4. Years of Service in the Position:  
5. Level of training in disaster management: ___________________________________________ 
6. Total Working Years in Disaster Management Field:  
7. Total Number of Disaster Incidents Participated:  
8. Phone:      E-mail:  
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APPENDIX C  
ORGANIZATION LIST WITH ACRONYMS 
236th Louisiana Air National Guard Combat 
Communications Squadron 
236th ccs Baton Rouge Visitors and Convention Bureau brvcb 
911 Emergency Call Centers 911 Bechtel National, Inc. becht 
Air Force Academy afa BellSouth bell 
Air National Guard:  159th Fighter Wing 159th FW Best Western Hotels bwest 
Air National Guard:  1st Air Force 1AF Boasso America Corp. boas 
Alaron Trading Corp. atc Boh Bros. Construction Co. bhobro 
Algiers Economic Development Foundation aedf Bonnabel High School bhs 
Allstate Insurance ai Boomtown Casino boom 
Alvarez & Marsal a&m BP, PLC bp 
American Airlines aa Broadmoor Construction Inc. bci 
American Broadcasting Corporation abc Brookings Institution brook 
American Red Cross arc Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives atf 
American Red Cross Southwest Service Area 
Office 
arcssao Carnival Corporation carn 
America's New Orleans Fund, Inc.  anofi Catch 22 Foundation cat22 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. apc Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New Orleans ccano 
Apache Corp. ac Catholic Charities USA ccusa 
Aramark amk Catholic Life Center clc 
Archdiocese of New Orleans ano Centers of Disease Control and Prevention cdc 
Arden Cahill Academy aca Ceres Gulf, Inc. ceres 
Area's Levee Board Officials albo CH2M Hill ch2m 
Arkansas National Guard ang Chalmette Refinery Field Hospital crfh 
Army Corps of Engineers ace Chalmette Refining LLC crllc 
Arthur Monday Senior Citizens Center amscc Charity Hospital chahosp 
Ascension Baptist Church abapc Charter Communications, Inc. cci 
Associated Branch Pilots abp Chase Bank chase 
Astor Crowne Plaza acp Chateau Sonesta Hotel csh 
AT&T at&t ChevronTexaco Corp. chev 
Atonement Lutheran School als Children's Hospital chhosp 
Baptist Mercy Hospital bmh Cingular Wireless cing 
Barriere Construction Co. bcc City of Algiers calg 
Bass Enterprises bass City of Baton Rouge, Department of Public Works cbrdpw 
Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport brma City of Baton Rouge, Police Department cbrpd 
Baton Rouge Technology Center brtc City of Gretna cgret 
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City of Gretna, Police Department ctretpd Conference USA conusa 
City of Harahan chara Continental Airlines ca 
City of Harahan, Police Department charapd County of Harris, Texas cntyhar 
City of Kenner cken County of St. Louis, Missouri cntystlou 
City of Kenner, Police Department ckenpd Covington Field Hospital cfh 
City of Los Angles Fire Department clafd Cox Communications cox 
City of Mandeville cmand Delta Airlines da 
City of New Orleans cno Democratic Party demo 
City of New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board cnoswb Department of Administration, Louisiana dadminla 
City of New Orleans, City Attorney Office cnwcao Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Louisiana dagla 
City of New Orleans, City Council cnocc Department of Commerce, United States dcus 
City of New Orleans, Department of Health cnodh Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism, Louisiana dcrtla 
City of New Orleans, Finance Department cnofin Department of Defense, United States dod 
City of New Orleans, Fire Department cnofd Department of Economic Development, Louisiana dedla 
City of New Orleans, Housing Authority cnoha Department of Education, Harris County Texas dedhct 
City of New Orleans, Police Department cnopd Department of Education, Louisiana dedla 
City of Slidell cslid Department of Education, United States dedus 
City of Slidell, Fire Department cslidfd Department of Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana depla 
City of Slidell, Office of the Mayor cslidom Department of Environmental Quality, Louisiana deqla 
City of Slidell, Police Department cslidpd Department of Health and Hospitals, Louisiana dhhla 
City of Slidell, Public Affairs Office cslidpao Department of Health and Human Services, United States dhhsus 
City of St. Gabriel cstgab Department of Homeland Security, United States dhsus 
City of Vancouver cvan Department of Housing and Urban Development, United 
States 
dhudus 
City of Westwego cwest Department of Insurance, Louisiana dila 
City of Westwego, Police Department cwestpd Department of Justice, Louisiana djla 
Civil Air Patrol - Louisiana Wing cap Department of Justice, United States djus 
CJ Brown cjbro Department of Labor, Louisiana dlla 
Clarence M. Kelly & Associates cmk&a Department of Natural Resources, Louisiana dnrla 
Cleco Corp. cleco Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana dpscla 
Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana crcla Department of Social Services, Louisiana dssla 
Coast Waterworks, Inc. cwi Department of State, Louisiana dosla 
Coldwell Banker Phelps & McKey Realtors Inc. coldwel Department of State, United States dosus 
Columbia Broadcasting Service cbs Department of the Treasury, Louisiana dotrsla 
Columbia Sussex Corp. csc Department of Transportation and Development, Louisiana dtdla 
Department of Transportation, United States dotus Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States  fema 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Louisiana dwfla Federal Housing Administration fha 
Devon Energy Corp. devon Fertility Institute of New Orleans fino 
Dewberry Technologies dewbry Florida National Guard fna 
Dillard University dilu Fluor Corp. fluor 
Diocese of Baton Rouge dbr Foley & Judell f&j 
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team dmort Freddie Mac fremac 
Division of Administration, Louisiana dala French Quarter Hotel fqh 
Dixie Electric Membership Corporation demco Geico geico 
Dixon Correctional Center dcc General Accountability Office, United States gaous 
DMJM Harris-AECOM dmjm General Electric ge 
Drug Enforcement Agency, United States deaus General Motors gm 
DRW Investments LLC drw George Washington University fwu 
E.J. Morris Senior Center ejmsc German Air Force gar 
East Jefferson General Hospital ejghosp Gootee Construction Inc. gote 
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Ecole Classique School ecs Government of Afghanistan gvafg 
Eighth Coast Guard Auxiliary District ecgad Government of Bangladesh gvban 
Elayn Hunt Correctional Center elayn Government of Canada gvcan 
Eleanor McMain Magnet Secondary School emmss Government of Cuba gvcub 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact emac Government of Qatar gvqat 
Entergy Corp. entergy Government of Saudi Arabia gvsa 
Environmental Protection Agency, United States epaus Government of Sri Lanka gvsl 
Episcopal High School ehs Government of Thailand gvthai 
Equifax equi Government of The Netherlands gvneth 
Ernest N. Morial Convention Center enmcc Governor of Louisiana govla 
Experian esperi Governor of Mississippi govmiss 
Exxon Mobil Corp. exxon Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission gnoec 
Fannie Mae famae Gulf Royal Dutch Shell, PLC shell 
Federal Aviation Administration faa Harrah's New Orleans Casino harah 
Federal Bureau of Investigations fbi Harvy Lincoln Elementary hle 
Federal Communications Commission, United 
States 
fccuss Henry's Kitchen hkit 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. fdic Herb Wallace Fire Station hwfs 
Federal Disaster Mortuary Operational Response 
Team 
fdmort Heritage Foundation herfnd 
Federal Drug Administration, United States fdaus Hibernia National Bank hnb  
Hibernia National Bank Operation Center 
Houston 
hnboch Lamar Dixon Center lamar 
Hibernia National Bank Operation Center 
Shreveport 
hnbocs Latter & Blum Inc. l&b 
Hilton Hotels hilton Legal Council for the Mayor of New Orleans lcmno 
Historic New Orleans Collection hnoc Liberty Bank and Trust lbt 
Home Depot hmdepo Lift lift 
Homeland Security Division of LOHSEP hls Little Sisters of the Poor's Mary Joseph Residence lspmjr 
Houma Courier hc LM Ericsson lme 
Houma Terrebonne Civic Center htcc Louis Armstrong International Airport laia 
House Tax Writing Committee htwc Louis Armstrong International Airport Field Hospital laiafhosp 
Houston Astrodome astro Louisiana Air National Guard laang 
Houston Independent School District hisd Louisiana Arts and Science Center lasc 
Houston's Toyota Center htc Louisiana Associated General Contractors lagc 
Hyatt Hotels hyatt Louisiana Banking Association lba 
Illinois Conservation Police icp Louisiana Bond Commission lbc 
Independent Schools Associations of the 
Southwest 
isas Louisiana Democratic Party ldp 
Institute for Regional Forecasting irf Louisiana Emergency Operations Center leoc 
International Aid intaid Louisiana Gaming Control Board lgcb 
International Business Machines ibm Louisiana Governor's Office of Film and TV lboftv 
International Council of Shopping Centers icsc Louisiana Heart Hospital lhh 
International Longshoreman's Association ila Louisiana High School Athletic Association lhsaa 
Israel Augustine Middle School iams Louisiana Hospital Assocation lha 
J&J Maintenance, Inc. j&j Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus llbc 
JetBlue Airways jetblu Louisiana Legislature laleg 
John Curtis Christian School jccs Louisiana National Guard lang 
Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance jlci Louisiana Notary Association lna 
Kellogg Brown & Root Services kb&r Louisiana Nursing Home Association lnha 
Kentucky Fried Chicken kfc Louisiana Occupational Therapy Association lota 
Kentucky Utility Crew kuc Louisiana Office of Financial Institutions laofi 
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Kenyon International Emergency Services kies Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness 
lohsep 
L.E. Rabouin Career Magnet School lercms Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, Inc. loop 
Lafourche Telephone Company latelco Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office losco 
Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Levee System lphls Louisiana River Pilots Association lrpa 
Lakeland Hospital lakhosp Louisiana Shrimp Association lsa 
Lakeview Regional Medical Center lakrmc Louisiana State Fire Marshal sfm 
Louisiana State Police lsp National Association of the Advancement of Colored People naacp 
Louisiana State University   lsu National Basketball Association nba 
Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors lsubos National Bond Lawyers Association nbla 
Louisiana State University Department of 
Psychiatry 
lsudop National Broadcasting Corporation nbc 
Louisiana State University Health Care Services 
Division 
lsuhcsd National Center for Missing and Exploited Children ncmec 
Louisiana State University Hurricane Center lsuhc National Disaster Medical System ndms 
Louisiana State University Medical Center lsumc National Football League nfl 
Louisiana State University Police Department lsupd National Guard natgd 
Louisiana State University School of Journalism lsusj National Hurricane Center nhc 
Louisiana State University, Manship School for 
Mass Communications 
lsumsmc National Marine Fisheries Service nmfs 
Louisiana Supreme Court lsc National Mortgage Bankers Association nmba 
Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar 
Admissions 
lsccba National Trust for Historic Preservation nthp 
Lowe's lowes National Weather Service nws 
Lt. Governor of Louisiana ltgovla Natural Hazards Research and Applications Center at the 
University of Colorado 
nhrac 
Lutheran High School lhs New Jersey Air National Guard naangd 
LVI Services, Inc lvi New Mexico National Guard nmngd 
MaCann Protective Services macan New Orleans Chamber of Commerce nocc 
Major League Baseball mlb New Orleans Emergency Management System noems 
Mandeville Police Department mpd New Orleans Hornets noh 
Marrero Marrero-Estelle Fire Station marrer New Orleans Metropolitan Convention and Visitors Bureau nomcvb 
Marriott Hotels mariot New Orleans Mission nom 
Mayor of New Orleans mayno New Orleans Museum of Art noma 
Memorial Medical Center mmc New Orleans Saints nos 
Metairie Park Country Day mpcd North Shore Regional Medical Center nsrmc 
Metairie Transit Facility mtf North Shore Square Mall nssm 
Michoud Assembly Facility maf Northrop Grumman Corp. ngc 
Minerals Management Service, United States mmsus Northwest Airlines na 
Moody's moody O. Perry Walker High School opwhs 
Motorola, Inc. motola Ochsner Foundation Clinic ofc 
Ms. Mae's Bar mmb Ochsner Foundation Hospital ofh 
Munters munt Office of Community Services, Louisiana ocsla 
Murphy Oil Corp. murph Office of Councilwoman Jackie Clarkson ocjc 
National Aeronautical and Space Administration nasa Office of Financial Institutions, Louisiana ofila 
National Association of Home Builders Research 
Council 
nahbrc Office of Former President Bush ofpb 
Office of Former President Clinton ofpc Office of US Senator Charles Grassley  
Office of Homeland Security, New Orleans ohsno Office of US Senator Hillary Clinton ouscg 
Office of Management and Budget, United States ombus Office of US Senator Joseph Lieberman oushc 
Office of Senator David Vitter osdv Office of US Senator Max Baucus ousjl 
Office of Senator Harry Reid oshr Ohio National Guard ousmb 
Office of Senator Mary Landrieu osml Operation Life-Line Depot ongd 
Office of State Representative Arthur Morrel osram Oppenheimer & Company olld 
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Office of State Representative Cedric Richmond osrcr Our Lady of Holy Cross College o&c 
Office of State Representative Joe Salter osrjs Our Lady Wisdom Health Care Center olhcc 
Office of State Representative John Alario osrja Owner-Operator Independent Driver's Association olwhcc 
Office of State Representative Nita Hutter osrnh P&O Ports ooida 
Office of State Representative Peppi Bruneau osrpb Papa John's franchise near Rouse's Supermarket p&o 
Office of State Senator Cleo Fields osscf Parish of Ascension, School District papa 
Office of State Senator Craig Romero osscr Parish of Assumption, Police Department parascsd 
Office of State Senator Don Hines ossdh Parish of East Baton Rouge parasupd 
Office of State Senator Edwin Murray ossem Parish of East Baton Rouge, Fire Department parebr 
Office of State Senator Mike Michot ossmm Parish of East Baton Rouge, School Board parebrfd 
Office of State Senator Robert Barhnam ossrb Parish of East Baton Rouge, School District parebrsb 
Office of State Senator Walter Boasso osswb Parish of East Feliciana parebrsd 
Office of the Chief of Staff to the Governor of 
Louisiana 
cosla Parish of Jefferson paref 
Office of the Mayor of Atlanta omatl Parish of Jefferson Emergency Management Agency parjef 
Office of the Mayor of Las Vegas omlv Parish of Jefferson, Clerk of Courts parjefema 
Office of the Mayor of San Francisco omsf Parish of Jefferson, Correctional Center parjefcoc 
Office of the President of the United States potus Parish of Jefferson, District Court parjefcc 
Office of the Vice President of the United States ovpus Parish of Jefferson, Emergency Medical Services parjefdc 
Office of US Representative Bobby Jindal ousrbj Parish of Jefferson, Morgue jefems 
Office of US Representative Charles Rangel ousrcr Parish of Jefferson, Office of the Coroner parjefm 
Office of US Representative Charlie Melancon ousrcm Parish of Jefferson, Office of the Sheriff parjefooc 
Office of US Representative Dennis Hastert ousrdh Parish of Jefferson, School District parjefos 
Office of US Representative Mark Foley ousrmf Parish of Lafayette parjefsd 
Office of US Representative Nancy Pelosi ousrnp Parish of Lafayette, School District parlaf 
Office of US Representative Peter King ousrpk Parish of Lafourche parlafsd 
Office of US Representative Thomas Tancredo ousrtt Parish of Orleans parlafo 
Office of US Representative William Jefferson ousrwj Parish of Orleans Prison paror  
Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court parorcdd Parish of St. Tammany, Public Works Department parstpwd 
Parish of Orleans, Communications District parorcd Parish of St. Tammany, School District parstsd 
Parish of Orleans, Levee District parorld Parish of Tangipahoa partan 
Parish of Orleans, Office of the Coroner paroroc Parish of Terrebonne parter 
Parish of Orleans, Recorder of Mortgages parorrm Parish of Washington parwas 
Parish of Orleans, Register of Conveyances parorrc Parish of West Baton Rouge wbr 
Parish of Orleans, School District parorsd Pete Maravich Center Field Hospital pmcfh 
Parish of Plaquemines parpla Pinnacle Entertainment pinnacl 
Parish of Plaquemines Emergency Management 
Agency 
parplaema Port of Galveston portg 
Parish of Plaquemines, Office of the Sheriff parplaos Port of New Orleans portno 
Parish of Plaquemines, School District parplasd Professional Golf Association pga 
Parish of St. Bernard parsb Public Service Commission, Louisiana pscla 
Parish of St. Bernard Emergency Management 
Agency 
parsbema Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service races 
Parish of St. Bernard, Fire Department parsbfd Rainbow/PUSH push 
Parish of St. Bernard, Office of the Coroner parsboc Reality Executives Integrity First Real Estate reifre 
Parish of St. Bernard, Office of the Sheriff parsbos Regional Assistance Center for the County of St. Louis, 
Missiouri 
raccstlm 
Parish of St. Bernard, Police Department parsbpd Regional Transit Authority rta 
Parish of St. Bernard, Port, Harbor and Terminal 
District 
parsbphtd Regions Bank regbnk 
Parish of St. Bernard, School District parsbsd Ridgewood Preparatory School rps 
Parish of St. Charles parsc Risk Management Solutions, Inc. rms 
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Parish of St. Charles, School District parscsd Royal Sonesta Hotel rsh 
Parish of St. Gabriel, Morgue parsgm Salem Lutheran School sls 
Parish of St. James, School District parsjsd Salvation Army salvarm 
Parish of St. John the Baptist parstjo Sarah T. Reed High School strhs 
Parish of St. John the Baptist, School District parbsd Second Harvest Food Bank shfb 
Parish of St. John, School District parsjosd Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs 
schsga 
Parish of St. Tammany parst Senate Finance Committee sfc 
Parish of St. Tammany Council parstc ServiceMaster sm 
Parish of St. Tammany, Assessment Office parstao Shelter in Corpus Christi Texas scct 
Parish of St. Tammany, Clerk of Courts parstcc Sheraton Hotels sheraton 
Parish of St. Tammany, Emergency Operations 
Center 
parsteoc Slidell Memorial Hospital smhosp 
Parish of St. Tammany, Office of Emergency 
Preparedness 
parstoep SMG smg 
Parish of St. Tammany, Office of the Sheriff parstos Social Security Administration, United States ssa 
Parish of St. Tammany, Police Department parstpd South Carolina National Guard scngd  
South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Assocation sleca The Spirit of America soa 
Southeastern Motor Freight smf The WorkSource work 
Southern Baptist Volunteers sbv Tiger Athletic Foundation tiger 
Southern Methodist University smu Times-Picayune tp 
Southgate Towers st TJC Engineering, Inc. tjc 
Southwest Airlines swa Touro Infirmary touro 
Southwinds Motel swm Town of Grand Isle twngi 
Sports Authority sa Town of Grand Isle Police Department twngipd 
Sprint Wireless sprint Town of Jean Lafitte twjela 
St. Charles Parish Hospital scphosp TransUnion transunion 
St. Martin's Episcopal School stmes Treasure Chest Casino tcc 
St. Rita's Nursing Home strita Truman Middle School tms 
St. Tammany Parish Home Builders Association stphba Tulane National Primate Research Center tnprc 
St. Tammany Parish Hospital stparhosp Tulane University tu 
St. Ville Elementary Library svel U.S. Joint Forces Command:  Standing Joint Forces 
Headquarters 
sjfhq 
St. Vincent de Paul Society svps United Airlines ua 
Standard & Poor s&p United States Army usarmy 
State Farm Insurance sfi United States Army:  Logistics Readiness Center lrc 
State of Arkansas arkansas United States Coast Guard uscg 
State of Louisiana LA United States Congress uscon 
State of Mississippi Emergency Operations 
Center 
misseoc United States Customs Agency usca 
State of Texas texas United States Defense Mapping Agency usdma 
Stella Worley Middle School swmc United States Fish & Wildlife Service usfws 
Stennis Space Center ssc United States Geological Survey, St. Petersburg Laboratory usgsspl 
Sunshine Garden Health Food Store in Covington sghfs United States Marine Corps usmc 
SuperDome sd United States Navy usnav 
Superdome Commission sdcom United States Post Office uspost 
Sylvanie F. Williams School sfws United States Public Health Service usphs 
Tenet Healthcare Corp. tenet United States Secret Service ussec 
Terrytown 5th District Volunteer Fire 
Department 
tdvfd United States Senate ussen 
Texas National Guard tngd University of Memphis um 
Texas Workforce Commission twc University of Southern Mississippi usm 
The Humane Society human Urban League urban 
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The Shaw Group, Inc shaw Verizon Wireless verizon 
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster: 
Louisina Chapter 
voad 
W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Co. wgy&s 
Waffle House near Covington waffle 
Wal-Mart walmrt 
Wal-Mart (Tchoupitoulas Street) walmrtts 
Walter P. Moore & Assoc. wpm&a 
WAPT – TV wapttv 
Warren Easton Fundamental High School wefhs 
Washington - St. Tammany Electric Cooperative wstec 
WBRZ – TV wbrztv 
WDSU – TV wdsutv 
West Jefferson General Hospital wjfhosp 
West Jefferson Medical Center wjmc 
Western Union west 
Westwego Alario Center westweg 
WGNO – TV wgnotv 
Whole Foods whole 
William Franz School wfs 
Winn-Dixie's Riverside Market Place windix 
WVUE – TV wvuetv 
WWL – TV wwltv 
Zephyr Field Field Hospital zephyr 
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